such as Alabama, instituted white manhood suffrage. From the 1820s onward, property-holding and taxpaying requirements for voting came under sustained attack in state constitutional conventions.
Those defending property qualifications for voting portrayed the franchise as a privilege rather than as a right and insisted that, in the words of a Massachusetts delegate, “it was a distinction to be sought for; it was the reward of good conduct. It encouraged industry, economy and prudence; it elevated the standard of all our civil institutions, and gave dignity and importance to those who chose, and those who were chosen” (p. 57). Other delegates argued that extension of the franchise would “jeopardize the rights of property, and the principles of liberty,” enabling the many poor to confiscate the property of the wealthy few (p. 175). Proponents of manhood suffrage responded that limiting the franchise was inconsistent with the natural equality of all men recognized in the Declaration of Independence. If human beings were equal by nature, then they should have an equal voice in governing. They insisted that “possession of land [was no] evidence of peculiar merit” and that assertions that the vote might be misused did not justify qualifications that were “invidious and anti-republican” (pp. 339, 352).
After fierce debate, the Massachusetts Convention of 1820–1821 and the Virginia Convention of 1829–1830 boThexpanded the franchise, with Massachusetts permitting taxpayers to vote and Virginia extending the vote to heads of families and certain types of leaseholders. But neither state embraced manhood suffrage. In contrast, the New York Convention of 1821 jettisoned its freehold requirement. By giving the vote to white males who paid taxes or otherwise made a contribution to the community through service in the militia or as firemen or through work on the roads, it in practice established white manhood suffrage, expanding the state’s electorate by 160,000 voters.5 At the same time, however, New York introduced an onerous freehold requirement for African-Americans that effectively disenfranchised all but a few black voters.
A final area left to the states involved the structure of state governments. The Federal Constitution requires that the national government guarantee to each state a “republican form of government,” but it otherwise permits the states broad leeway in designing their institutions, provided they are republican in character. The states have taken advantage of this opportunity to experiment. So, for example, Pennsylvania and Vermont initially established unicameral legislatures, New York and New Jersey lodged ultimate appellate authority outside the judiciary, and several states permitted removal of judges by address, that is, on the recommendation of the legislature even in the absence of an impeachable offense.
In the Massachusetts convention, the key structural issue was the system of representation. Under its 1780 constitution, Massachusetts apportioned representation in the Senate on the amount of taxes that residents paid, and it guaranteed representation to each town in the House, with proportionately more representatives for more populous towns and cities. Those who defended the system of representation in the Senate noted that “all government is a modification of general principles and general truths, with a view to practical utility” (p. 92). They argued that the existing system provided a salutary check on “intemperate legislation” and insisted that “property should have its due weight and consideration in political arrangements” (pp. 84, 91). Because “no practical inconvenience has been felt” under this system, it was unwise “to exchange the results of our own experience for any theory” (p. 78). In contrast, those who favored basing representation in the Senate on population contended that “our government is one of the people, not a government of property” (p. 64). Invoking the revolutionary slogan of no taxation without representation, they argued that it did not justify unequal representation based on the amount of taxes paid. Adequate checks and balances could be established, and property rights protected, without directly representing wealth. Ultimately, the convention declined to make any change in the apportionment of the Senate.
For the New York Convention of 1821, debate centered on two distinctive institutions, the Council of Revision and the Council of Appointments, that were created by the state’s 1777 constitution. That constitution lodged the veto power over laws that were “hastily and inadvisedly passed” in the Council of Revision, which consisted of the governor, the chancellor, and judges of the supreme court.6 It is not altogether clear whether this institution, apparently modeled on the king of England’s Privy Council, was designed to strengthen the executive, which otherwise might have lacked the fortitude to oppose the legislative will, or to weaken it by requiring the concurrence of a council to veto bills. Whatever the case, the council played an active role in legislation, vetoing 169 of the 6,500 bills passed by the legislature (2.6 percent), although the legislature overrode almost one-third of its vetoes.
Although there was little support in the convention for the retention of the Council of Revision, the delegates divided over what should be done with the veto power. Some radical delegates favored a gubernatorial veto that could be overridden by a simple majority in the legislature, arguing that requiring an extraordinary majority “tends to perpetuate the aristocracy that exists in the constitution” and interferes with popular government (p. 144). However, most delegates concluded that “the experience of the community shews, that no essential injury” would result from requiring a two-thirds majority to override gubernatorial vetoes, because “a wise and salutary law” would generate broad support (p. 148). One indirect effect of the abolition of the Council of Revision, unnoted by the delegates, was a broader exercise of judicial review by the courts. Judges who had been reluctant to invalidate laws that had survived scrutiny by the Council of Revision became much more willing to strike down legislation after its abolition.7
New York’s 1777 constitution lodged the appointment power in a Council of Appointment, composed of the governor and four senators elected annually by the legislature. Although the expectation was that the governor would appoint officials with the advice and consent of the council, the constitution did not expressly state that, and the senators on the council claimed a concurrent power of nomination. When New York’s 1801 convention confirmed this concurrent power of nomination, it opened the door to a system of blatant political patronage that ultimately undermined support for the council. The 1821 convention voted unanimously to abolish the Council of Appointment, but this raised the question of where the appointment power should be lodged. The eventual answer was a political compromise, under which various local officials—justices, sheriffs, county clerks, and coroners—would be nominated and selected at the county level; all other judges would be appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate; and all other officials—such as the state treasurer and attorney general—would be appointed by the legislature.
Perusal of the debates on these and other matters reveals a considerable political sophistication among the delegates. They readily appeal to fundamental principles to bolster their arguments, invoking the Declaration of Independence’s natural equality of human beings and the natural rights possessed by all human beings as a consequence of that equality. Writers such as Locke and Grotius are regularly cited, and delegates often draw on English and Roman, as well as American, history to support their arguments. Experience likewise plays a crucial role in the convention deliberations, with delegates assessing not only the effects of existing practices and institutions in their own states but also the effects of alternative constitutional arrangements in sister states.
The importance of the task of constitutional reform attracted the most talented political figures in the states to the conventions. Thus the Virginia convention included two former presidents (James Madison and James Monroe), the chief justice of the Supreme Court (John Marshall), future justice Philip Barbour, and two United States senators, including John Randolph, who attended sessions with crepe on his hat and sleeves in mourning for the old constitution.8 The Massachusetts convention boasted former president John Adams, Supreme Court justice Joseph Story, and future senator Daniel Webster, among others, while the New York convention included future president Martin Van Buren, Chancellor James Kent, and Chief Justice Ambrose Spencer.
Yet the convention debates also highlight the contributions of lesser known figures. Constitutional conventions are a peculiarly American invention, designed to provide ordinary citizens an opportunity to chart their political futures. The seriousness and good sense exhibited by virtually all the delegates confirms how important political responsibilities