is clear, since the Scriptures here and there attest that kings are ministers of God, and from Him they have the authority and judge in His place (Proverbs 8, Book of Wisdom 6, Romans 13, 1 Peter 2). The assumption is also clear, since the authority of the viceroy comes from the king, and that of the legate from the Pope; and the same is proved by experience and confirmed by the holy Fathers Augustine and Bernard. Augustine in his commentary on Psalm 70 says: “Where the father orders what is not against God, he has to be listened to as if he were God, etc.” Now it is certain that the authority of the king is greater than the authority of a father, as Augustine himself says in sermon 6 on the word of God. Bernard, in De praeceptis [praecepto] et dispensationibus [dispensatione], says: “When someone, whether God or a man, in place of God, gives a command, the command undoubtedly has to be obeyed with the same care and carried out with the same reverence, provided that the man does not command anything contrary to God,” and here he clearly says that the laws differ with respect to their content, not with respect to those who make the prescription.
But you will object that Bernard in the same passage, speaking of the commands of men, says that orders are not neglected without guilt, nor are they scorned without committing a crime, for neglect always deserves blame, and scorn must always be condemned; in this he seems to say that human law never binds under pain of mortal sin unless by reason of contempt. I reply that we are talking here of precepts about small matters in which there cannot be crime except by reason of contempt. For not even priests can bind under pain of mortal sin out of their own will.
Sixth, it is proved because the assumption that the prince can bind with respect to punishing, but not with respect to guilt, seems to imply a contradiction, since obviously punishment and guilt are related; blessed Augustine in book 1 of his Retractationes, chapter 9, says: “Every punishment, if it is just, is punishment of a sin,” and in epistle 105 [186] and elsewhere, he says that God Himself would be unjust if He condemned an innocent. How, therefore, can the princes condemn to death those who transgress their laws if they have not committed a sin? If they have not committed any error of conscience?
You will say, how is it, then, that the rules of some religious orders bind with respect to punishment but not guilt? I reply that they are binding not as a law, but as an agreement and a pact, as purely penal laws. And it is not even a proper punishment, but the infliction of a penalty in order to aid the spirit.
Seventh, and last, it is proved from the doctrine of the apostles, for in Romans 13 Paul affirms it in many ways. First, when he says: “Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God.”94 Second, “Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God.”95 Third, “And they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.”96 The Greek and Latin Fathers interpret this last passage as referring to eternal damnation. Fourth, “Wherefore ye must needs be subjects,”97 and fifth, “Not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake.”98 Sixth, “For they are God’s ministers.”99 In 1 Peter 2: “Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord’s sake,”100 that is, not only for fear of punishment.
These passages demonstrate sufficiently what we want, for if princes have their authority to command from God, certainly those who do not obey them offend not only the princes, but also God; and if those who resist the prince resist the ordinance of God, certainly they sin in conscience, no differently than if they had transgressed the divine laws, and if those who resist receive damnation for themselves, certainly they commit a wrong worthy of that punishment. If they of necessity are subject to individual princes not only for fear of wrath but also for conscience, how do those who are not obedient to them fail to commit a sin? Finally, if princes are God’s ministers and we must obey them for God, certainly those who scorn the commands of princes scorn the majesty of God. 101
As for the contrary arguments, I respond as follows:
To the first, second, and third I reply that from the fact that the political authority is temporal and its end is external peace and that man does not make judgments on internal matters, it is rightly inferred that it can oblige only to perform temporal and external acts, but not that it cannot bind in conscience. For even if this rule directs only external acts, nevertheless, since it is a rule, deviating from it is committing a sin.
You will say, how can the law or temporal authority produce a spiritual effect, namely, binding the conscience? I reply that even if the political authority and its law are called temporal because of their object, which is to deal with temporal and external matters, nevertheless in themselves they are spiritual things. Besides, binding the conscience is not performing something spiritual, but only commanding another in such a way that if he does not obey, he sins; and by the testimony of his conscience he should or could understand that he is indeed committing a sin. Therefore, whoever can command can also bind the conscience, even if he does not make judgments on internal matters or does not examine another person’s conscience.
To the fourth and fifth I say that the prince cannot impose a spiritual and eternal punishment, and he cannot lift such punishment, but he can nevertheless impose an obligation under pain of such punishment, since he does it by the authority of God, Who granted him the latter and not the former. It is as if a king allowed a viceroy to impose an obligation on the subjects under pain of capital punishment but did not allow him to administer justice by himself or to pardon the punishment. Or we can say that political law binds under pain of eternal punishment not because it is the law of man, but because it is the law of the minister of God. Whoever offends a minister of God at the same time offends God, wherefore if per impossibile there were no God in nature, and likewise per impossibile there were a certain political law, this would bind in conscience, and transgressing it would be a sin, but no spiritual punishment or eternal damnation would follow the transgression.
To the sixth I say that it is not absurd that the same sin is punished by many and in many places when it offends many, for often we see that murderers have the hands cut off at the place where the murder took place, and their heads cut off at the place of public execution.
To the seventh I say that it depends on the intention of the legislator whether he wants to command in earnest and to make true laws or wants only to show what should be done without any command. But if he wants to command in earnest and make true laws, it is not in his power to exempt his law from binding under pain of mortal or venial sin, according to the importance of the matter.
To the last I say that the reason why human law gives way to divine law when they cannot both be obeyed at the same time is not that human law does not bind under pain of sin, but that it is established less firmly. For in such a case it ceases to be law, and therefore it ceases to be binding. See what we said in book 4 of De Summo Pontifice; and also John Driedo in book 3 of De libertate Christiana, Adrian in Quodlibeta 6, Francisco de Vitoria in the lecture on civil authority; Alfonso de Castro, book 1 of De potestate legis poenalis, chapter 4, and Domingo de Soto, De iustitia et iure, book 1, question 6, article 4.
The third proposition
The conduct of public trials is not forbidden to Christians. The proof is, first, that it is a prerogative of the prince to exercise justice, for Scripture usually considers king and judge almost as synonyms: Psalm 2, “Be wise now therefore, O ye kings: be instructed, ye judges of the earth”;102 Isaiah 33, “For the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king”;103 Jeremiah 23, “A King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth.”104 If, therefore, it is lawful for Christians to have a prince, why not a judge also?
Second, because the laws would have no benefit if there were no judgment, but laws must not be abolished, as we showed above, nor therefore judgments.
Third, Scripture in both Testaments admits judgments, for we read this in Deuteronomy 16: “Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, which the Lord thy God giveth thee, throughout thy tribes: and they shall judge the people