relationships and imaginations.
During 2002 and 2003, as part of my master’s thesis in pedagogy, I conducted twenty-six semi-structured interviews with women in Germany and the United Kingdom, fourteen of which were used to analyze and discuss the current impact of normative views about mothers in Germany and the UK. The interviews in the UK were made possible with the financial support of the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst (DAAD), which allowed me to spend one semester as a visiting researcher at the Women’s Studies Department at Lancaster University, which is now the Centre for Gender and Women’s Studies. With Germany and the UK being the main sites of my research, I understood the interview material to provide insights into various theories developed and experiences had by my interviewees within these two socio-geographical settings. Thus, the focus of the study was not to compare the sites of my research as potential contradictory cultural settings, but to understand more about possibilities to work through various accounts by women about motherhood/mothering and RGTs. These possibilities were broadened not only by the bilingualism of the material and the wide ranging personal and professional [16] backgrounds of my interviewees, but also by the fact that my interviewees agreed to be defined as having gained expertise in the field motherhood/mothering in either Germany or the UK. Due to the time available and the page limitation of a master’s thesis the discourse analysis of the gathered material focused on two main areas, namely, becoming a mother – identity and status, and becoming a mother – a choice? In the context of the master’s thesis, “becoming a mother” did not describe the process of being pregnant or relate to mothers-to-be. Rather, my work took into account that “becoming a mother” covers processes such as wanting to be pregnant, having been pregnant, never wanting to be pregnant and being pregnant and that these processes have in common that they are intimate states in (not exclusively) women’s lives.
Based on the research conducted for the master’s thesis, I decided that I would move toward a focus on embodiment in my PhD dissertation, foregrounding the practice of looking at the relationship between RGTs and embodiment in ways that do not situate pregnant women, or women who are attempting to get pregnant, as the primary focus. It appeared to me, that much of the work regarding the relationship between reproduction and embodiment at the time focused on “pregnant embodiment” and the literally pregnant female body (Nash 2012, Young 1984, Tyler 2000, Matthews and Wexler 2000). In 1998, my master’s thesis submitted for my diploma in social work at the University of Applied Sciences in Kiel, Germany, had focused on the history of women’s sexuality by investigating social, cultural, legal and religious regulations and structures from the Middle Ages to the end of the 20th Century. Other than the 1998 study, which took me back in time as it looked at constraints and understandings of women’s sexuality in history, conceptualizing my master’s thesis in pedagogy in Frankfurt am Main had to serve as an introduction to my PhD research. As such it pre-examined conceptual choices and introduced me to RGTs as a research field and to English speaking countries as part of the sites I would be looking at. Thus, this time I chose to travel in space and language rather than time.
At the beginning of my second master’s Thesis, public and policy debates, medical discourses and ethical concerns, and thus, medical options open to women within Germany and the UK in the field of reproductive medicine were and still are significantly different. When I worked on the first conceptual draft of the study that was to become the pre-study for my PhD research, feminist scholars such as Sigrid Graumann and Sarah Franklin pointed out that it is no longer, and maybe never has been, possible to detach fertility treatment from genetic research (Graumann 2003, Franklin 1998). In this study, I will therefore refer to the area as Reproductive and Genetic Technologies (RGTs) thereby acknowledging the very intersection of practices, which are related to the use of bodily substances outside of women’s bodies such as egg cells and outside of human bodies in general, such as cell tissue.
[17] Having the privilege of being hosted at Lancaster University in England for one semester enabled me to have conversations with some of the key feminist thinkers in the field of RGTs at the time, including Maureen McNeil, Sara Ahmed and Sarah Franklin. Also, attending many conferences, meetings, symposia and reading groups during my stay, it was repeatedly stated that one of the most significant sites for future-leading policy decision-making in the health care sector in Europe would be the area of RGTs. Additionally, Nicole Richardt pointed out, in relation to Julia O’Connor’s et. al work, that the conjunction between Reproductive and Genetic Technologies had an impact on legal challenges for welfare states. “Welfare states have concerned themselves with the sexual and reproductive lives of their citizens […], but embryological research and ARTs4 present a new set of challenges” (Richardt 2003: 88). For her comparison of the legal framework countries develop in response to these challenges Richardt chose Great Britain and Germany to explain, “[…] why diametrically opposed laws on embryological research were passed in the two countries” (ibid). Her choice points to the fact that within the European Community, Germany, and the UK were and are oftentimes represented as not only occupying polar positions with respect to the regulation and practice of RGTs but, within debates that took place in the beginning stages of this study regarding embryo and stem cell research, the two countries were codified as the antithesis of each other. It seems as though “the German position” and “the British position” have become the edges of the platform on which the European discussions about regulating new innovations in reproductive science and medicine take place. Pointing out that this oppositioning is an oversimplification, “[…] in that there are respects in which the UK is not the most liberal,” Deryck Beyleveld and Shaun D. Pattinson however, acknowledge that “Of the permissive countries, the UK is generally viewed as the most liberal, and it is the contrast between its position and that of prohibition countries such as Ireland, Germany and Austria […]” (Beyleveld and Pattinson 2001: 59).
Within the political discussion in Germany, a concentration on issues concerning the concept of human dignity and the Kantian maxim, that as an end in itself humans are required never to treat others merely as a means to an end, seemed and seems to inform discussions about embryo research as well as practices like In Vitro Fertilization (IVF)5 in which the child could be seen as a “remedy” for an illness of its parents (i.e. infertility). At the beginning of this study it seemed to me that in both Germany and the UK, the focus of public and political debate was on the status of the embryo. On the one hand, the [18] embryo was viewed as holding the potential to become a human being and thus able to claim human rights. On the other hand, the embryo was seen as offering the best possible ‘material’ for infertility and stem cell research and its presumed potential feeds the vision of a patient specific medicine.
During the main writing period of the PhD this book is based on a shift took place and members of feminist organizations such as ReproKult in Germany or non-profit activist institutions such as the Corner House in the UK pointed to the situation of women not only with regards to reproductive technologies, but also especially with regards to genetic research. At the time, also on the European level an awareness began to form, which was then expressed in the 2005 decision of the European Parliament not to fund embryonic research that uses up embryos and the call of the United Nations to ban (human) cloning, as a means of preventing the exploitation of women as egg cell donors. This is followed, however, by the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee in the UK issuing a report that explores the idea of differentiating between forms of embryos in order to allow a different assessment of their status, which in turn creates a terminology that can justify the use of embryos that are not to be used for reproduction for research purposes (Select Committee on Science and Technology 2002: Fourth Report). With this report, the committee also responds indirectly and in a disagreeing manner to the call of the United Nation. The report states: “Britain is well placed to be a world leader in human genetics and embryology research and it is crucial that our scientists, in complying with regulatory requirements, are not hampered by bureaucracy” (ibid). This example illustrates that the understanding of how to achieve scientific progress and the relationship of law to this process is quite different in different European countries. The opposite picture that is painted between the UK and Germany on a European level had, in the first instance, influenced my choice for these research sites. However, it has never been my research interest to find details on this contrary positioning or relationship of both sides, but to look at how developments in both countries impact the level of women’s