(chairman of the cumann); George Colley, a future deputy leader of the party; his father Harry Colley, TD for Dublin North-East; Oscar Traynor, also a TD for Dublin North-East; and Harry Boland, brother of Kevin Boland and son to Gerald Boland.53 Unfortunately, the Ó Cléirigh memorandum is not signed, therefore one will never be able to state definitively that Haughey wrote or co-wrote it. Nonetheless, the fact that it was written in the plural, suggests that its contents represent the collective viewpoint of the members of the Tomas Ó Cléirigh cumann.54
The very fact that Haughey, in his capacity as honorary secretary of the Ó Cléirigh cumann, sent the memorandum directly to the Fianna Fáil national executive reinforces the argument that he most likely endorsed its contents.55 Moreover, the memorandum’s ‘military’ tone, focused on guerrilla warfare tactics, included attacks on key military and strategic installations in Northern Ireland, which adds weight to the argument that Haughey had a part to play in its formation. At this time he was a FCÁ officer, commanding ‘A’ company, North Dublin battalion. Over the previous several years, initially in the LDF and later the FCÁ, he had amassed a wealth of military knowledge, an unusual trait for the time.
Oral testimonies also provide circumstantial evidence to support the claim that Haughey played a role in the formulation of the Ó Cléirigh memorandum. Although Haughey’s son, Seán Haughey, remains adamant that ‘there is nothing to suggest’ that his father contributed to the Ó Cléirigh memorandum, there is contrary evidence to suggest otherwise. In correspondence with this author, Seán Haughey stated that there is no copy of the Ó Cléirigh memorandum on partition in the private papers of Charles J. Haughey. He instead suggested that George Colley was the possible author.56 Two former members of the Ó Cléirigh cumann, however, disagree with Seán Haughey’s claim.
In a 2008 interview Harry Boland, a member of Ó Cléirigh cumann during the period in question, said he would be ‘very surprised’ if Haughey did not produce the Ó Cléirigh memorandum. He explained that Haughey and Colley worked closely with one another and although he could not recall the memorandum in question, both men were in charge of policy development.57 Mary Colley, wife to George Colley, was ‘convinced’ that Haughey and her husband devised the Ó Cléirigh memorandum. In a 2009 interview she recalled that the two men would spend hours together discussing Northern Ireland, and she remembered that Haughey came to her home on several occasions during late 1954 and early 1955, where, she believed, he and Colley formulated the memorandum.58
The Ó Cléirigh memorandum was produced in the aftermath of the 1954 Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis, held in October of that year. The catalyst was Éamon de Valera’s public acknowledgement during his presidential address that without the consent of Ulster unionists he was unable to offer any credible solution for ending partition.59 Furthermore, the Fianna Fáil leader categorically rejected the use of force to secure Irish unity.60 To the amazement (and disgust) of some of those present, he admitted that he did not think it ‘is possible to point out steps’ that would ‘inevitably lead to the end of partition’.61 He went as far as to inform Fianna Fáil delegates that ‘our efforts to make for a solution of that sort have come to nought’.62
De Valera’s speech, as reported by the Irish Times, did not have the support of a number of ‘wild men’ within Fianna Fáil.63 Harry Boland, who was in attendance during the 1954 Ard Fheis, recalled that ‘many young folks within Fianna Fáil had become disillusioned’ because so little progress was being made to end partition. He remembered that at this Ard Fheis a cohort of delegates, particularly those of a younger age, openly expressed their frustration at the lack of action on partition from the Fianna Fáil hierarchy.64 Boland remarked that along with Haughey and Colley, he felt that ‘nothing was happening on the North’ and that the time had arrived to initiate a fresh approach to partition.65 Indeed, the previous September 1954, on behalf of the Ó Cléirigh cumann, Haughey issued a resolution requesting that ‘the [Fianna Fáil] National Executive submit to the Ard Fheis proposals for a positive line of action on partition’.66
It was with this sense of despondency and frustration that members of the Ó Cléirigh cumann penned the memorandum. Its central thesis was the advocacy of physical force as a legitimate method to secure Irish unity. Its preamble declared that de Valera’s recent Ard Fheis speech, ‘made it clear’ that partition could not be ended by ‘diplomatic measures’. Therefore, the only ‘policy open to us which gives reasonable hope of success’, it explained, was the use of force.67 ‘Outside the Organisation’, the Ó Cléirigh memorandum declared:
There is a noticeable and growing discontent with National Inaction in relation to Partition. This Cumann believed that this feeling is particularly widespread even at present, and that the question of Partition will become a major issue for the younger generation of Irish people, at any rate within the next five years ... At present, young people who feel strongly on this question of Partition have not outlet [sic] for their feelings of national outrage except the IRA ...We believe it is the duty of the Fianna Fáil Organisation to provide the leadership and the organisation of such national feeling, and that if it should fail to do so, it will be responsible for the consequences.68
In the context of understanding the genesis of Haughey’s attitude to Northern Ireland, the Ó Cléirigh memorandum offers fascinating evidence, which has only come to light in recent years.69 Four recommended policies stand out for particular attention. First, the memorandum suggested that the Irish government, in conjunction with the Irish army, should enact a campaign of guerrilla warfare in Northern Ireland. It argued that:
An important preparation would, of course, be in the military sphere. While there is a reasonable hope that negotiations could be forced before the necessity for military action arose, nevertheless it would be criminally negligent to embark on the campaign without having made preparations in our power to deal with every contingency likely to arise. In this connection, we advocate the lying-in of the greatest possible stocks of arms and ammunitions suitable for guerrilla warfare, the closest possible study of British military installations likely to be of particular importance in relation to the areas in which the campaign will be carried out ...70
The Ó Cléirigh memorandum envisaged that the Irish government-sponsored guerrilla warfare campaign would concentrate its resources on one or two areas in Northern Ireland with Catholic majorities (probably situated in counties Derry and Armagh). It noted that the following advantages could hence be won:
(a)From the point of view of the international propaganda, we can claim that we are merely trying to enforce the will of the people in the area; and
(b)The area or areas concerned being contiguous to the Border can be more easily dealt with and kept in communication with the other portion of the Six-Counties.71
It explained that an objection to this policy might be advanced on the grounds that the ‘concentration of our efforts on one or two nationalist areas would be tantamount to the abandonment of the remainder of the Six-Counties’. ‘Such an argument,’ it noted, ‘would be unrealistic, since there is ample precedent for a step-by-step policy in our past history, e.g. the taking over of the ports was not regarded as an abandonment of our claim on the Six-Counties.’72
Second, the Ó Cléirigh memorandum proposed that once the guerrilla campaign was underway that the Irish government, with the support of Northern Ireland Catholics, should commence a campaign of civil disobedience (in those selected areas). Such a campaign, it noted:
Should be controlled and directed by the Irish Government, either openly or secretly. The object of such a campaign would be to create an international incident which could not be ignored by the British Government. The campaign would be based on that adopted by Sinn Féin, i.e. non-recognition of British or Stormont sovereignty in the area or areas selected; non-recognition of the Courts, and the setting-up of ‘Sinn Féin’ Courts; the withholding of rates and taxes...73
Indeed, at the 1954 Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis, during a private meeting, Colley had asked de Valera’s opinions on the possibility of creating an ‘incident on the border’, which would bring international attention to partition. De Valera was quick to reject Colley’s hypothesis. He rhetorically inquired if Colley would be prepared to be a ‘G [Green] Special’, who like the B-Specials, would have to enforce the rule of law