are evidently intended to remind him of duty and [27] obligation; and without which he could have no idea of it. It is as really a natural sense, as the external ones of sight, feeling, tasteing &c. As constitutional as the other internal ones of honor, harmony, benevolence, &c. All which where any of them are wanting, no industry or discipline can give the subject any idea of their objects, whatever the Fatalists or Moralists pretend to the contrary. It is well known that these gentlemen assert it to be generated by the occasions, although by these it is only excited into action, upon the appearance of its objects: It unfolds when the person is arrived to the use of reason, and this being its nature, it evidently implies moral laws with a capacity of obeying and refusing. Here then it is to be observ’d, that such a sense could be to no pertinent purpose, if we had not liberty. The faculty would otherwise shew great unkindness in the construction of the mind. Is it possible to believe that an infinitely wise and good Being, would have plac’d such a severe chastiser in our frame, were we really necessitated; but rather that he would have form’d us so as not wrongfully and injuriously to afflict ourselves. We should rather believe that he would have impressed mankind with an effectual bias to right conduct, or else with proper instincts for every laudable purpose. vid. Divine moral government next to be considered.
[28] The appearances of a divine moral government are presumptive of liberty.
In the general course of common providence a scheme of moral government appears. We find that right action and conduct tend to happy enjoyments; as the contrary naturally to evil effects; and this by an establishment in the nature of things. So that we are beforehand apprised of the respective general consequences, in which we find ourselves interested, and naturally accountable: Common providence having thus the nature of law and government.
As to any special providence, the Materialists would have us believe there is no such thing; but that every event is the effect of general laws without any interpositions. They are no ways concerned that observation and facts are against them, as well as the universal sense of the first ages. We find the ancients firmly persuaded of a particular and special providence, and frequently observing that good morals and religious observances, engage a kind and indulgent providence on their side. That where these and religious observances have been duly attended to, especially by their rulers, a people have been divinely smiled upon by providence; and not only so, but many times honoured with riches, power and grandeur; together with the prolonging their duration as a people; and contrariwise. This was matter of [29] their observation, an evidence of what the universal Father of his creatures expects in the moral world, viz. That all mankind, of whatever condition, or however circumstanced, should use their intelligent powers in the best manner they were capable of; by improving and disciplining themselves into virtuous, and approvable conduct; and with the use of the best religious observances they are furnished with, or can obtain. A confirmation of which we have in the beginning of St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans.
What shall we then think of the present doctrine of our sectaries, That materially good deeds are hateful to the Deity, unless in a state of grace; and that by every act of obedience, although performed with an honest intention to amend our lives, we render ourselves more abominable in the sight of God, and are further remov’d from his grace and favour, than by a course of licencious living, and total disregard of every thing praise-worthy. Do not these teachings tend to render the divine word, dispensations and grace, inconsistent and contradictory to one another, and to the harmony of the divine attributes; as well as abhorrent to any idea we can form of the divine wisdom and rectitude? But I return.
By careful examination it might evidently appear, that events are not always effects of general laws, but that at least some of them [30] are really expressive of a divine, and special administration. Cursory observers may not be sensible of this; so few of the instances being explicit enough to satisfy such persons. And yet in this very particular, they are most agreeable to that divine wisdom which would not too much interrupt our liberty. Which observations bring me to the following question;
By what rules the divine disposer governs the moral world?
And the general answer to this may be, That he does it in a manner suitable to the moral nature of mankind. Has he given man moral powers? Then surely he rules him in a moral manner, so far as those powers reach. To suppose any thing different from this, would be to charge unerring rectitude with impropriety. The most evident appearances are, that he deals with mankind as rational beings, in a state of trial and probation. Agreeable to this, if we only contemplated the system of man, with his relations to his Maker, it would naturally appear, and even prior to any perception of the fact, that there must be some sort of correspondent treatment, as by revealed will, and specialties in providence. The nature of man, and the circumstances he is placed in, absolutely require it; and the wisdom of the Deity appears concerned in it. But the mode is to treat these things with banter and ridicule; or to explain them away; or at best to give no solid reasons against them.
[31] The learned, and from them the unlearned, form to themselves, what they esteem honorary notions of the Deity. They judge of the divinity by themselves; they find care, and extensive employment, burdensome; and esteem attention to small things servile. On the contrary, that it is great and noble to have their affairs carry’d on without their own attention and looking after. This they imagine God-like. They do not advert to it, that inaction is unnatural to intelligences; and that continued, and eternal action, is essential to the Deity, the supream intelligence. From their feelings, they imagine the Deity hath surely so dispos’d the laws of nature, as to bring about all his designs without any specialties, and please themselves with their own conclusions. They indeed own there are some events which cannot be accounted for by the known laws, but they do not allow them to be specialties, or interpositions. Instead of this they tell us, there are unknown laws by which they are effected: But they do not advert to it, what such an imagination, if pursued through its consequences, would run up into. I shall mention only one thought upon it.
Suppose then there are such unknown laws, Do we not hold that there are no confusions, contradictions, or absurdities in, or among, these laws, whether there be more or fewer, but a perfect harmony, as in the attributes of [32] their divine author? Allowing this, how shall we reason about events which require laws contrary to the known ones, and subversive of them; for such instances might be given, but for some reasons must be left to the reader’s reflections to supply for himself. Such, whatever they be, must be resolv’d into a supernatural agency, an agency that does not affect matter in the manner of the laws of nature; some power interposing in the natural course of things: And for which there is always some special and moral, not natural occasion, but effected by an immediate will and agency, which it would be improper to term a law of nature, since it does not always have effect on the same occasions, and in the same circumstances. Let the matter be considered, without bias and prejudice and it will appear that there is in specialties no repugnancy to any of the natural laws, farther than a temporary suspension of their operations; or only a particular exertion of power; having the natural laws directly after to take place.
Can it imply any contradiction in the divine government, to admit such additions to common providence? I confess, that as a divine moral government of the world requires it, I can form no idea of such an administration without them: But on the contrary, that they appear most wise, and honorable to the divinity, and beneficial to the world. The [33] short question is, Hath the Divinity never interpos’d? If it be allowed that he has once done so, the argument is or ought to be given up.
It is difficult in this day of modern opinion to offer any thing in contradiction to the vogue. It is well known that there are [some] who hold the notion of visitations from the unseen world, and of various kinds: as there are others who deny them. Without asserting or denying the thing, I shall offer a few thoughts upon the supposition of it.
They who hold the doctrine of specialties, do it as the divine method of supplying events for answering the designs of infinite wisdom: This is pious and well; but may there not be some remote and future uses of them as well as the immediate intentions? for the present, supposing such events, which by the way it would be unbecoming rashly to deny, certainly the natural tendency would be to excite considerations of various kinds; particularly concerning an unseen world; the agency of a supreme cause; the being and employment of intelligences, and a divine government; by these religious reflections