tendency toward a general pneumatology is the result of a pneumatological expansionism which occurred during the early-modern period and resulted in disparate, vaguely pneumatized outlooks within disciplines ranging from metaphysics to physical sciences to history.46 Though Hegel likely falls both within Hinlicky’s category of “general pneumatology” and Radner’s portrayal of “pneumatological expansionism,” he differs from predecessors such as Gottfried W. Leibniz47 in one key respect—while philosophers such as Leibniz drew from the Lutheran tradition at-large, Hegel was directly influenced by Luther’s writings alone. Indeed, there is a discernible difference in how pneumatology is incorporated within the grand philosophical system of Hegel, even to the extent that the Spirit undergirds his entire corpus. In this regard, it can be persuasively argued that he was an ardent disciple of Luther.
Karl Barth once proclaimed that though Hegel was known primarily as a philosopher, his foremost desire was theological: to be the Protestant Aquinas.48 This claim is echoed by Robert C. Solomon who states that Hegel’s “Christian ambitions, however unorthodox, [are] the very heart of his philosophy.”49 This is readily evident in the breadth of Hegel’s engagement with Geist, a concept informing his metaphysics, understanding of history, conception of human progress, and, implicitly, his entire philosophical outlook. It is most comprehensively delineated in Phänomenologie des Geistes, and Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion (VPR).50 Though Geist is understood differently in these two works, the importance of Hegel vis-à-vis this essay is his explicit affinity for Luther’s pneumatology. In this regard, Hegel believed that he was “more Lutheran than Lutherans,” insofar as he believed that Lutheranism had “become a pale reflection of its former self, especially with respect to the power of the Spirit undergirding Luther’s passionate and imaginative theological assertions.”51 To this end, Alan M. Olson posits that Hegel had an “instinctive appreciation of Luther’s dialectical conception of the Holy Spirit,”52 from which he structured his own pneumatology. Hence, J.M. Fritzman rightly characterizes Hegel’s theological-philosophy as “largely a radicalization of Luther’s.”53
At this juncture, one might ask: what pneumatological commonalities with Luther can be observed in Hegel? At least three exist: (1) the priority of the Holy Spirit in elucidating the Trinity; (2) an emphasis placed upon the linguistic mediation of the Spirit; and (3) the “incarnational” aspect of Luther’s pneumatology as it relates to personal and communal unity with God. Concerning the first item, it was previously noted that Luther inverted the order of the Trinity in his Large Catechism to mirror the experience of the believer. As a reader of Luther, Hegel extended this inversion and speculatively reimagined his Trinitarian framework “from the concept of God as Spirit.”54 This is evident in his 1821 manuscript of VPR, where he states that “God is spirit—that which we call the triune God.”55 This pneumatological priority is noteworthy, as similar to Luther, the Trinity is central to Hegel’s worldview. In fact, Dale Schlitt argues that without the doctrine of the Trinity, Hegel’s categories of history of the world, principle of freedom, and true religion all cease to be coherent.56 Though there is some uncertainty as to how far Hegel removes the notion of personhood from the Trinity,57 and for that matter, “being” itself from the Trinity,58 Olson aptly notes that Luther’s catechetical instruction was highly formative for Hegel, both for his doctrine of the Trinity and his philosophical corpus as a whole.59
Second, Luther’s insistence on the Spirit’s mediation of Christ through the preached Word is reworked in Hegel’s emphasis on the linguistic mediation of Geist.60 This is most readily observed in First Philosophy of Spirit, where Hegel asserts that “language is the first and primary manifestation (or potency, as he puts it, emulating Schelling) of Spirit separating itself from ‘air’ as its primal element and positing itself as speech.”61 This emphasis of both Hegel and Luther may be contrasted with Melanchthon’s understanding of the spoken word as primarily testifying to salvific work—a linkage which Powell claims “did not loom large in Hegel’s thought.”62 As a note, Hegel’s (and Luther’s) emphasis on the Spirit’s linguistic mediation will be revisited when discussing Karl Rahner.
Third, Luther’s parallel of God in Christ with the Holy Spirit in the Christian—V-M. Kärkkäinen’s posited “incarnational” language in Luther’s pneumatology—is incorporated into Hegel’s expansive panentheism63 Unlike Luther, Hegel articulates Geist (and God) as not a Creator apart from the creation, but rather, a substance permeating the created order.64 This extensive presence of Geist extends to human individuals in history via the historical event of the Incarnation. For Hegel, the unification of the divine and human in the historical Jesus de-particularized the incarnation (and the Holy Spirit), and thus, universalized both the possibility of unification of these natures and the Incarnation itself for all human agents.65 Although the notion of Hegel’s universal incarnation would be anathema to Luther, Hegel’s emphasis on unity with the Divine certainly resembles both the mystical language present in Luther’s early writings and Mannermaa’s Finnish interpretation of Luther. Moreover, other assertions of Hegel regarding the Incarnation event, such as it being the moment of God’s self-revelation,66 are exactly in tandem with Luther’s positions. Evidence of Hegel’s close-reading of Luther’s “unity language” is also apparent in his description of communal unity, where he posits—in agreement with Luther—that the mark of the hurch is the “indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the gathered community.”67 Additionally, Hegel borrowed Luther’s understanding of the Spirit’s work as the Agent who “calls, gathers, enlightens, and sanctifies” the Body of Christ.68 For all of the above reasons, in some strange way, Hegel was as he claimed to be, “more Lutheran than Lutherans.”
Several decades after Hegel (1770–1831), an extraordinary pneumatologically-shaped historical development arose in the work and theology of Roman Catholic theologian Karl Rahner (1904–1984). What was extraordinary was not merely the novel content of Rahner’s theology. Instead, the adage of fashion (or history!) repeating itself every so often was transposed to the sphere of theology and manifestly exhibited in modern Catholic theology. Perhaps stranger than Hegel’s “Lutheran-ness,” the pneumatology of the rabble-rouser Luther—an individual who casually called the Pope the “Antichrist”—heavily influenced Rahner’s theology due to his appropriation of Hegelian philosophy. It is to this striking development that we now turn.
Lutheran Hegelianism in Karl Rahner
Rahner’s theological career could have ended before it started when he failed to defend his first dissertation (Geist in Welt) in 1936.69 But Rahner, despite that initial difficulty, went on to produce a staggering literary output. He also made immense contributions to Vatican II, and concretized his legacy as the foremost Catholic theologian of the twentieth century.70 Relevant to this essay, Rahner marked a decisive shift in theological scholarship as he sought to recapture the centrality of Trinitarian concerns in popular discourse. Like Luther, Rahner’s Trinitarian framework undergirded his theological program, yet unlike Luther, he spent extensive time explicitly articulating this framework via logic and speculative philosophy. Indeed, outside of Catholic circles, he is best known for a statement known as Rahner’s Rule: “The ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity.”71 His Trinitarian commitments are most clearly delineated in The Trinity and Foundations of the Christian Faith. However, most of his corpus engages the Trinity and does so in a manner bearing a striking resemblance to what may be called “Lutheran Hegelianism.” This kinship is so evident that Olson argues that Rahner’s masterworks are inconceivable apart from Hegel’s influence.72
Aside from Trinitarian commitments, there are three additional commonalities between Rahner and Lutheran Hegelianism: (1) a healthy Christology that supports a robust pneumatology; (2) an emphasis on the linguistic mediation of the Spirit; and (3) the universalization of the Spirit. Concerning the first item, one must examine Rahner’s doctrine of the Trinity. Specifically, Rahner refers to the Trinity as the “self-communicating” God. In this conception of the Trinity, the Father serves as the eternal “mystery of God,” while both the Son and the Spirit serve as the one communication of God.73 One important note: though the Trinity is the framework of Rahner’s theology, it is the Incarnation that serves as its historical referent. Hence, the notion