footing in moral philosophy, that those appearances in the natural world do in natural philosophy, which are reducible to good general laws? And that in order to bring moral philosophy, or the knowledge of the moral world, upon the same footing with natural philosophy, or the knowledge of the material world, as it now stands; we must enquire into moral phenomena, in the same manner as we do into physical ones: that is, we must endeavour to find out by experience the good general laws to<13> which they are reducible. For this must hold good in general, that so far as we are able to reduce appearances to a good general law, so far are we able to explain them or account for them. As phenomena which are not the effects of general laws, are in the nature of things absolutely unexplicable; so those which are, can only be explained by reducing them to the general laws of which they are the effects. “Explaining or accounting for phenomena can mean nothing else; it is not indeed now pretended by any philosopher to mean any thing else.”
A prejudice that may arise from treating natural philosophy in this manner removed.
This conclusion manifestly ensues from what has been said. But lest any one should be startled at an attempt to treat effects in the same manner, which are evidently of so different natures, as corporeal and moral effects certainly are; or lest any one should have imagined that general laws can only take place with regard to matter and motion, and consequently, that an essay to explain moral appearances by general laws, must involve in it all the absurdity of an attempt to handle effects, which are not mechanical or material, as if they were such: to prevent all such objections, and to proceed more distinctly and surely in this essay, let us just observe here, that though no two things can be more different than a thinking being and a corporeal one; or than moral powers and operations are from passive unperceiving objects, and their qualities and effects; yet the exercises of all the moral powers, dispositions and affections of minds, as necessarily presuppose an established order of nature, or general laws settled by the Author of nature with respect to them; as the exercises of our bodily senses about qualities and effects of corporeal beings, do with regard to them.
Moral powers and the exercises of moral powers, necessarily suppose and require general laws.
As we could neither procure nor avoid, by our will and choice, any sensation of our sight, touch, or any other of our senses, had not nature established a certain order, with respect <14> to the succession or conveyance of our sensations, or the methods in which they are produced in us; so in like manner, we could neither acquire knowledge of any kind, contract habits, or attain to any moral perfection whatsoever; unless the Author of our nature had fixed and appointed certain laws relating to our moral powers, and their exercises and acquisitions. Being able to attain to science, to arts, to vertues, as necessarily presupposes a fixed and appointed road to virtue, &c. as being able to move our hands or limbs, does an established order of nature, with respect to these motions, and the sensations resulting from them, or attainable by them.
We are not more certain that we have sensations, than we are certain that we have power, or a sphere of activity.
We are not more certain, that sensations are conveyed into or impressed upon our minds, by means of certain organs of sensation in a certain order, than we are sure that we have a certain extent of dominion, or a certain sphere of activity and power allotted to us by nature: that is to say, that certain effects, both in the corporeal and moral world, are made to depend, as to their existence or non-existence, upon our will, that they should exist or not exist. That we have such a power, both with regard to several actions of our body and of our mind, is plain matter of experience.
It is not disputed.
There is indeed no dispute about this kind of liberty or dominion belonging to man: but how far it extends, is another question, to be considered afterwards. Now wherever this liberty or dominion obtains, or whatever are its bounds, however wide, or however narrow and stinted it may be, this is certain, that so far as it extends, it necessarily presupposes certain laws of nature relating to it; or to speak more properly, constituting it. For this is no more than saying, that did not fire gently warm and cruelly burn, according to certain fixed laws ascertainable by us, we could not know how to warm ourselves without burning: and by parity of<15> reason, were not knowledge, habits, and moral improvements, acquirable in a certain fixed way, we could not acquire them or attain to them.
But power, and a sphere of activity, cannot take place but where general laws obtain.
That is, we could have no liberty, no dominion, no sphere of activity or power, neither in the natural nor moral world: or in other words, either with regard to objects of sense, or moral objects, but upon supposition, that the natural and moral world are governed by general laws; or so far as they are so governed.
If it could be proved that we have no dominion, no power properly so called, assigned to us by nature, that would not prove us to be mere stocks, mere pieces of mechanism; since even upon that supposition, this essential difference would still remain between material objects and us, that we are conscious, whereas the latter are quite void of perception. But on the other hand, if we really have a certain sphere of activity, in the sense above defined (as we most certainly have to a very considerable extent) this sphere of activity must be allotted to us by our Maker; and it necessarily supposes, so far as it extends, a certain fixed dependance of objects upon our wills as to their existence or non-existence, conformably to which, and not otherwise, we may exercise that dominion.
Some remarks on the controversy about liberty and necessity.
The question about liberty and necessity has been violently agitated among metaphysicians almost in all ages; but it no ways concerns this present enquiry, that I should enter any further into it than just to observe, 1. That whatever way it may be determined in abstract metaphysical speculation, this fact remains indisputable, that many objects depend upon our will, as to their existence or non-existence, many objects without the mind as well as in it. And all such objects are εϕ ημιν, that is, they are put by nature within our power, in any sense, that any thing can be said to be dependent on a being, within its power, or at its option and disposal.<16> Such ways of speaking are of universal use and extent: none are more such: but to say that such phrases, received in all languages, and universally understood, have no meaning at all, is to assert an absurdity no less gross than this; that men may discourse, hold correspondence, and be influenced and determined in their correspondence with one another, without understanding one another, without any ideas at all. Common language is built upon fact, or universal feeling. And every one understands what it is to be free, to have a thing in his power, at his command, or dependent upon him. It is only such philosophers, who seeking the knowledge of human nature, not from experience, but from I know not what subtle theories of their own invention, depart from common language, and therefore are not understood by others, and sadly perplex and involve themselves. But, which is more, nothing can be more certain than that pains and pleasures are the consequences of certain actions; may be foreseen by us; and may be avoided or obtained accordingly, as we act in such or such a manner. But if this fact, which is matter of universal experience, be admitted to be true, we are certainly in respect of all such pains and pleasures, free. That is, having, or not having them, depends absolutely on our exerting our selves to have them or not to have them, according to the connections of nature: so that, whether the constitution of nature be fortuitous, necessary, or the free choice of a free being, we are free, and have power; or our happiness and misery, as far as the connection of these with our actions reaches, totally depends upon ourselves. If a fact be certain, there is no reasoning against it; but every reasoning, however specious it may be, or rather, however subtle and confounding, if it be repugnant to fact, must be sophistical. And the fact just now mentioned is as<17> certain, as any matter of experience or consciousness can be.
2. Any reasoning from which it follows that men can neither deserve blame nor praise for their actions, and that it is needless for us to take care either to procure goods, or avoid evils, must be false; because it leads to a very absurd and fatal mistake in life and conduct. But truth cannot lead to absurdity or error. For this reason, such arguments were called by the antients λογοι αργοι,23 ignavae rationesa Sophisms that lead to inaction: and they were justly reckoned absurd upon that account; absurd, because to follow them would be sure ruin. If certain