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American Political Writing During the Founding Era: 1760–1805


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governing parts, in respect to public measures, and the art of governing.—And when this happens, though it be but in one, since each part is strictly necessary to constitute the legislative body—it greatly wounds the state—embarrasses affairs—and is productive of general uneasiness and discontent.—The people soon feel inconveniences rising from jarrs and interference among their rulers—and as they have an indubitable right, they take [19] it upon them, to judge what, and how far any thing is so, and where to fix the blame.

      In such a government, rulers have their distinct powers assigned them by the people, who are the only source of civil authority on earth, with the view of having them exercised for the public advantage; and in proportion as this worthy end of their investiture is kept in sight, and prosecuted, the bands of society are strengthened, and its interests promoted: But if it be overlooked, and disregarded, and another set up as the object of their pursuit; we will suppose it should be, but by one of the supreme branches, or, indeed, by a single member of any, who happens to be of leading influence and great abilities, it will go far in making a schism in the body.—Calamity and distress may be expected, in a measure, to ensue—We need not pass the limits of our own nation for sad instances of this.—Whether, or how far, it has also been exemplified in any of the American colonies, whose governments, in general, are nearly copies of the happy British original, by the operation of ministerial unconstitutional measures, or the public conduct of some among ourselves, is not for [20] me to determine: It is, however, certain, that the people mourn!—May God turn their mourning into joy! and comfort them, and make them rejoice from their sorrow!—

      Rulers are under the most sacred ties to consult the good of society. ’Tis the only grand design of their appointment. For the promotion of this valuable end, they are ordained of God, and cloathed with authority by men.

      In a state of nature men are equal, exactly on a par in regard to authority; each one is a law to himself, having the law of God, the sole rule of conduct, written on his heart.

      No individual has any authority, or right to attempt to exercise any, over the rest of the human species, however he may be supposed to surpass them in wisdom and sagacity. The idea of superior wisdom giving a right to rule, can answer the purpose of power but to one; for on this plan the Wisest of all is Lord of all. Mental endowments, though excellent qualifications for rule, when men have entered into combination [21] and erected government, and previous to government, bring the possessors under moral obligation, by advice, perswasion and argument, to do good proportionate to the degrees of them; yet do not give any antecedent right to the exercise of authority. Civil authority is the production of combined society—not born with, but delegated to certain individuals for the advancement of the common benefit.

      And as its origin is from the people, who have not only a right, but are bound in duty, for the preservation of the property and liberty of the whole society, to lodge it in such hands as they judge best qualified to answer its intention; so when it is misapplied to other purposes, and the public, as it always will, receives damage from the abuse, they have the same original right, grounded on the same fundamental reasons, and are equally bound in duty to resume it, and transfer it to others.—These are principles which will not be denied by any good and loyal subject of his present Majesty King George, either in Great-Britain or America—The royal right to the throne absolutely depends on the truth of them,—and the revolution, an [22] event seasonable and happy both to the mother country and these colonies, evidently supports them, and is supported by them.

      But it has been objected, that the doctrine which teaches that the people are the source of civil authority, and that they may lawfully oppose those rulers, who make an ill use of it, is likely to be attended with the worst of consequences—occasion disturbance and revolutions in the state, and render the situation of rulers perpetually unsafe and dangerous.

      If the rulers are of the latter character mentioned in our text, the safety of the community forbids any attempt or disposition to make their situation easy; and I trust the objection is without force in regard to those of the former.—It is altogether unreasonable to suppose a number of persons by a free and voluntary contract, should give up themselves, their families and estates so absolutely into the hands of any rulers, as not to make a reserve of the right of saving themselves from ruin—and if they should, the bargain would be void, as counteracting the will of heaven, and the [23] powerful law of self-preservation. It must be granted that the people have a right in some circumstances, or that they have not a right in any, to oppose their rulers—there is no medium—A sober and rational inquiry into the consequences of each supposition, is the best method to determine on which side the truth lies—In doing this, I shall take the liberty to adopt the sentiments and nearly the words of a writer of the first class on Government.*

      If it be true that no rulers can be safe, where the doctrine of resistance is taught; it must be true that no nation can be safe where the contrary is taught: If it be true that this disposeth men of turbulent spirits to oppose the best rulers; it is as true that the other disposeth princes of evil minds, to enslave and ruin the best and most submissive subjects: If it be true that this encourageth all public disturbance, and all revolutions whatsoever; it is as true that the other encourageth all tyranny, and all the most intolerable persecutions and oppressions imaginable. And on which side then will the advantage lie?—And which of the two shall we chuse, for the sake of the happy effects and consequences of it?

      [24] Supposing it to be universally admitted, that if rulers contrive and attempt the ruin of the publick, it is the duty of the people to consult the common happiness, and oppose them in such a design; it must follow, I think, that the grounds of publick unhappiness would be removed, and those inconveniences, which by mistake are represented as the consequence of this doctrine, prevented; for, on this supposition, the worst of Princes would learn to do that out of interest, which the best constantly do out of a good principle and true love to their subjects—No Prince would have any persons about him, to advise and incite him to illegal or unjust actions—and if he had at any time been guilty, he would, upon the first representation, and without being forced to it, readily acknowledge his error, and set all things right again. And let who will say it, the dispositions of subjects are not so bad, nor their love to public disturbance so great, but that a Prince of such conduct may be sure of reigning in their affections, and of being obeyed out of love and gratitude; which is the securest foundation any throne can possibly be fixed on.—So far is it from being true, that the universal [25] reception of the doctrine of resistance would be the ground of public confusion and misery, that it would prevent the beginning of evil, and take away the first occasion of discontent.

      It must be acknowledged, it is because this doctrine, whatever is pretended, hath not been received, that any rulers have been misled, and encouraged to take such measures, as in the end, have proved fatal to themselves. With respect therefore to rulers of evil dispositions, nothing is more necessary than that they should believe resistance, in some cases to be lawful. I intend not for a few discontented individuals who may happen to take it into their heads to resist, but for the majority of a community, either by themselves or representatives. Such rulers, indeed, cannot bear the propagation of this doctrine; but the reason why they cannot, viz. its being preventive of their pernicious designs, is an undeniable argument of its being the more necessary.

      As for good rulers, they are not affected by the propagation of it, but may promote it themselves consistently with their [26] own particular interest; for it is the chief interest of princes to reign in the affections of their subjects, free from all suspicion and jealousy of evil design. Nothing can give a nation greater satisfaction that their supreme magistrate sincerely endeavors to promote their interest, or gain him more hearty love and esteem, than the admission of this doctrine; it looks open, and removed from base and unworthy purposes; but a zeal for the opposite doctrine, tends, in its nature, and has been seen, in experience, to create jealousies in the minds of subjects, to take off their affections from a prince, and to lay the foundation of their withdrawing their allegiance from him.

      But supposing it to be universally received, that it is the duty of the people patiently to submit, and not oppose their rulers, tho’ manifestly carrying forward the ruin of the public, nothing can be imagined to follow, but what is of the worst consequence to human society, unless we suppose rulers as angels of God, or rather, as God himself,