the factious proceedings of his great barons. Resolved to supplant him, they made overtures to Jean, King of Navarre, the successor to Alfonso's hereditary dominions, whose eldest son, Count Viane, had already gathered golden opinions in Lower Italy. But Jean, more anxious to consolidate his kingdom than to augment it by outlying appendages, declined interfering, and the malcontents turned to the Angevine claimant of the Neapolitan crown. René the Good still reigned in Provence, occupied with his pen and pencil, and better fitted to be the bard of chivalry than its hero. His son, the titular Duke of Calabria, had established himself at Genoa in 1458, with almost sovereign authority, on the invitation of her citizens, who, finding themselves worsted in a contest, unwisely renewed by Alfonso, after the peace of Lodi, in order to avenge himself of the obstinately Angevine policy of that republic, naturally called to their aid his French rival. The Duke's winning qualities, and the sound judgment which he had manifested in their service, were well calculated to render him a competitor very formidable to the unprepossessing Ferdinand. The Genoese, whose hearts he had thus gained, were ready to back him with a naval armament, reinforced by some galleys originally fitted out at Marseilles for the Turkish expedition, but placed by Charles VII. at René's disposal. Florence, a tried partisan of the Angevine succession, was faithful to her prescriptive policy, and now urged upon Venice the recent grudge which both republics owed to Alfonso of Aragon. But it was in vain that the Duke sought support from Francesco Sforza and the Pope. The former, with comprehensive glance, calculated the risks of French domination in Italy, and took his stand on the treaty of Lodi, which, uniting all her powers in one solemn national league, guaranteed the succession of Naples. He therefore respectfully declined from the Angevine candidate the same bribe which Celestine had vainly offered him of his father's holdings in the Abruzzi, and during the Congress at Mantua confirmed the Pontiff's inclination for the Aragonese dynasty.
In October, 1459, the Duke of Calabria made a descent on the Neapolitan coast, and his arrival gave the signal for an almost universal rising of the great barons of the kingdom. At this crisis of his fortunes, Ferdinand succeeded, through the Duke of Milan's strenuous exertions, in detaching from the Angevine party Venice and Florence, which assumed a neutral position. He also summoned Piccinino from schemes of personal aggrandisement in La Marca, to defend his crown; but that greedy freebooter, indignant at being called off his quarry, took the usual licence of condottieri, and opened a correspondence with his master's competitor. Warned of this by the Count of Urbino, the King and the Duke of Milan made every effort to retain Giacopo under the banner of Aragon, and we are assured that the Count, in their interest, went so far as to promise him a surrender of part of his newly recovered territory, should the adventurer not make good for himself any other seigneury.106 But trusting little to that slippery soldier, they desired Federigo and the Lord of Pesaro to concert measures for preventing his march into the Abruzzi. Their precautions were, however, defeated, for Piccinino, who then lay in Romagna, sent his baggage and camp-followers to be embarked at the nearest ports, and partly by dexterously misleading them as to his route, chiefly by forced marches of extraordinary rapidity, in three days scoured the Adriatic coast, and reached the Tronto without impediment. On the last day he is said to have done fifty miles, with twenty squadrons of men-at-arms and two thousand infantry—a feat which cost him many horses, and which he was believed to have effected by aid of the Lady of Loretto, before whose shrine he found time to prefer a passing orison. Possibly more important to his success was the adhesion of Ercole d'Este, and of the Lords of Rimini and Camerino, to the cause of Anjou, as well as orders privately given by the papal legate to accelerate the passage of his formidable company through the ecclesiastical territory.
Although the army of the League, following closely on that of Piccinino, had crossed the Tronto early in April, it was unable to effect a junction with Ferdinand, in consequence of the eastern side of the kingdom having risen against him, and of the passes being all well guarded. In this state of affairs the King's defeat at Sarno rendered his prospects still more gloomy, and his only remaining hope seemed to rest on the confederate force in the Abruzzi. It consisted of a strong contingent from Lombardy, led by Bosio Sforza, and of a less important brigade of ecclesiastical troops, besides the hardy mountaineers of Montefeltro and the well-tried company of Alessandro Sforza, the whole commanded by the Count of Urbino. It was kept in check by Piccinino's army, superior especially in infantry and cross-bowmen, although of late considerably weeded of the Braccian veterans, many of whom had taken service under the Lords of Pesaro and Urbino.
In July these contending armaments were in presence at San Fabbiano, on the Tordino, the Angevines encamped on the hill-side, the Aragonese in the plain, separated by a considerable extent of intervening level ground, on which marauding or exploring parties from each camp daily met. During one of these skirmishes, a defiance was given by Nardo da Marsciano to Francesco della Carda to break a lance, which was cheerfully accepted; and the challenge being repeated by Serafino da Montefalcone, it was taken up by one Fantaguzzo da S. Arcangelo. Two days were allowed for preparations, and, when the encounters took place, victory declared for the Aragonese knights, who, by order of Piccinino, were crowned with laurel, and escorted back to their camp by a pompous array of martial music. While aiding to keep the lists, Federigo, in making a dash at a straggler, spurred his charger, which suddenly bounding, so wrenched his back that he was rendered incapable of motion, and was lifted from his horse in exquisite pain. Being put to bed, with the prospect of a tedious cure, a council of war was held in his tent, when Alessandro Sforza, the next in command, advocated a general action; but the Count spoke long and strongly in favour of defensive tactics, and of saving the troops from continual skirmishes, exhausting to their strength and temper. The latter opinion was unanimously approved of; but Alessandro having exclaimed, with some show of mortified feeling, "You, however, have thrice had a tussle with the enemy," Federigo replied, "Well then, you may do the same, but with two or three squadrons only, not putting the whole encampment under arms." Accordingly, two days after,107 a partial onset was made, which, as both sides were supported by repeated reinforcements, gradually brought on a general action. The battle, thus commenced without plan or object, became a disorderly pell-mell fight, and hence, probably, its results were far more fatal than the usually bloodless engagements of hired companies, more anxious about their own safety than the cause which they supported for the nonce. Little can be gathered from the confused accounts of the Urbino writers, and that of Simonetta is obviously incomplete. From the latter it would seem that the Braccians strove to cross a deep ditch in front of their quarters, whilst Ricotti makes them successful in breaking through the enemy's line, too much extended under an apprehension of being outflanked by superior numbers. Again, the biographers of Federigo tell us that, learning the impending loss of a battle brought on against his advice, he rose from bed, had himself swathed in bandages, and, though unable to don his armour, was lifted on horseback, heading a charge of the reserve, which, although not crowned by victory, averted a certain and signal defeat. The contest was prolonged when night had closed in, and, after seven hours of severe fighting, the combatants withdrew to their respective quarters. Baldi, who dwells very fully on the Count's gallantry, quoting contemporary manuscripts, mentions that two horses were killed under him: but his courage was shown in triumphing over the agony of his malady even more than by exposing himself in the brunt of a battle which had become almost desperate. His conduct in both respects was done justice to by his followers, and much of his military reputation dated from the disastrous fight of San Fabbiano. It is to be regretted that no return of its casualties has reached us, as it would have been curious to know the losses of the most bloody action of this age. Berni merely says that 400 horses and many men were slain. As to its immediate consequences, our authorities are again at issue. Simonetta, the historian of the Sforzas, and, consequently, a partisan of the League, admits that, though apparently a drawn battle, the disadvantage was greatly on the allies' side; that a portion of their troops fled from the field, and never drew bridle until they had crossed the Tronto, followed by the rest, during the stillness of the subsequent night. Sismondi also claims a victory for the Angevines, with the loss to their opponents of all their baggage and most of their horses. On the other hand, Baldi quotes two contemporary authorities, one of them a spectator, to prove that Federigo's army sacrificed scarcely more than four hundred horses, and that he did not break up his cantonments for at least ten days later, and even then only in consequence of progressive disaffection in the Abruzzi. He admits, however, that the confederate army exhibited a most pusillanimous spirit, and, but for their captain-general's exertions and authority,