laws relative to our communion with a material world are therefore very fitly chosen.
CHAPTER III.
Another class of laws. Those relative to the association of ideas and habits.
Both these effects take their rise from one principle.—And they are inseparable, or must go together; if the one take place, the other must likewise take place. The formation of habits supposes association of ideas; and where association of ideas takes place, habits must be contracted.
But whether these effects are reduced to one principle in our nature or not, they do really take place, i.e. ideas are associated, and habits are formed by us. And both proceed from a most useful principle in our nature.
Which is really the law of improvement to perfection: for by means of it only do we, or can we arrive at perfection of any kind.
But, in order to treat more fully of so useful and extensive a law of our nature, an associated idea is defined and exemplified, in order to distinguish it from a complex idea.
From the very definition, it is plain, that almost all our ideas have something in them of the associated kind.
This is the necessary effect of a world, governed by general laws, upon minds which have the associating quality, or are capable of forming habits.
Accordingly, when we come to philosophize, natural philosophy consists, in a great measure, in separating ideas, which the order of nature hath associated in our mind.
And it is one great business, if not the chief in moral philosophy, to break or separate associations.
Many associations are made by ourselves. But many are inevitably formed in consequence of the order of nature, or the methods in which ideas are independently of us conveyed into our mind.
What hath been said is no objection against the law of association. For, in general, it is the law of improvement to perfection.
Several good effects arise from it—Without it we could never become acquainted with the course of nature; every thing would for ever be new to us.
Unraveling or separating ideas of associations is a very agreeable, rational employment.
It is in consequence of the law of association, that we are capable of strengthening or diminishing our desires, or of adding to our pleasures, and of alleviating our pains.
Because desires are excited by ideas, and our power over our ideas lies chiefly in associating and separating.
Another circumstance with respect to association merits attention—Like ideas are very easily associated. Wit consists in associating—Judgment in separating—Both suppose the law of association to take place—It is therefore in consequence of the law of association, in a great measure, that there are different genius’s among mankind—The same law gives rise to an equal diversity of moral characters.
But so far as temper depends on association of ideas, it depends on ourselves.
Wit and its instruments, metaphor and simile, are associations—Philosophy is separating work—Both may run into extravagances.
Practical philosophy, or the government of our affections, consists in the assiduous examination of our ideas, fancies and opinions—The chief business of education is to establish early the habit of self-examination.
Associations cannot be broken by mere refutation of false opinions, but by contrary practice—Were it not so, the law of association would not have its effect.
I proceed next to consider active habits, properly so called,—from our power of contracting habits, proceed memory,—habitual knowledge, taste of every kind,—and perfection of whatever faculty.
Instruction and education presuppose the power of habit—How memory may be improved in consequence of this law—We are imitative creatures, but it is in consequence of the law of habits that imitation hath its effect, or example its influence.
Habit renders that agreeable which was at first disagreeble.
It ballances our natural desire after novelty.
By the law of habit, passive impressions grow weaker in proportion as practical habits are strengthened—instances.
It is in consequence of the law of habits that temper is formed—In consequence of it, we are able to establish in our mind the deliberative habit,—which is self-command, and true moral liberty.
It is therefore this law which renders us capable of liberty, or of being free agents.
The laws relating to association of ideas and habits, are therefore good general laws,—an useful corolary.
CHAPTER IV.
Another class of laws relative to our guiding principle and our moral conduct—Our excellence consists in our having reason and a moral sense to guide our conduct.
It is by our reason, that we rise above merely perceptive beings in the scale of life—It is all our force, or, at least, our chief one.
Reason is our guiding principle, and ought to be exerted as such.
There are two things to be considered with respect to our guiding principle and our rule of conduct—Our sense of right and wrong,—and our sense of happiness—That these two do not disagree, shall be shewn afterwards.
But first let us consider our sense of right and wrong—whether we have such a sense or not is a question of fact—But that we have it is plain, for we are not only capable of electing, but of approving—These two are very different operations.
If we have an approving and disapproving sense, we have a moral sense, or a sense of right and wrong.
What are the qualities which excite approbation or disapprobation—Actions must be done with affection, freedom and reflexion, to excite approbation or condemnation.
Of such actions, veracity, candor, benevolence, &c. excite our approbation, and their contraries our disapprobation.
Several arguments to prove we have a moral sense—from analogy,—for we have a sense of beauty in material forms.
—From languages, for they suppose it.
—From the polite arts, oratory, poetry, painting, &c. for they suppose it.
Without supposing it, to account for several phenomena, we must have recourse to very subtle reflexions of which the mind is not capable, and for which it hath not time.
We can no more be bribed to approve an action, than to assent to a proposition.
Further reflexions on a moral sense—It is not worth while to dispute about a name, if the thing be owned.
And it must be owned by all who acknowledge moral differences of actions and characters.
However, it is proper, nay, necessary to give this sense or faculty in our nature a distinguishing name—This is no less necessary than it is to give distinguishing names to our other senses and faculties.
That we are determined by pleasure and pain in all our motions, is true in a certain sense—But this general proposition is of little use in philosophy, till our pleasures are distinguished and classed.
And our moral sense renders us capable of a peculiar set of them, the highest we are susceptible of, or can conceive.
The cautiousness of the ancient moralists in using the words good and evil very commendable.
If we have no moral sense, then we are only capable of computing our external interest or advantage.
But if we have a moral sense, we are capable of rising higher, and taking in what is worthy and laudable in itself into the account.
If we would but try ourselves by proper questions, we should soon feel, that we have indeed a moral sense— And it is absurd to suppose a moral sense, not to be from nature. Art cannot create.