Rig-Veda, vii. 35. 4.
104 Dînâ-î-Maînôg-î Khirad xv. 3.
105 de Groot, Religious System of China (vol. iv. book) ii. 435.
106 Genesis, xviii. 32.
107 Robertson Smith, Religion of the Semites, p. 424, n. 1.
108 Lane, Modern Egyptians, pp. 247, 248, 532. Sell, op. cit. pp. 242, 278, 287, 288, 298. Cf. Wallin, Första Resa från Cairo till Arabiska öknen, p. 103.
109 Harnack, History of Dogma, ii. 133, n. 3.
For the explanation of these and similar facts various circumstances have to be considered. Good deeds may be so pleasing to a god as to induce him to forgive the sins of the wicked in accordance with the rule that anger yields to joy. There is solidarity not only between members of the same family, but between members of the same social unit; hence the virtues of individuals may benefit the whole community to which they belong. The Catholic theologian argues that, since we are all regenerated unto Christ by being washed in the same baptism, made partakers of the same sacraments, and, especially, of the same meat and drink, the body and blood of Christ, we are all members of the same body. “As, then, the foot does not perform its functions solely for itself, but also for the benefit of the eyes; and as the eyes exercise their sight, not for their own, but for the common benefit of all the members; so should works of satisfaction be deemed common to all the members of the Church.”110 Moreover, virtues, like sins, are believed to be in a material way transferable. In Upper Bavaria, when a dead person is laid out, a cake of flour is placed on his breast in order to absorb the virtues of the deceased, whereupon the cake is eaten by the nearest relatives.111 And we are told that, in a certain district in the north of England, if a child is brought to the font at the same time as a body is committed to the ground, whatever was “good” in the deceased person is supposed to be transferred to the little child, since God does not allow any “goodness” to be buried and lost to the world, and such “goodness” is most likely to enter a little child coming to the sacrament of Baptism.112 A blessing, also, no less than a curse, is looked upon in the light of material energy; goodness is not required for the acquisition of it, mere contact will do. Blessings are hereditary:—“The just man walketh in his integrity: his children are blessed after him.”113
110 Catechism of the Council of Trent, ii. 5. 72.
111 Am Urquell, ii. 101.
112 Peacock, ‘Executed Criminals and Folk-Medicine,’ in Folk-Lore, vii. 280.
113 Proverbs, xx. 7.
It is no doubt more becoming for a god to pardon the sinner on account of the merits of the virtuous, than to punish the innocent for the sins of the wicked. It shows that his compassion overcomes his wrath; and the mercy of the deity is, among all divine attributes, that on which the higher monotheistic religions lay most stress. Allah said, “Whoso doth one good act, for him are ten rewards, and I also give more to whomsoever I will; and whoso doth ill, its retaliation is equal to it, or else I forgive him.”114 Nevertheless, the moral consciousness of a higher type can hardly approve that the wicked should be pardoned for the sake of the virtuous, or that the reward for an act should be bestowed upon anybody else than the agent. The doctrine of vicarious merit or recompense is not just; it involves that badness is unduly ignored; it is based on crude ideas of goodness and merit. The theory of opera supererogativa, as we have seen, attaches badness and goodness to external acts rather than to mental facts, and assumes that reparation can be given for badness, whereas the scrutinising moral judge only forgives badness in case it is superseded by repentance. If thus a bad act cannot be compensated by a good one, even though both be performed by one and the same person, it can still less be compensated by the good act of another man. From various quarters we hear protests against the notion of vicarious merit—protests which emphasise the true direction of moral reward. Ezekiel, who reproved the old idea that the children’s teeth are set on edge because the fathers have eaten sour grapes, also taught that a wicked son is to reap no benefit from the blessings bestowed upon a righteous father.115 “Fear the day,” says the Koran, “wherein no soul shall pay any recompense for another soul.”116 The Buddhistic Dhammapada contains the following passage, which sums up our whole argument:—“By oneself the evil is done, by oneself one suffers; by oneself evil is left undone, by oneself one is purified. The pure and the impure stand and fall by themselves, no one can purify another.”117
114 Lane-Poole, Speeches and Table-Talk of Mohammad, p. 147.
115 Ezekiel, xviii. 5 sqq.
116 Koran, ii. 44.
117 Dhammapada, xii. 165.
CHAPTER IV
THE NATURE OF THE MORAL EMOTIONS (concluded)
WE have seen that moral disapproval is a form of resentment, and that moral approval is a form of retributive kindly emotion. It still remains for us to examine in what respects these emotions differ from kindred non-moral emotions—disapproval from anger and revenge, approval from gratitude—in other words, what characterises them as specifically moral emotions.
It is a common opinion, held by all who regard the intellect as the source of moral concepts, that moral emotions only arise in consequence of moral judgments, and that, in each case, the character of the emotion is determined by the predicate of the judgment. We are told that, when the intellectual process is completed, when the act in question is definitely classed under such or such a moral category, then, and only then, there follows instantaneously a feeling of either approbation or disapprobation as the case may be.1 When we hear of a murder, for instance, we must discern the wrongness of the act before we can feel moral indignation at it.