relation.
Finally, the explication and conceptual analysis of the cognitive and trans-cognitive practices of negation and denial in Plotinus and Dionysius might profitably serve as the basis for other historical and/or contemporary research in the areas of mysticism and mystical theology, such as for example the epistemological and/or philosophical-/theological-anthropological implications of such practices. In addition, the present study may serve as a resource for contributions to discussions concerning the rapprochement between certain forms of mysticism/mystical theology and contemporary philosophy/theology.25
Having addressed the basic motives of this study, the general approach it takes, as well as its potential contributions, we can proceed to layout the structure of the book. Broadly speaking, the book is divided into two parts. The first part consists of three chapters, and is an examination of Plotinus’s apophasis and negative theology as it relates to his understanding of the One. The second part consists of four chapters, and is an examination of Pseudo-Dionysius’s apophasis and negative/mystical theology as it relates to his understanding of God. In each case, I exhibit the richness and sophistication of Plotinus’s and Dionysius’s apophatic theology by articulating its deep structure and internal “logic” in two respects: first, those metaphysical and explanatory lines of thought which generate and sustain the requirement for negative statements concerning the One (Plotinus) or God (Dionysius); and second, the broader context in which negation functions in cognitive and trans-cognitive ways to prepare and enable the soul for an eventual union with the One or with God. However, while there are similarities between the apophases and negative theologies of Plotinus and Dionysius, the respective analyses do not consequently produce the same results.
In Plotinus’s case, I show why and how I judge Plotinian apophasis and negative theology to be perhaps the most extreme and “radical” of such practices. Correlative to the two respects identified above—metaphysical explanation and mystical union—there are two respects in which I characterize Plotinian apophasis and negative theology as “radical” and “extreme.” First, Plotinus’s convictions about the unusual metaphysical status of the One as absolutely simple and absolutely independent ultimately lead him to the following conclusion: the most appropriate way of understanding the One—which is to say, the way that acknowledges the peculiar and unique reality of the One—is to conceive of the One as utterly disconnected from and unrelated to everything else produced by it. In effect, Plotinus is asking his audience to sever the very relations that permit one to regressively reason back to the One so as to establish it as the unconditioned condition of all else. Second, with respect to mystical union, Plotinus argues that in order for the soul to prepare itself for union with the One, it must cease from all noetic activity, and, as Plotinus adamantly exhorts, “Take away everything!”26
In Dionysius’s case, I begin by showing how the kinds of metaphysical intuitions, convictions, and lines of thought operative in Plotinus’s negative theology function to generate apophasis. Unlike Plotinus, who is explicitly working to present a philosophical account of reality, Dionysius’s stated theological task is to properly interpret the biblical symbols of God in light of God’s reality. On the supposition that Dionysius appropriates several Proclean, metaphysical and explanatory conceptualities, I show that there is good reason to conclude that the priority Dionysius ultimately gives to divine unity suggests that the persons of the Trinity are themselves derivative, divine differentiations that proceed from an undifferentiated divine ground. This implies therefore that there is not only an apophasis correlative to the God–world relation, but also perhaps another, yet “deeper,” more extreme apophasis correlative to, and required by, the relationship between the trinitarian persons and that undifferentiated divine ground. With regard to mystical union, I exhibit the way in which the ordered denial of aphairesis functions anagogically as a necessary but not sufficient condition preparing the soul for union with God.
In chapter 1, I establish a framework from within which to understand the demand for apophasis with respect to the One: the conceptual milieu of Plotinian apophasis. I propose that it is ultimately the unique metaphysical status of the One that leads Plotinus to make such radical negations. In order to understand how the demand for apophasis with respect to the One is initially generated, I present the basic structure of dependence in Plotinus’s view of reality, discussing two key metaphysical conceptualities: first, the notion of participation understood as non-reciprocal likeness and dependence; and second, a constituent ontology, according to which an entity is dependent upon and thus explained by its constituent parts. Given Plotinus’s explanatory framework and its demands, the conclusion is that only what is absolutely simple can be absolutely independent, so as to function explanatorily as that which ultimately accounts for everything else: The One. A further implication is that that which ultimately accounts for everything else—i.e., the One—will also be “outside” of or beyond being. In the next section, I explain that the need to say something about the One derives from the explanatory role that it must play as the source and ground of everything else. I conclude by suggesting that Plotinus’s statements concerning the One are context-sensitive and have more than one functional role to play in his thought.
In section 1.4, I pick up the theme of the concluding suggestion in the previous paragraph, sketching the ways in which the project of metaphysical explanation—as a subset of rational discourse about the One—serves the ultimate goal of the preparing the soul for union with the One. Presenting the broader context enables us to do two things. First, we see that Plotinus’s philosophical project of metaphysical explanation, while an end in itself, also serves the ultimate goal of mystical union. Second, we see the way in which Plotinus’s statements concerning the One can function with a view to explanation as well as with a view to motivating his audience to pursue union with the One. I conclude the first chapter by explaining why Plotinus believes that it is necessary for the soul to move beyond rational discourse, reasoned knowledge, and noetic awareness: for the soul to be involved in rational discourse, reasoned knowledge, and noetic awareness is for the soul to be in an epistemic and ontological condition of multiplicity. In order for the soul to become united to the One, it must transcend that condition of multiplicity, by becoming like unto the One—i.e., it must become more simple.
The bulk of chapter 2 is devoted to an analysis of various types of representative statements concerning the One. The aim of the analysis is not only to properly understand Plotinus’s statements about the One, but also to show the various ways in which Plotinus would have the reader understand his statements and hence his conception of the One in exclusively negative terms. In the first section, I examine the inherent limitations of discourse and knowledge with respect to the One. I examine in some detail a passage in which Plotinus suggests that even negative discourse is finally inadequate to representing the One: indeed, that the very structure of discourse itself disqualifies it from reflecting the simplicity of the One. Plotinus presents another kind of analysis, which exhibits the inherent limitations of knowledge with respect to the One. In section 2.2, I discuss the basic structure of Plotinus’s view of knowledge based on the eternal Forms, and the implications of that view where the One is at issue. Heuristically deploying the concepts of extension and intension, the basic purpose of the analysis is to show the epistemic and semantic consequences of that appropriation. I indicate a few of the problems raised by Plotinus’s adoption of the Platonic conceptuality of participation. I suggest that perhaps statements that appear to predicate some attribute of the One ought to be understood in terms of an identity statement in which the predicate functions like a name: for example, “the One is the ultimate source and principle of the instantiated property fx.” Even if this is the case, there remains the question of how one ought to understand the notions of principle and source.
I proceed in section 2.3 to examine the difficulties of naming the One, taking as representative cases, the designations Plotinus seems most often to use: “the Good” and “the One.” At issue, again, are the extension and intension of the name “the Good.” I offer the two following conclusions about the name “the Good.” First, by “the Good,” Plotinus would have his audience understand that the Good is the ultimate source and cause of goodness in entities. Second, as odd as it may appear at that point in the analysis, Plotinus believes that it is less appropriate to think and speak of the Good in ways which are relative to any of its products than to attempt to think and speak the Good itself.