What is Philosophy of Mind?. Tom McClelland

and how philosophy of mind has become integrated with the cognitive sciences. I’ll also take a look at how philosophy of mind might develop in the future.

      In one sense, the overview of philosophy of mind that I will offer won’t be especially opinionated. I’ll be presenting mainstream views and keeping some of my more eccentric opinions to myself. But in another sense the overview I offer will inevitably be opinionated. The philosophy of mind is a big field, so my selection of which ideas to discuss in this short book reflects my opinions on what’s most important in the discipline. One way to get the benefit of some different perspectives is to engage with the suggested readings at the end of each chapter, which are arranged in recommended reading order.

Key Concepts

      Anti-materialism: the view that materialism is false and at least some entities are non-physical.

      Brentano’s thesis: the thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental, i.e. that all and only mental states have the property of being about things beyond themselves.

      Epistemic asymmetry: the fact that we each know about our own mental states in a way that others cannot. Intentionality: the property of being about something. The belief that tea is restorative is about tea and has tea as its ‘intentional object’. Not all intentional objects actually exist.

Materialism: the view that everything, including mental states, is ultimately constituted by physical entities.

      Mark of the mental: a feature that all and only mental states have, differentiating the mental from the physical. Propositional attitudes: a mental attitude taken towards a propositional content. If you believe that tea is restorative, the proposition is that tea is restorative and the attitude is believing.

References and Further Reading

       Tim Crane (2001), Elements of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. This excellent introduction explores how all the different kinds of mental state fit together. Crane’s focus is on intentionality and the claim that intentionality is the mark of the mental.

       Franz Brentano (1911 [1874]), Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Excerpt reprinted in David J. Chalmers (ed.) (2021), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd edn, New York: Oxford University Press. This is the original formulation of the view that would later be known as Brentano’s thesis.