of man, particularly the operations of his mind; how far he is necessitated and how far free; according to, or in some such manner as has been already expres’d. But especially we must have right notions of the Deity; right so far as they go, for we cannot have adequate ones. We must allow the infinite difference between his manner of knowing, and that of mankind; of him who sees the essence of matter, and all effects in their causes; to whom the past, the present, and the future are ever before him in one perfect, and continued view. We must acknowledge the boundless immensity of that wisdom and power by which he made all Worlds; and that Omnipresence by which he is every moment of duration present to them, to every part of them, and to all, even the minutest beings in them. Then if we add to this, the dependent nature of man, whose Liberty is no more than a capacity of passing occasionally, from one necessitating motive to another, we shall be in some measure prepared to satisfy ourselves in the present question.
Admitting then the foregoing postulate, which I think will not be disrupted, we shall [42] perceive that as the Almighty sees all effects in their causes, so all the causes and changes of Motive must be accordingly foreknown by him; that he can foresee whether the subject will consider or not; whether partially or impartially; and in either case, what the event will be. For we may easily perceive, that he can as well forsee what the mental eye of the mind in consideration will discover, as what will appear to the bodily eye in the course of life; and equally what the effect will be, (i.e.) how the rational creature will determine.
It is own’d, that the determinations of the mind are greatly influenced by the different characters of persons. So that although they see the same thing, and under the same individual circumstances, they will yet judge very differently; but however perplexing this may be to mankind to determine what the party will do, it makes no difference with Omniscience. He equally sees their special peculiarities as he does any simple object; their original nature, various complications, and special influences; and in one self-same view, what particular in the whole will determine them, and exactly how. So that he cannot need an absulute decree to know what one will do.
[43] This short account of the matter, may prove sufficient for the impartial and contemplative, while the most clear and full rationale would be to no purpose for others. On this, and the foregoing way of thinking, it is evident, to me, that the Almighty could make a free agent; and that, man having liberty, his every action is yet foreknown. Such objection being remov’d, affords one more presumption of the reality of liberty, as distinguished from any absolute self-determining power; and upon the whole, that such a power is not necessary to the idea of Moral Freedom.
THE END.
English colonists in America began living under local government based upon the consent of the majority before John Locke was born, and by the time he wrote his Second Treatise they had evolved most of the institutions and practices that Locke’s theory implied. Nevertheless, Locke’s work had considerable impact on Americans by the middle of the eighteenth century, probably because it nicely justified theoretically what Americans were already doing. Locke built his theory from rationalist assumptions, while Americans built their institutions on biblical foundations, especially upon the notion of a covenant. While to men in the 1770s there seemed to be no essential conflict between what Locke and the Bible were telling them, their synthesis of the two was in fact an American accomplishment, not a logical necessity. John Tucker, pastor of the First Church in Newbury, here, in the Election Day Sermon of 1771, demonstrates how the synthesis was accomplished.
I PETER II. 13, 14, 15, 16.
Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake: Whether it be to the King as supreme, or unto Governors, as unto Governors, as unto them who are sent by him, for the punishment of evil-doers, and for the praise of them that do well.
For so is the will of God, that with well-doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men: As free, and not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God.
The great and wise Author of our being, has so formed us, that the love of liberty is natural. This passion, like all other original principles of the human mind, is, in itself [6] perfectly innocent, and designed for excellent purposes, though, like them, liable, through abuse, of becoming the cause of mischief to ourselves and others. In a civil state, the genius of whose constitution is agreeable to it, this passion, while in its full vigor, and under proper regulation, is not only the cement of the political body, but the wakeful guardian of its interests, and the great animating spring of useful and salutary operations; and then only is it unjurious to the public, or to individuals, when, thro’ misapprehension of things, or by being overballanced by self-love, it takes a wrong direction.
Civil and ecclesiastical societies are, in some essential points, different. Our rights, as men, and our rights, as christians, are not, in all respects, the same. It cannot, however, be reasonably supposed, but that this useful and important principle, must, in its genuine influence and operation, be friendly to both: For although our Saviour has assured us, his kingdom is not of this world; and it be [7] manifest from the Gospel, which contains its constitution and laws, that his subjects stand in some special relation and are under some peculiar subjection to him, distinct from their relation to and connection with civil societies, yet we justly conclude, that as this divine polity, with its sacred maxims, proceeded from the wise and benevolent Author of our being, none of its injunctions can be inconsistent with that love of liberty he himself has implanted in us, nor interfere with the laws and government of human societies, whose constitution is consistent with the rights of men.
Christ came to set up a kingdom diverse, indeed, from the kingdoms of this world, but it was no part of his design to put down, or destroy government and rule among men. He came to procure liberty for his people, and to make them free in the most important sense, yet not to exempt them from subjection to civil powers, or to dissolve their obligations to one another, as members of political bodies.
[8] As to things of this nature, all ecclesiastical constitutions and laws, as coming from GOD, must leave men just as they were; because all civil societies, founded on principles of reason and equity, are, as well as the peculiar laws of Christianity, agreeable to the Deity, and certainly, intimations from the all-perfect mind cannot be contradictory.
These things, seem not to have been rightly apprehended, and well understood by men at all times and in all places. The Jews, some of whom were early proselyted to the christian faith, had imbibed high notions of their liberty and superiority to all others, as the peculiar people of GOD; and were loth to own subjection to the Romans, as a civil state, when they were actually under their dominion. And some converts from among the Gentiles, tho’ they had not these national prejudices, yet from their subjection to Jesus Christ, as their King and Ruler, and, as ‘tis probable, from mistaking the meaning of some apostolic declarations asserting [9] their freedom as christians, disclaimed likewise all human authority over them.
Men of this cast, gave no small trouble both to Church and State, in the early days of the Gospel. Of such the Apostle Peter speaks where he says—They despise government: Presumptuous are they. Self-willed, they are not afraid to speak evil of dignities.
Such men as these, and their seditious, turbulent behaviour, I doubt not, this same Apostle had in view, when he delivered the instructions in my text, by which he endeavoured to guard christians against their evil practices.
But, as all authority, demanding submission, and all submission, due to such authority, are likely to be best understood, by having these things reduced to their first principles; by having the foundation of such authority fairly produced, and its just boundaries, which must be the measure of submission due to it, clearly marked out: