threw out one troop to the left to cover the further advance of the main body.
"This was somewhat delayed, after crossing the rise, by the disappearance of our volunteer guide of the previous night.
"Some little time elapsed before another guide could be obtained.
"In the meantime Lieutenant-Colonel Grey withdrew his force and the covering Maxims out of action under the protection of the M.M.P. covering troops, and rejoined the main body.
"At this juncture Colonel Grey was shot in the foot, but most gallantly insisted on carrying on his duties until the close of the action.
"Sub-Inspector Cazalet was also wounded here, but continued in action until he was shot again in the chest at Doornkop.
"While crossing the ridge the column was subjected to a very heavy fire, and several men and horses were lost here.
"I detailed a rear-guard of one troop and two Maxims, under Major R. White, to cover our rear and left flank, and moved the remainder of the troops in the ordinary day formation as rapidly forward as possible.
"In this formation a running rear and flank guard fight was kept up for ten miles. Wherever the features of the ground admitted, a stand was made by various small detachments of the rear and flank guard. In this manner the Boers were successfully kept at a distance of 500 yards, and repulsed in all their efforts to reach the rear and flank of the main body.
"In passing through the various mines and the village of Randfontein, we met with hearty expressions of goodwill from the mining population, who professed a desire to help if only they had arms.
"Ten miles from the start I received intelligence from Colonel Grey, at the head of the column, that Doornkop, a hill near the Speitfontein Mine, was held by 400 Boers, directly barring our line of advance.
"I repaired immediately to the front, Colonel White remaining with the rear-guard.
"On arriving at the head of the column, I found the guns shelling a ridge which our guide stated was Doornkop.
"The excellent dispositions for the attack made by Colonel Grey were then carried out.
"The B.B.P., under Major Coventry, who, I regret to say, was severely wounded and lost several of his men, attacked and cleared the ridge in most gallant style, and pushed on beyond it.
"About this time Inspector Barry received the wound which, we have learnt with grief, has subsequently proved fatal.
"Chief-Inspector Bodle at the same time, with two troops M.M.P., charged and drove off the field a large force of Boers threatening our left flank.
"The guide had informed us that the road to the right of the hill was impassable, and that there was open and easy country to the left.
"This information was misleading. I afterwards ascertained that without storming the Boer position there was no road open to Johannesburg, except by a wide detour of many miles to the right.
"At this moment Dr. Jameson received a letter from the High Commissioner again ordering us to desist in our advance. Dr. Jameson informed me at the same time of the most disheartening news, viz. that he had received a message stating that Johannesburg would not, or could not, come to our assistance, and that we must fight our way through unaided.
"Thinking that the first ridge now in our hands was Doornkop, we again pushed rapidly on, only to find that in rear of the ridge another steep and stony kopje, some 400 feet in height, was held by hundreds of Boers completely covered from our fire.
"This kopje effectually flanked the road over which the column must advance at a distance of 400 yards. Scouting showed that there was no way of getting round this hill.
"Surrounded on all sides by the Boers, men and horses wearied out, outnumbered by at least six to one, our friends having failed to keep their promises to meet us, and my force reduced numerically by one-fourth, I no longer considered that I was justified in sacrificing any more of the lives of the men under me.
"As previously explained, our object in coming had been to render assistance, without bloodshed if possible, to the inhabitants of Johannesburg. This object would in no way be furthered by a hopeless attempt to cut our way through overwhelming numbers, an attempt, moreover, which must without any doubt have entailed heavy and useless slaughter.
"With Dr. Jameson's permission, I therefore sent word to the Commandant that we would surrender provided that he would give a guarantee of safe conduct out of the country to every member of the force.
"To this Commandant Cronjé replied by a guarantee of the lives of all, provided that we would lay down our arms and pay all expenses.
"In spite of this guarantee of the lives of all, Commandant Malan subsequently repudiated the guarantee in so far as to say that he would not answer for the lives of the leaders, but this was not until our arms had been given up and the force at the mercy of the Boers.
JOHANNESBURG FROM THE NORTH.
Photo by Wilson, Aberdeen.
"I attribute our failure to reach Johannesburg in a great measure to loss of time from the following causes:—
"1. The delay occasioned by the demonstration in front of Krugersdorp, which had been assigned as the place of junction with the Johannesburg force.
"2. The non-arrival of that force at Krugersdorp, or of the guides to the Krugersdorp-Johannesburg section of the road, as previously promised by Johannesburg.
"3. The delay consequent on moving to the firing of the supposed Johannesburg column just before dark on Wednesday evening.
"I append (1) a sketch-map of the route from Pitsani to Krugersdorp marked A. This distance (154 miles) was covered in just under seventy hours, the horses having been off-saddled ten times. The 169 miles between Pitsani and Doornkop occupied eighty-six hours, during seventeen of which the men were engaged with the Boers, and were practically without food or water, having had their last meal at 8 a.m. on the morning of the 1st January at Van Oudtshoorn's, seventeen miles from Krugersdorp."
(The report concludes with a list of officers engaged in the expedition.)
It will be noted that Sir John Willoughby does not attribute his failure to the bungling of his employés that is said to have taken place. The man that was despatched to cut the telegraph wires failed to do so, with the result that the Boers were provided with the news of the invasion eight hours before the Reform leaders were aware of it; while another man, whose business it was to wrench away the rails between Johannesburg and Krugersdorp, and thus interrupt communication from Pretoria, was reposing in a clubhouse hopelessly drunk, while the train he should have intercepted carried ammunition for use against the invaders.
In order to present a fair picture of the situation, it must be admitted that many of the statements in this report were emphatically contradicted by the Reformers, notably the opening paragraphs, which scarcely tally with the fact that on the 28th (the day referred to) Dr. Jameson received the letters from the Reformers telling him not to start.
The following statement of the four Reform leaders, which was read at their trial, will present the case from their point of view, and those interested may judge for themselves of a question over which many differences of opinion exist:—
"For a number of years endeavours have been made to obtain by constitutional means the redress of the grievances under which the Uitlander population labours. The new-comer asked for no more than is conceded to emigrants by all the other Governments in South Africa, under which every man may, on reasonable conditions, become a citizen of the State; whilst here alone a policy is pursued by which the first settlers retain the exclusive right of government.
"Petitions supported by the signatures of some forty thousand men were ignored, and when it was found that we could not get a fair and reasonable hearing, that provisions already deemed obnoxious and unfair were being made more stringent, and that we were being debarred for