hesitation in opening fire on the Krugersdorp position.
"The two 7-pounders and the 12½-pounder opened on the Boer line, making good practice under Captain Kincaid-Smith and Captain Gosling at 1900 yards.
"This fire was kept up till 5 p.m. The Boers made practically no reply, but lay quiet in the trenches and battery.
"Scouts having reported that most of the trenches were evacuated, the first line, consisting of the advanced guard (a troop of 100 men), under Colonel White, advanced. Two Maxims accompanied this force; a strong troop with a Maxim formed the right and left support on either flank.
"Lieutenant-Colonel Grey, with one troop B.B.P. and one Maxim, had been previously detailed to move round and attack the Boers' left.
"The remaining two troops, with three Maxims, formed the reserve and rear-guard.
"The first line advance continued unopposed to within 200 yards of the watercourse, when it was checked by an exceedingly heavy cross-fire from all points of the defence.
"Colonel White then pushed his skirmishers forward into and beyond the watercourse.
"The left support, under Inspector Dykes, then advanced to prolong the first line to the left; but, diverging too much to his left, this officer experienced a very hot flanking fire from the farmhouse and plantation, and was driven back with some loss.
"Colonel Grey meanwhile had pushed round on the extreme right and come into action.
"About this time Major Villiers' patrol returned and reported that the country to our right was open, and that we could easily move round in that direction.
"It was now evident that the Boers were in great force, and intended holding their position.
"Without the arrival of the Johannesburg force in rear of the Boers—an event which I had been momentarily expecting—I did not feel justified in pushing a general attack, which would have certainly entailed heavy losses on my small force.
"I accordingly left Inspector Drury with one troop and one Maxim to keep in check the Boers who were now lining the edge of the plateau to our left, and placed Colonel Grey with two troops B.B.P., one 12½-pounder, and one Maxim, to cover our left flank and continue firing on the battery and trenches south of the road.
"I then made a general flank movement to the right with the remaining troops.
"Colonel Grey succeeded in shelling the Boers out of their advanced position during the next half-hour, and blew up the Battery House.
"Under this cover the column moved off as far as the first houses of the Randfontein group of mines, the Boers making no attempt to intercept the movement.
"Night was now fast approaching, and still there were no signs of the promised help from Johannesburg. I determined, therefore, to push on with all speed in the direction of that town, trusting in the darkness to slip through any intervening opposition.
"Two guides were obtained, the column followed in the prescribed night order of march, and we started off along a road leading direct to Johannesburg.
"At this moment heavy rifle and Maxim fire was suddenly heard from the direction of Krugersdorp, which lay one and a half miles to the left rear.
"We at once concluded that this could only be the arrival of the long-awaited reinforcements, for we knew that Johannesburg had Maxims, and that the Staats-Artillerie were not expected to arrive until the following morning. To leave our supposed friends in the lurch was out of the question. I determined at once to move to their support.
"Leaving the carts escorted by one troop on the road, I advanced rapidly across the plateau towards Krugersdorp in the direction of the firing, in the formation shown in the accompanying sketch.
"After advancing thus for nearly a mile the firing ceased, and we perceived the Boers moving in great force to meet the column. The flankers on the right reported another force threatening that flank.
"Fearing that an attempt would be made to cut us off from the ammunition carts, I ordered a retreat on them.
"It was now clear that the firing, whatever might have been the cause thereof, was not occasioned by the arrival of any force from Johannesburg.
"Precious moments had been lost in the attempt to stand by our friends at all costs, under the mistaken supposition that they could not fail to carry out their repeated promises, renewed to us by letter so lately as 11 a.m. this same day. It was now very nearly dark. In the dusk the Boers could be seen closing in on three sides, viz., north, east, and south. The road to Johannesburg appeared completely barred, and the last opportunity of slipping through, which had presented itself an hour ago when the renewed firing was heard, was gone not to return.
"Nothing remained but to bivouac in the best position available.
"But for the unfortunate circumstance of the firing, which we afterwards heard was due to the exultation of the Boers at the arrival of large reinforcements from Potchefstroom, the column would have been by this time (7 p.m.), at least four or five miles further on the road to Johannesburg, with an excellent chance of reaching that town without further opposition.
"I moved the column to the edge of a wide valley to the right of the road, and formed the horses in quarter column under cover of the slope. The carts were formed up in the rear and on both flanks, and five Maxims were placed along the front so as to sweep the plateau.
"The other three Maxims and the heavy guns were posted on the rear and flank faces.
"The men were then directed to lie down between the guns and on the side; sentries and Cossack posts were posted on each face.
"Meantime the Boers had occupied the numerous prospecting trenches and cuttings on the plateau at distances from 400 to 800 yards.
"At 9 p.m. a heavy fire was opened on the bivouac, and a storm of bullets swept over and around us, apparently directed from all sides except the south-west.
"The troops were protected by their position on the slope below the level of the plateau, so that the total loss from this fire, which lasted about twenty minutes, was very inconsiderable.
"The men behaved with admirable coolness, and were as cheery as possible, although very tired and hungry and without water.
"We were then left unmolested for two or three hours.
"About midnight another shower of bullets was poured into the camp, but the firing was not kept up for long.
"Somewhat later a Maxim gun opened on the bivouac, but failed to get our range.
"At 3.30 a.m. patrols were pushed out on all sides, while the force as silently and rapidly as possible was got ready to move off.
"At 4 a.m. a heavy fire was opened by the Boers on the column, and the patrols driven in from the north and east sides.
"Under the direction of Major R. White (assisted by Lieutenant Jesser-Coope) the column was formed under cover of the slope.
"Soon after this the patrols which had been sent out to the south returned, and reported that the ground was clear of the Boers in that direction.
"The growing light enabled us to ascertain that the Boers in force were occupying pits to our left and lining the railway embankment for a distance of one and a half miles right across the direct road to Johannesburg.
"I covered the movements of the main body with the B.B.P. and two Maxims under Colonel Grey along the original left front of the bivouac, and two troops M.M.P., under Major R. White, on the right front.
"During all this time the firing was excessively heavy; however, the main body was partially sheltered by the slope.
"Colonel White then led the advance for a mile across the vley without casualty, but on reaching the opposite rise near the Oceanic Mine, was subjected to a very heavy long-range fire. Colonel White hereupon very judiciously