the party, is typical of such an approach. In fact, Whelan’s survey account of Haughey’s contribution to Northern Ireland is littered with generalisations and in places inaccuracies. With regard to Haughey’s Northern Ireland policy on becoming taoiseach in 1979, for example, Whelan made the misinformed claim that Haughey ‘followed much the same policy as [Jack] Lynch’.74 As is explained in this book, such fleeting comments are wide of the mark.
Moreover, studies focused on modern Ireland and the history of Irish nationalism, have neglected to delve into Haughey’s political thinking in relation to Northern Ireland. In their respective works, Richard English and George D. Boyce, offered excellent insights into the development of Irish nationalism, both conceptually and from a practical perspective. Nonetheless, neither author thought it worthwhile to consider Haughey’s attitude to Irish nationalism or more generally Northern Ireland.75 Those works focused on Anglo-Irish relations during the Northern Ireland conflict have similarly neglected to analyse, in sufficient detail, Haughey’s Northern Ireland policy.76
The most controversial episode in relation to Haughey’s lifelong association with the Northern Ireland question was undoubtedly his involvement with the Arms Crisis. While there has been some first-class investigative journalism devoted to this subject, notably by the Magill magazine in 1980,77 together with several published works on the Arms Crisis,78 many questions still remain unanswered regarding Haughey’s role in this affair. Indeed, several of Haughey’s biographers79 and more general studies related to Fianna Fáil have, likewise, sought to explore his contribution to this pivotal event in modern Irish history.80 Yet, these works have offered only a superficial insight into Haughey’s actions and motivation. To quote Conor Cruise O’Brien, himself writing in the mid-1970s, ‘much still remains murky’ regarding the Arms Crisis and Haughey’s involvement in this affair.81
This study seeks to clear up many of these unanswered questions, not least the motivations behind Haughey’s actions during the Arms Crisis. In fact, a misinformed perception continues to dominate the historiography in relation to Haughey’s role during this affair. While most writers are in agreement that he played a prominent part in this seismic episode in the history of modern Ireland, many continue to question his motivations. A widely held myth continues to distort the true reasons behind Haughey’s actions, seeing his role in the conspiracy to import arms and ammunitions into Northern Ireland as little more than shrewd political opportunism on his behalf in a bid to topple and replace Jack Lynch as Fianna Fáil leader.82 Raymond Smith wrote that before the events surrounding the Arms Crisis Haughey ‘had never been identified in the public mind as holding any strong views on how the Northern Ireland question might be solved’.83 Stephen Collins, likewise, noted that the ‘real surprise of the Arms Crisis was not that it had happened but that Haughey should be centrally involved’.84
Bruce Arnold, in the vein of many other writers, claimed that Haughey’s militant stance towards Northern Ireland from the summer of 1969 culminating in his involvement in the Arms Crisis, was motivated not by any ‘burning zeal’ to secure Irish unity but was, in fact, ‘a republicanism created to defend a political flank’.85 The idea, Arnold wrote, that Haughey ‘was a committed, if covert, republican ... simply does not add up. There is no evidence for it’.86 Haughey, Arnold maintained, was frightened by Neil Blaney’s undisputed republican credentials, a reputation which could prove vital in any future bid for the presidency of Fianna Fáil. Haughey, therefore, converted to ‘covert republicanism’ during this period in an effort to outflank Blaney on the republican ticket.87
A perception has emerged amongst writers that Haughey neither held a deep-rooted ideological commitment to Irish unity nor genuinely cared for the plight of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland. On the contrary, they argue that Haughey was motivated purely by his desire to be leader of Fianna Fáil.88 In particular, writers point to Haughey’s period as minister of justice during the early 1960s when under the Seán Lemass-led government he showed no remorse for his suppression of the IRA border campaign (1956–62).89 Indeed, Arnold alluded to the ‘fact’ that prior to the outbreak of the violence in Northern Ireland in mid-1969, Haughey was a strong advocate of the Lemass-style economic solution for securing an end to partition.90
However, Haughey’s clampdown of the IRA and his general endorsement of Lemass’s Northern Ireland policy, do not necessarily contradict his perceived alleged ‘greening’ by 1969/70. As Justin O’Brien observed, for an ambitious young minister, as ‘he ascended the ranks of the party and government, there was little to be gained in emphasising the gap between rhetoric and reality’ in relation to Northern Ireland.91 Better for Haughey to bide his time. This study argues that the outbreak of violence on the streets of Northern Ireland in 1969 struck a chord with Haughey, ‘his passion for Irish unity was revealed and his well-hidden anti-partitionist feelings reignited’.92 It would be misleading not to agree that political ambition was a motivating, if not central, factor in Haughey’s thinking during this period. However – and this is an important point – his actions were also motivated by a genuine and hitherto unrecognised deep-rooted commitment to a united Ireland. As Henry Patterson correctly explained, ‘For Haughey, the events of August 1969 produced a powerful confluence of ideological affinity and political ambition.’93
A further significant gap in the historiography of Haughey’s involvement with Northern Ireland, centres on his undervalued role in the genesis of the Northern Ireland peace process. In fact, apart from the seminal studies by Ed Moloney94 and Eamonn Mallie and David McKittrick,95 respectively, Haughey’s contribution to the early stages of the Northern Ireland peace process during the late 1980s and early 1990s has all but been ignored.96 Haughey’s biographers97 and more general studies related to the history of Fianna Fáil98 have, likewise, glossed over his integral role in helping to bring the gun out of Irish politics. Haughey’s decision during his retirement to generally refrain from speaking about his role vis-à-vis the Northern Ireland peace process has also played a part in distorting the historical facts. As he later explained: ‘The stage is already overcrowded with people attempting to claim credit.’99 Again, this work readdresses this imbalance, offering readers a fresh interpretation of Haughey’s public and private role in the embryonic stages of the Northern Ireland peace process.
Conclusion
Writing in the Irish Times in the immediate aftermath of Haughey’s shock resignation as taoiseach and Fianna Fáil leader in late 1992, Frank Millar aptly described Haughey’s attitude to Northern Ireland and more generally Anglo-Irish relations. ‘Charles Haughey,’ Millar wrote, ‘will at least go down in history as the man who most wanted to have a profound effect on Anglo-Irish relations.’ Millar continued: ‘he [Haughey] was that rare creature in southern Irish politics – a man with an abiding interest in the North. Whatever about his views he at least had a keen sense of the place.’100 Millar had indeed got to the very essence of Haughey’s feelings towards Northern Ireland and his lifelong aversion to the partition of his beloved country.
Addressing the assembled media on his appointment as Fianna Fáil leader in December 1979, Haughey was asked by one journalist about his dismissal as a government minister in 1970 and his time in the ‘political wilderness’. ‘They are very much now a matter for history. I’m leaving them to the historian,’ was Haughey’s reply.101 Well, the time has now arrived for the historian to do his job. On the emotive subject of Northern Ireland this book brings to life many of Haughey’s hidden skeletons. It deconstructs the myths and picks apart the historical inaccuracies and simplifications when assessing his stance on Northern Ireland and more generally Anglo-Irish relations.
CHAPTER ONE
‘I Am a Man of Northern Extraction’: The Genesis of Haughey’s Attitude to Northern Ireland, 1945–1966
‘When I talk about Ireland I am talking about something that is not yet a reality, it is a dream that has not yet been fulfilled.’
[Charles J. Haughey, circa 1986]1
‘My ancestral home’: Haughey’s Ulster background
The origins of Charles J. Haughey’s