of all four ultimate types: formally considered, this is what Marion claims transpires in the case of divine revelation.15 Although Marion appropriates Dionysian apophatic and mystical theology in several ways, the one I wish to highlight momentarily is the way in which one aspect of mystical union with God seems to involve a cognitive and epistemic condition in which there is an absence of “vision,” due to an excess, rather than deficiency, of “light.”16 There is an obvious, structural isomorphism between Dionysius’s conception of the aspect of mystical union just cited and Marion’s conception of divine revelation understood as a saturated phenomenon. Might it be that Dionysius’s conception of mystical union is what clued Marion to conceptualizing divine revelation in terms of a saturated phenomenon?17 But what if Dionysius’s conception of mystical union in fact hinges upon prior metaphysical convictions and reflections on the divine nature, convictions that would apparently be implicated by Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics: for instance, the line of thought concluding to the view that God remains incomprehensible because God’s reality is excessively hyper-essential/hyper-ontological?18
Although the issues above remain beyond the scope of the present project, part of the larger question raised by this project is that of discerning the particular, defining structure, rationale(s) and internal “logic” that underwrite the family of claims that typically seem to be part and parcel of any given negative theology: God is ineffable, incomprehensible, and so forth. In this broader context, it seems fair to ask the following sorts of questions: How extreme can an apophasis and negative theology be without the kinds of metaphysical convictions that are operative in and constitutive of the respective reflections of Plotinus and Dionysius?19 Conversely, are there, for example, ineluctable limitations to the deployment of any post-Heideggerian (or otherwise) phenomenological methodology attempting to avoid ontotheology? If so, would—and how would—those limitations constrain the kind and degree of negative and apophatic claims offered on strictly phenomenological bases?
Consider the following example: If, as Marion and Dionysius both seem to believe, an encounter with God—whether by way of divine revelation or mystical union—results in a cognitive and epistemic condition analogous to blindness which disallows the constitution of knowledge, and if that cognitive and epistemic condition is supposed to be due to an “excess” of God’s reality (or intuitive givenness, to use a phenomenological term), rather than a deficiency of some kind, then how would one have any independent means to actually determine whether that cognitive and epistemic state is in fact the consequence of excess rather than lack? It is not immediately clear how Marion would have the means to answer this question, at least based on what he has presented thus far.20 In Dionysius’s case, he would have recourse to the metaphysical and explanatory line of thought that concludes to the view that God’s reality is indeed excessively superabundant and hyper-essential/hyper-ontological.21
I believe that part of what makes the apophasis and negative theology of figures such as Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius so rich and sophisticated are the convictions and lines of thought that involve, entail, and/or constitute metaphysical explanation. Therefore, on the very broadest of levels, a key component of the task of the present project is to exhibit the way(s) in which such convictions and lines of thought contribute to the richness and sophistication of Plotinian and Dionysian apophases and negative theologies, inasmuch as they comprise an essential element of the structure, rationale and internal “logic” of those apophases and negative theologies. That is also to say, one of the aims of this study is to articulate and display, in the cases of both Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius, the integrity of the relationships between apophasis as deployed in metaphysical explanation and apophasis as deployed in the service of mystical union, and by implication, the integrity of the relationship(s) between metaphysical explanation and mystical union.
To be sure, the significance of the relationship between Plotinus and Dionysius—at least for the purposes of this project—lies in the systematic and conceptual connections between their respective apophases and negative theologies. On the one hand, to my knowledge, there is no explicit, direct historical evidence definitively supporting the view that Dionysius read either the Enneads or Porphyry’s biographical essay on the life of Plotinus.22 On the other hand, there is at least one metaphor that both Plotinus and Dionysius deploy as a conceptual model: both employ a sculpting metaphor in order to illustrate by analogy the practice of aphairesis—that is to say, the practice of denial understood, among other things, in terms of subtraction.23 Historically speaking, the figure whose thought links Plotinus and Dionysius is Proclus, from whom Dionysius seems to appropriate several Neoplatonic conceptualities.
Why, then, go back to Plotinus? Well, again for the purposes of this project, there are several reasons. First, historically speaking, Plotinus can arguably be understood to be the first thinker who deploys apophasis in such a systematic, philosophically-nuanced, and relentless manner, and therefore is a key figure for any student hoping to understand and appreciate apophasis and negative theology. Second, like Dionysius, Plotinus employs apophasis and negative theology in two ways: more narrowly in the service of metaphysical explanation, and more broadly as a means of preparing the soul for mystical union. Third, Plotinus’s pagan Neoplatonic, apophasis and negative theology serve as a fascinating and fruitful point of contrast with that of Dionysius, who takes himself to be articulating a specifically Christian logos.
Finally, I would like to add a few, brief remarks about the fruit and contribution of the present study. First and perhaps foremost, I believe that the present analysis of the deep structure and internal “logic” of both Plotinian and Dionysian apophases and negative theologies will provide illuminating and probing ways of understanding and evaluating the kinds of, and ways in which, apophasis and negative theology are deployed in various philosophical, theological, and religious contexts, including those of modern and contemporary philosophy and theology, such as in the case of Jean-Luc Marion.
Second, the interpretations of Plotinus and Dionysius elucidated in this study submit fresh and freshly illuminating ways of understanding their respective apophases: for example, the kind of metaphysical reading propounded exhibits facets of the structure and internal “logic” of Plotinian and Dionysian apophasis that a consideration of each thinker’s epistemology and/or negative language alone would not accomplish.
Third, this book intends to fill the following gap in scholarship: there has been no sustained examination in the secondary literature comparing and contrasting the negative theologies of Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius, two important historical figures whose texts have been significant for various areas of research in philosophy, theology, and religion: e.g., classical conceptions of God in late antiquity and the middle ages, as well as more recent philosophers and/or theologians whose work may build on or distance themselves from Plotinus’s view of the One or Dionysius’s view of God. Given the varying conceptions of divine simplicity in Plotinus and Dionysius, as well as the distinctive senses of their uses of the language of negation and denial in light of those conceptions, the present study might be used to raise further questions, for instance, concerning the types of models of divine aseity and divine simplicity conceptualized by Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure, Meister Eckhart, and Nicholas of Cusa. Likewise, these metaphysical considerations may well have fascinating systematic consequences for understanding their respective conceptions of union with God, considered in via or in the eschaton.24 Take as a momentary example, the thought of Meister Eckhart. While Eckhart was clearly influenced by Pseudo-Dionysius—and as a well-accepted commonplace, Proclus as well—there may be reasons to consider the view that in some important respects his apophasis bears a strong, systematic “family” resemblance to what I take to be Plotinus’s radical deployment of apophasis.
In addition, the interpretations of Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius presented might be utilized more broadly to shed further light upon the complex relations not only between non-Christian and Christian Neoplatonism in late antiquity, but also between late-antique Platonism and late patristic theology.
Fourth, the kind of metaphysical reading of Dionysius presented might be employed to apply a bit of critical pressure to those interpretations which take him to have thoroughly domesticated whatever Neoplatonic conceptualities he has appropriated, presumably in the service of Christian doctrine and praxis. This study shows how Dionysius’s adoption of certain Proclean conceptualities bear