themselves, or misled by others. This supposition leaves no restraint on such rulers as have designs of their own, distinct from [27] the public good: Public misery and slavery will therefore ensue; and this is a state of things infinitely worse than that of public disturbance, supposing such sometimes to take place in consequence of resistance. The inconvenience of the latter will soon be felt and rectified by the people themselves; but the former, on the principle of non-resistance, is absolutely without a remedy.
When people feel the influence and blessing of a good administration, they are not, in general, disposed to complain and find fault with their rulers; it is inconsistent with their own interest, and that of their families to do so. If we will be determined on a point of such delicacy by a ruler himself, who, as absolute as he was, had wisdom and public virtue to give judgment conformable to the nature and truth of things, we shall see that it is under the influence of an evil administration the people are discontented and mourn; and that under the influence of a good, one they rejoice.
All lawful rulers are the servants of the public, exalted above their brethren not [28] for their own sakes, but the benefit of the people; and submission is yielded, not on the account of their persons considered exclusively of the authority they are clothed with, but of those laws, which in the exercise of this authority are made by them, conformably to the laws of nature and equity.
This position is so far from being unacceptable to good rulers, or thought to be derogatory of their dignity, that they esteem it as implying the highest human character, and an official resemblance of the great Saviour of mankind, who came not to be ministered unto, but to minister; and accordingly went about doing good.
The assertion that rulers are constituted by the people for the common happiness, is no denial of St. Paul’s doctrine, who, speaking of magistracy, hath said—There is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God:—any more than it is a denial of the blessings of husbandry, merchandize, and the mechanic arts, or, indeed any thing beneficial to society, being from God, to say, that men have invented them—They are all from God, from [29] whom cometh down every good and perfect gift; and much in the same sense, as it is his will that men should be employed in them for their own advantage: But men by their reason, which is also the gift of God, are the immediate discoverers of their utility. It is, however, necessary to observe, that as civil government holds a distinguished place among the gifts of God; and, considering the human make, the blessings of it are productive of a greater aggregate of happiness, both in a natural and moral view, than most others: Much has been said in revelation about it—the divine approbation manifested—and the qualification of rulers exactly stated.
Although government is not explicitly instituted by God, it is, nevertheless, from him; as, by the human constitution, and the circumstances men are placed in, He has signified it to be his will, that, as a security of property and liberty, and as necessary to greater improvements in virtue and happiness than could be attained in a state of nature, there should be government among them. But it is from man, as for the same end—the procuring a greater good to each individual, on the whole, than could [30] be had without it; they have, in conformity to their make and circumstances, and the dictates of reason, voluntarily instituted it. And thus government is the ordinance both of God and man. And so the new-testament writers consider it, and speak of its design as being the same in both, viz. The public happiness.
This is a striking indication to rulers, not only as to their aims in accepting any public office in a community, but as to the obligations they are under to discharge the duties of it with fidelity. They are the trustees of God, vested with authority by him, in the benevolent designs of his providence, to be employed in guarding and defending the just Rights and Liberties of mankind; and as far as they can, advancing the common welfare.
And as they are responsible to him who is no respecter of persons; they are not to expect their public conduct is to be exempted from his most strict and impartial scrutiny.
They are also the trustees of society, as their authority, under God, is derived [31] from the people, delegated to them with design it should be exercised for, and to no other purpose than, the common benefit; and this renders them justly accountable to their human constituents, whose tribunal, however some have affected to despise it, is full of dignity and majesty—Kings and emperors have trembled before it!
While meerly to possess places of dignity and eminence is sufficiently gratifying to some minds, the chief joy of rulers, mindful of the importance of their station, arises from a consciousness of such behaviour, in their public capacity, as will be approved of God, and accepted of men. For this great and valuable purpose, they will be careful to deserve the character first mentioned in the text—be just and impartial in every part of administration; and with their integrity, endeavour to join those other accomplishments which are requisite to the honorable discharge of their respective trusts.
But this brings us in the second place to point out some of the qualifications of rulers.
[32] And superior knowledge may be mentioned as one, that greatly exalts and adorns their character.
They should, therefore, be ambitious to become possessed of it, that they may be at no loss how to conduct, or which way to turn themselves in any difficult and embarrassed state of affairs; but may know what the people ought to do, and be able and ready to lead and advise them in the more boisterous and alarming, as well as in calm and temperate seasons.
Distinguished abilities and knowledge, tho’ happily placed in rulers, are not indeed so absolutely necessary, in order to understand the constitution, or the general rules of any particular mode of government a people have chosen to put themselves under, as for other important matters in administration.
All fundamental laws and rules of government are, in their nature and design, and ever ought to be, plain and intelligible—such as common capacities are able to comprehend, and determine when, and how far they are, at any time, departed [33] from. Were not this the case, people’s entering into society, and erecting government, could not be justified on the principle of reason, or prudence; as government instead of protecting them in the peaceable and quiet enjoyment of Liberty and property, might be made an engine of their destruction, and put it in the power of rulers of evil dispositions, under the specious pretext of pursuing constitutional measures, to introduce general misery and slavery among them.
The knowledge which the people have of the constitution, or original fundamental laws of government, whereof the plain law of self-preservation is necessarily the chief, in all forms of government, is the only adequate check on such ruinous conduct.
The people being judges of their own constitution of government, is the principle from which the British nation acted, and on the truth of which they are to be justified, when they determined, their constitution was invaded by their sovereign, and that he was carrying on designs, which if pursued, must issue in the destruction of it.
[34] But if they were no judges of such matters, if they meddled with that which did not belong to them—the revolution, and succession of an illustrious house, may have taken place without right, against law and reason, being founded in misconception and error; and the heirs of an abjured popish prince, still remain the only just, and lawful claimants to the British throne; a doctrine, which, I am sure, no American, and I hope, but few in great Britain, will ever admit. If the foundations be destroyed, what can the righteous do?
But high degrees of knowledge are requisite in rulers for other great and weighty purposes in government. If they would act with dignity and advantage in their public capacity, they should be well acquainted with human nature, and the natural rights of mankind; which are the same under every form of government: They should also be acquainted with the general rules of equity and reason, and the right application of them, as circumstances vary; with the laws of nations, their strength, manners, and views; but especially with the genius, temper, customs and religion of the people they are called [35] to govern: This will enable them to accommodate public measures to public advantage, and to frame such laws and annex such sanctions, from time to time, as may be best calculated to encourage piety and virtue, industry and frugality, and prevent immorality and vice, and every species of oppression and misery—They should moreover know, in what instances natural equity and a regard to the good of the whole require