so that they cannot die, and they will be able to act rightly so that they cannot sin.
The second was that of Adam and Eve in the state of innocence, who could live so that they could also never die, and they could act rightly so that they could never sin either.
The third is ours, who can only live so that we cannot help but die at some point, and who can only act so that we cannot avoid sin, even if only a venial sin. There is not a fourth degree below these three, except that of not living and not acting rightly, a degree suited for the damned. See Augustine, De correptione et gratia, chapter 2. Since therefore freedom consists in being able to choose good and reject evil, it is clear that the law does not oppose this freedom; it does not prevent us from choosing good and rejecting evil, but rather helps us to do so by providing the condition to exercise this freedom. The law can rightly be said to be opposed to slavery, since it cannot be fulfilled by a slave of sin. Hence Paul in Romans 3 says: “Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law.”89 See Augustine, De spiritu et littera, chapter 30.
Second, this point is also proved: the divine law does not oppose freedom; therefore the human law does not oppose freedom either. The antecedent is clear, for Adam was created free, yet a law was imposed on him not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2). The consequence is proved because divine and human law are the same as far as obligation is concerned, as will be clear in the following chapter.
The second proposition
The civil law does not bind in conscience less than the divine law, even if it is less stable and firm. To explain, divine and human law are different regarding their solidity, since divine law cannot be abrogated by man, while human law can. But regarding their obligation they are not different because both bind in conscience, under pain of either mortal or venial sin according to the gravity of the issues themselves. Thus there is not a better rule for understanding whether human law binds under pain of mortal or venial sin than to think of this law as divine and then see how it would bind.90
This is proved, first, because binding force is the essence of the law, as is said in De Summo Pontifice, book 4, chapter 16, and to bind is a necessary effect of law. Therefore, every law binds in the same way, by whomever it is made, whether by God, an angel, or a man, and among men, by a bishop, a king, or a father. The consequence is proved by analogy. Since the essence of man is to be rational and his proper characteristic is to be able to laugh, every man is reasonable and able to laugh, whether he be created by God alone, like Adam, or by God out of another human, like Eve, or procreated by men, like Cain.91 The antecedent is clear, as law is a normative rule. However, it is a central feature of a rule to direct intrinsically in such a way that to deviate from it is a sin against the prescribed norm, just as to deviate from a rule in nature is called a sin of nature, as in the case of monsters, and to deviate from a rule of an art is a sin against that art.
Here it is to be noted that just as other things depend on an agent for their existence, but not for their essence, since the essences are eternal, and [regarding the question of essence] it is also possible that things participate in a certain way in the divine essence, the law also depends for its existence on the legislator, for there will be no law unless it is established by him who has authority. But for its essence, the law does not depend on the legislator, for the binding force of the law is something eternal and immutable and stems from a certain participation in the eternal law of God, which is the first and greatest rule. Blessed Augustine seems to have intended this in Contra Faustum, book 22, chapter 27, when he says: “A sin is something said or done or desired against the eternal law of God.” In fact whoever transgresses the law, be it natural law, positive law, divine law, or human law, always sins against the eternal law, since every law participates in the eternal law. And even though it is impossible that any given true law does not come from God, since no law can be made unless by him who has authority, and there is no authority but from God (Romans 13), nevertheless if per impossibile a law did not come from God, it would still bind under pain of sin, just as if per impossibile there were a man who was not made by God, he would still be rational.92
The second proof is that if the law only bound because it is divine, then clearly all laws would be equally binding, for there would be the same reason for the obligation in all of them. But this is false, for the law “thou shalt not kill” is more binding than the law “thou shalt not steal,” and this more than “thou shalt not lie,” and this more than “thou shalt not say careless words.”
Third, it is furthermore clear that a divine law is more binding the more contrary its violation is to the end of that law—namely charity. Hence it is worse to kill than to steal, as killing is more against charity; and to say a pernicious lie is a mortal sin, while to say an officious lie is a venial sin, because the former is against charity and the latter is outside of the realm of charity. But human law also has charity as its end, and it regulates the means to this end, for when the apostle says that “the end of the commandment is charity,”93 it is meant for all commands. This is clear, for a just civil law is either a conclusion or a determination from the divine moral law. Therefore they have the same end, and they differ only in this: that the human law directs human acts to external acts of love, that is, to the peace and preservation of the commonwealth, but the divine law directs also to internal acts of charity; therefore the reason of the human and the divine laws is the same insofar as the obligation is concerned.
But you will object: if the gravity of the sin comes from the nature of the thing and from the relation to charity, then laws are superfluous, since we are equally obliged before and after the law to avoid what by its own nature harms charity and to do what is necessary to preserve charity.
I reply: the consequence is denied, for if the law does not help by prescribing or prohibiting something in general, many things which are bad for one person will not be so for another. For example, without a law that prohibits the carrying of arms, carrying arms will be bad for him who is easily moved to anger and who has enemies whom he wishes to harm, but it will not be bad for a peaceful man who wants only to defend himself. Nevertheless if the law prohibits it, then it is bad for all, as the law does not have to consider whether it might be good or bad for one or another, but what is advantageous and what is not for the commonwealth. Besides, there are many things that are necessary or harmful to the common good, which, nevertheless, are neither good nor bad for anybody in particular, unless they are prescribed or prohibited by law. For example, a tribute to the king is necessary. But if there is no law, it is not necessary for me to pay, for what I pay benefits the king little, and it does not concern me to see what the commonwealth needs; and all people could say the same. Similarly, it is harmful to the commonwealth that gold be exported from the province, but it is evidently not harmful to me to export my own gold; and all people could say the same. Therefore a law is necessary which, by making general prescriptions or prohibitions, can provide for the advantage of the commonwealth.
Fourth, the divine positive law binds under pain of sin, since it makes the act that it prescribes into an act of virtue, which it was not before. For if a Jew ate pork, which is prohibited in the law, though in moderation, not contemptuously but for hunger, without a doubt he would sin, but he would not sin formally against obedience, since he did not do it out of contempt and therefore against temperance; and eating pork in moderation is not in itself against temperance, but an indifferent thing. Therefore there was a law which made that abstinence a necessary act of temperance. And we see the same in human law. In fact, the divine law makes that which in itself was indifferent into an act of virtue for no other reason but that it is a rule of behavior imposed by Him Who has the authority to make prescriptions. But also man can make prescriptions and establish rules of behavior, as we showed above; therefore man can make an otherwise indifferent act into an act of virtue by his law, and accordingly divine and human laws are equal with regard to obligation.
Fifth, divine and human laws are as different as the law of the king and that of the viceroy, or the law of the Pontiff and that of his legates. But those latter cases bind in the same way and differ only in stability, and the