across the region, Lackenbauer and Dean illustrate how Arctic exceptionalist logic is also used to support narratives that portend conflict and thus call for extraordinary action to defend the Arctic as a region apart. Rather than taking the dominant definition and employment of “Arctic exceptionalism” as the (singular) “proper” articulation of the concept, they point to several “Arctic exceptionalisms” at play in recent debates about the so-called Arctic regime and its place in the broader world order.
Andreas Østhagen seeks to bring clarity to the confusing multitude of actors and layers of engagement in Arctic (geo)politics. He unpacks the notion of Arctic “geopolitics” by teasing out the different, at times contradictory, dynamics at play in the North along three “levels” of inter-state relations: the international system, the regional (Arctic) level, and bilateral relations. By labelling these three levels as “good,” “bad,” and “ugly,” he showcases how the idea of conflict in the Arctic persists, and why this does not necessarily counter the reality of regional cooperation and stability.
As this book shows, one of the emerging questions of security in the Arctic has been how to address the growing strategic concerns of non-Arctic states. Despite the established view among Arctic governments that local security rests primarily within their purview, some non-Arctic states are now pressing to be included in current and future Arctic security dialogue, especially as the region opens up to greater economic activity. Among the factors driving this phenomenon are concerns from non-Arctic states about spillover of Arctic threats into their milieus, the desire to obtain ‘club goods’ in the form of accepted legitimacy as Arctic stakeholders, and the need to be heard in future areas of Arctic governance. One non-Arctic state, China, is widely seen as ‘forcing’ the debate about the role of non-Arctic governments in the circumpolar north, but other states outside of the region are also presenting their own views on Arctic security and potential threats, while at the same time seeking status as participants in Arctic security discourses. Marc Lanteigne argues that there is now a need for Arctic states to better address the security concerns of non-Arctic actors as the region continues to become internationalized in environmental, economic and military security.
The Slow-Moving Pandemic and the Future of the Arctic
As of this writing, we are in the midst of a global health crisis that has shaken the whole of humanity, caused a tragic number of deaths, and led to economic hardship and social upheaval not seen in many generations. Its effects are rippling across the globe. Yet global warming has not stopped because of COVID-19. In fact, climate change could be considered as a slower-moving pandemic, with differing yet equally or even more disastrous effects: cascading natural disasters, freakish weather events, and loss of wildlife and habitats, all generating climate refugees and mass migratory movements likely to shake polities and provoke conflict.
In many ways, the Arctic is humanity’s canary in the coal mine—an early warning sign of the extremes this slow-moving pandemic can cause, the place where the implications of the recent UN declaration of a planetary “climate emergency” are most palpable.88 Partly for these reasons, the Arctic has also become a focal point for intensifying geostrategic tensions, a space where political and economic interests collide with ecological and cultural sensitivities.
Insofar as the Arctic Eight and regional Indigenous people have continued to cooperate in the Arctic Council and have acted within the wider international regime based on universal norms and principles, the Arctic remains an exceptional region—one that has sought to insulate itself from global powerplays and tensions. At the same time, it is an arena where all powers are watching their backs: each is seeking to shore up its Arctic status and its stakes in a region where mineral riches and maritime passages await to be exploited politically, militarily and legally. The rhetoric of nationalism and conflict threatens to squeeze Indigenous voices and the language of peace and collaboration.
With global environmental and political change entwined, we are thus confronted with a double-edged reality, a paradox of enticing opportunities and incalculable riches that might be exploited for short-term gain, and of appalling long-term dangers that irreversible natural destruction may bring. As we glimpse the future of the Anthropocene—the horizon of 2040—complex questions abound, pertaining to peace and war, life and death.
It remains to be seen how far the Arctic regime can adapt to new expressions of nationalism, whether resource extraction can really proceed in a sustainable manner, and whether the Arctic as a zone of peace and collaboration can survive the changing global political dynamics that encroach on it. The essays in this volume offer important perspectives on the issues at stake and the processes under way.
Notes
1 1. Cited in “Sheila Watt-Clothier, Honorary Doctorate,” 2006, University of Winnipeg, https://www.uwinnipeg.ca/awards-distinctions/honorary-doctorate/cloutier.html.
2 2. See Kristina Spohr, “The Race to Conquer the Arctic—The World’s Final Frontier,” New Statesman, March 12, 2018, https://www.newstatesman.com/2018/03/race-conquer-arctic-world-s-final-frontier.
3 3. See Ibid.; Vincent-Gregor Schulze, “The Shadow of the Future: The Demand for an Arctic Regime,” Geopolitics and Security, March 16, 2017, https://polarconnection.org/arctic-future-regime/; Malgorzata Smieszek, “Informal International Regimes. A Case Study of the Arctic Council,” Academic dissertation, University of Lapland, December 11, 2019, https://lauda.ulapland.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/64024/Smieszek.Malgorzata9.12..pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
4 4. Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Snow, Water, Ice and Permafost in the Arctic (Oslo, 2017).
5 5. D.P. Stone, The Changing Arctic Environment: The Arctic Messenger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
6 6. See “Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, September 10, 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf; Smieszek, op. cit.; Oran R. Young, “Arctic Tipping Points: Governance in Turbulent Times,” Ambio 41 (2012), pp. 75–84; M. Carson and G. Peterson, eds., for the Arctic Council, Arctic Resilience Report (Stockholm: Stockholm Environment Institute and Stockholm Resilience Centre, 2016); M. Sommerkorn and S.J. Hassol, eds., Arctic Climate Feedbacks: Global Implications (Oslo: WWF International Arctic Programme, 2009).
7 7. Spohr, op. cit.; P. Oppenheimer and B. Israel, “The Arctic Region,” in R. Martella and B. Grosko, eds., International Environmental Law: The Practitioner’s Guide to the Laws of the Planet (Washington, DC: American Bar Association, 2014), pp. 933–62.
8 8. Young, op. cit.; Spohr, op. cit; Congressional Research Service, op. cit.; Smieszek, op. cit.; Joshua Tallis, “As ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ Melts Away, the US Isn’t Sure What It Wants Next,” Defense One, Jan. 22, 2020; Timo Koivurova, “How US Policy Threatens Existing Arctic Governance,” Arctic Today, Jan. 17, 2020; Melody Schreiber, “As the Arctic Changes, International Cooperation May Be Put to the Test,” Arctic Today, July 25, 2018; Stephanie Pezard, Abbie Tingstad, and Alexandria Hall, “The Future of Arctic Cooperation in a Changing Strategic Environment,” RAND Europe (PE-268RC), 2018.
9 9. Gary E. Weir, “Virtual War in the Ice Jungle: ‘We don’t know how to do this’,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, 2 (2005), pp. 411–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390500088635.
10 10. Spohr, op. cit.
11 11. Smieszek, op. cit.; Oppenheimer and Israel, op. cit.; M. Byers, International Law and the Arctic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); M. Durfee and R.L. Johnstone, Arctic Governance in a Changing World (London: Rowman & Littlefeld, 2019).
12 12. Smieszek, op. cit.; O.S. Stokke, Disaggregating International Regimes. A New Approach to Evaluation and Comparison (Cambridge/London: MIT Press, 2012).
13 13. See Young, op. cit.; E.C.H. Keskitalo, Negotiating the Arctic: The Construction of an International Region (New York: Routledge, 2004); J. English, Ice and Water. Politics, Peoples, and the Arctic Council (Toronto: Penguin Group, 2013); E. Wilson Rowe, Arctic Governance: Power in Cross-Border Cooperation (Manchester: