target="_blank" rel="nofollow" href="#ulink_955df7b5-05e8-5141-84f0-7b24c6dea259">20. The difficulty I note here is complicated by the fact that Marion—according to a statement that he had yet to actually write a theology (in a 2004 conference devoted to his work at the University of Notre Dame)—has yet to explicitly present in detail his phenomenological clarification and elucidation of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ in the context of a dogmatic, Christian theology (rather than say, in the context of his philosophical-phenomenological reflections).
21. Let me be clear about a couple of possible ramifications of my point here. I am not claiming that phenomenology is of no benefit, whether philosophically or theologically considered. On the contrary, I hold to the view that phenomenology is a beneficial philosophical and theological tool of analysis. However, I do question the possible limitations that a strictly phenomenological methodology might or would impose on any given apophasis and negative theology. Might it be that Barth is the wiser for eschewing the explicit deployment of what he takes to be any philosophical conceptuality—and the ramifications one would thereby be committed to—external to the theological boundaries established by and grounded in his view of divine revelation? Might it furthermore be the case that divine revelation, as Barth sees it, is not so easily susceptible and amenable to phenomenological analysis and clarification as Marion would have it? Like von Balthasar and Rahner, perhaps Marion’s Roman Catholic, theological commitments bear upon his view of the relationship between phenomenology and divine revelation, and between nature and grace.
22. See Plotinus, Enneads, trans. A. H. Armstrong, 7 vols.
23. For Plotinus, see Ennead I.6.9. Plotinus, Enneads, I.6.9: 259. For Dionysius, see The Mystical Theology. Pseudo-Dionysius, The Mystical Theology in Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, chapter 2, 1025A–1025B: 138. Although this commonality cannot be used—outside of further evidence—to show that Dionysius was somehow directly influenced by Plotinus, it can be used to identify the likely influence of Pythagorean philosophy upon both Plotinus and Dionysius.
24. In the case of Aquinas, rather than union with God, we may want to speak eschatologically of the beatific vision (or depending upon one’s understanding of Aquinas’s view of the consummation of creation and human being, perhaps of union and/or deification).
25. For examples of the genre, please see the following texts: The Mystical Element in Heidegger’s Thought, Forms of Transcendence, Indiscretion, and more recently, Martin Heidegger and Meister Eckhardt: A Path Towards Gelassenheit. Respectively: (1) Caputo, The Mystical Element. (2) Sikka, Forms of Transcendence. (3) Carlson, Indiscretion. (4) Dalle Pezze, Martin Heidegger.
26. Ennead V.3.17. Plotinus, Enneads, trans. Armstrong, Volume 5, 135.
27. Ennead VI.8.8. Plotinus, Enneads, trans. Armstrong, Volume 7, 251–53.
28. See Pseudo-Dionysius, Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works.
Part I
Plotinus on the Absolutely Simple One
Chapter 1
Plotinus’s Weltanschauung
and the Conceptual Milieu
for Plotinian Apophasis
Over the next three chapters, I present the salient features of Plotinus’s negative theology, an apophasis that, in certain respects, I take to be the most extreme case of such practices.29 I hope to sketch an interpretation of Plotinian negative theology that articulates the deepest reasons why Plotinus emphasizes that we can neither say, name, think, nor know the One. There are, to be sure, numerous hermeneutical keys that one might employ in explicating Plotinian negative theology. One could, for example, analyze Plotinus’s statements concerning the One in terms of their specific grammatical, semantic, and linguistic features.30 Or perhaps one may wish to argue that Plotinus’s negations and denials issue from some phenomenological characteristic(s)—or lack thereof—of the mystical experience of the One: for example, the ineffability of the experience itself.31 One could certainly adduce passages in support of such readings. To do so, however, would occlude the deeper reasons which motivate Plotinus to make such radically negative claims where the One is at issue. So, for any examination of Plotinian negative theology, while it is necessary to take account of mystical union with the One, and of the language and grammar of Plotinus’s statements, it is also necessary to understand something of the basic, metaphysical structure of Plotinus’s view of reality. For it is ultimately the unique and peculiar metaphysical status of the One—including the relationship between the One and its sequents—that leads Plotinus to make such radical negations. Only in this context, therefore, can we begin to understand the content and function of such negative statements in Plotinus’s thought.
It is ultimately the explanatory role that the One, or the Good, plays in Plotinus’s cosmological, metaphysical scheme—as the unconditioned condition of all things not itself—that generates the series of denials/negations with respect to the One: specifically, it is Plotinus’s conception of the One’s radical, undomesticated aseity/independence that impels such denials and negations. Plotinus’s way of giving a philosophical account of reality, however, is situated in a concrete context defined by many factors: among other things, his self-understanding as a follower and faithful interpreter of Plato; his own life experience; and his disagreements with philosophers whom he regards as wrongly holding views opposed to that of Plato.32 While these facts are well worth acknowledging, for the purposes of the present project, I want to avoid posing questions concerning the genesis of Plotinus’s conception of the One.33 In so doing, I want to delimit the scope of examination by treating only of the particular role that the One plays in Plotinus’s reflections, and thereupon, deal with Plotinus’s statements concerning the One.
With the above comments in place, the order of exposition will be as follows. In chapter 1, I establish the fundamental conceptual context from within which Plotinian apophasis with respect to the One is generated: first, the basic metaphysical structure of dependence; second, the tripartite structure of “higher” reality; and finally, the broader context in which rational discourse about the One functions not only to explain but also to enable the soul to begin a process eventuating in mystical union with the One. In chapter 2, I analyze in some detail Plotinus’s statements concerning the One. The task of this chapter is first of all to understand Plotinus’s statements and his conception of the One. Here, understanding Plotinus’s metaphysical and explanatory project provides the key to exhibiting the rationale and internal logic of apophasis with regard to the One, as well as the way in which Plotinus’s conception of the One must finally be understood in extremely negative terms. Finally, in chapter 3, I present what I take to be the heart of Plotinian negative theology: why I view Plotinian apophasis to be so radical. Plotinus’s conception of the absolute simplicity and independence of the One leads him to argue that the One is, in a way, not the origin of all things: in effect, he is asking us to conceptualize the One as abiding completely alone, utterly unrelated to everything else produced by it, even though it is in fact the source of everything else. I close the chapter by discussing the role of negation in respect of the soul’s ascent to mystical union with the One, part of which involves explicating Plotinus’s extreme injunction to negate negations, and “take away everything!”
1.1 The Basic Structure of Dependence
in Plotinus’s View of Reality
Plotinus understands the structure of reality in broadly Platonic terms. To understand any given entity is to understand the conditions of its dependence. What or why an entity is is explained