said) God exists necessarily, or is self-<7>existent. Now that which is necessary or self-existent, cannot be considered as of any Kind or Species of Beings, but as actually existing, (a) and is therefore a single Being: For if you imagine many Gods, you will see that necessary Existence belongs to none of them; nor can there be any Reason why two should rather be believed than three, or ten than five: Beside the Abundance of particular Things of the same kind, proceeds from the Fruitfulness of the Cause, in proportion to which more or less is produced; but God has no Cause, or Original. Further, particular different Things, are endued with peculiar Properties, by which they are distinguished from each other; which do not belong to God, who is a necessary Being. Neither do we find any Signs of many
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Gods; for this whole Universe makes but one World, in which there is but (a) One Thing that far exceeds the rest in Beauty; viz. the Sun; and in every Man there is but One Thing that governs, that is, the Mind: Moreover, if there could be two or more Gods, free Agents, acting according to their own Wills, they might will contrary to each other; and so One be hindered by the Other from effecting his Design; now a Possibility of being hindred is inconsistent with the Notion of God. <8>
Sect. IV. All Perfection is in God.
That we may come to the Knowledge of the other Attributes of God; we conceive all that is meant by Perfection, to be in Him, (I use the Latin Word Perfectio, as being the best that Tongue affords, and the same as the Greek τελειότης). Because whatever Perfection is in any Thing, either had a Beginning, or not; if it had no Beginning, it is the Perfection of God; if it had a Beginning, it must of necessity be from something else: And since none of those things that exist, are produced from nothing, it follows, that whatever Perfections are in the Effects, were first in the Cause, so that it could produce any thing endued with them; and consequently they are all in the first Cause. Neither can the first Cause ever be deprived of any of its Perfections: Not from any thing else; because that which is Eternal, does not depend upon any other thing, nor can it at all suffer from any thing that they can do: Nor from itself, because every Nature desires its own Perfection.
Sect. V. And in an infinite Degree.
To this must be added, that these Perfections are in God, in an infinite Degree: Because those Attributes that are finite, are therefore limited, because the Cause whence they proceed has communicated so much of them and no more; or else, because the Subject was capable of no more. But no other Nature communicated any of its Perfections to God; nor
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does he derive any thing from any One else, he being (as was said) necessary or self-existent. <9>
Sect. VI. That God is Eternal, Omnipotent, Omniscient and compleatly Good.
Now seeing it is very evident, that those Things which have Life are more perfect, than those which have not; and those which have a Power of Acting, than those which have none; those which have Understanding, than those which want it; those which are good, than those which are not so; it follows from what has been already said, that these Attributes belong to God, and that infinitely: Wherefore he is a living infinite God; that is eternal, of immense Power, and every way good without the least Defect.
Sect. VII. That God is the Cause of all Things.
Every Thing that is, derives its Existence from God; this follows from what has been already said. For we conclude that there is but One necessary self-existent Being; whence we collect, that all other Things sprung from a Being different from themselves: For those Things which are derived from something else, were all of them, either immediately in themselves, or mediately in their Causes, derived from Him who had no Beginning, that is, from God, as was before evinced. And this is not only evident to Reason, but in a manner to Sense too: For if we take a Survey of the admirable Structure of a Humane Body, both within and without; and see how every, even the most minute Part, hath its proper use, without any Design or Intention of the Parents, and with so great Exactness as the most excellent Philosophers and Physicians could never enough admire; it is a sufficient Demonstration that the Author of Nature is the most compleat Understanding. Of this a great deal may <10> be seen in (a) Galen, especially where he examines the Use of the Hands and Eyes; And
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the same may be observed in the Bodies of dumb Creatures; for the Figure and Situation of their Parts to a certain End, cannot be the Effect of any Power in Matter. As also in Plants and Herbs, which is accurately observed by the Philosophers. Strabo (a) excellently well takes notice hereof in the Position of Water, which, as to its Quality, is of a middle Nature betwixt Air and Earth, and ought to have been placed betwixt them, but is therefore interspersed and mixed with the Earth, lest its Fruitfulness, by which the Life of Man is preserved, should be hindred. Now it is the Property of intelligent Beings only to act with some View. Neither are particular Things appointed for their own peculiar Ends only, but for the Good of the Whole; as is plain in Water, which (b) contrary to its own Nature is raised upwards, <11> lest by a Vacuum there should be a Gap in the Structure of the Universe, which is upheld by the continued Union of its Parts. Now the Good of the Whole could not possibly be designed, nor a Power put into Things to tend towards it, but by an intelligent Being to whom the Universe is subject. There are moreover some Actions, even of the Beasts, so ordered and directed, as plainly discover them to be the Effects of some small degree of Reason: As is most manifest in Ants and Bees, and also in some others, which, before they have experienced them, will avoid Things hurtful, and seek those that are profitable to them.
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That this Power of searching out and distinguishing, is not properly in themselves, is apparent from hence, because they act always alike, and are unable to do other Things which don’t require more Pains; (a) wherefore they are acted upon by some foreign Reason; and what they do, must of necessity proceed from the Efficiency of that Reason impressed upon them: Which Reason is no other than what we call God. <12> Next, the Heavenly Constellations, but more especially those eminent ones, the Sun and Moon, have their Courses so exactly accommodated to the Fruitfulness of the Earth, and to the Health of Animals, that nothing can be imagined more convenient: For though otherwise, the most simple Motion had been along the Equator, yet are they directed in an oblique Circle, that the Benefit of them might extend to more Places of the Earth. And as other Animals are allowed the Use of the Earth; so Mankind are permitted to use those Animals, and can by the Power of his Reason tame the fiercest of them. Whence it was that the (b) Stoicks concluded that the World was made for the Sake of Man. But since the Power of Man does not extend so far as to compel the Heavenly Luminaries to serve Him, nor is it likely they should of their own accord submit themselves to him; hence it follows, that there is a superior Understanding, at whose Command those beautiful Bodies afford their perpetual Assistance to Man, who is placed so far beneath them: Which Understanding is none other
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than the Maker of the Stars and of the Universe. (a) The Eccentrick Motions of the Stars, and the Epicycles, as they term them, manifestly show, that they are not the Effects of Matter, but the Appointment of a free Agent; <13> and the same Assurance we have from the Position of the Stars, some in one Part of the Heavens, and some in another; and from the unequal Form of the Earth and Seas: Nor can we attribute the Motion of the Stars, in such a Direction, rather than another, to any thing else. The very Figure of the World, which is the most perfect, viz. round, inclosed in the Bosom of the Heavens, and placed in wonderful Order, sufficiently declares that these Things were not the Result of Chance, but the Appointment of the most