but the issue always becomes the will to continue the action, particularly if the interveners take increasing numbers of casualties.114 The intervention might also provide space for the humanitarians to do their job and deliver humanitarian assistance—although the issue of the staying power of the intervention forces will become an issue. These are all possible positive effects. But an intervention might have negative consequences. It might imperil the humanitarian mission. It might create incentives for certain parties, in particular rebel groups, to become more intransigent or otherwise encourage them, thus prolonging a conflict.115 It can also lead to civilian casualties. It must be recognized from the start of any R2P action that civilian casualties are inevitable. There are ways to mitigate this and reduce the potential for dead civilians. Yet, all too often, the interveners do not want to take such actions, at least partly because it may imperil their own troops. This was illustrated all too clearly in Kosovo, where NATO restricted itself to high-altitude bombing of Serb positions, rather than exposing their airplanes to antiaircraft fire or the dangers of putting troops on the ground, which would inevitably have led to NATO casualties. As a result, more civilians were killed than might have been the case otherwise. Humanitarians thus need to keep this in mind when advocating for intervention.
We thus have a very complicated relationship between these three sets of responsibilities and associated practices. The choices made by decision makers and actors on the ground are difficult and complex. While the three responsibilities—protection, prosecution, and palliation—all come from the same broad human rights and humanitarian project, their efficacy and eventual impacts are such that they are not necessarily mutually reinforcing. Rather, they may at times undermine each other—either intentionally or unintentionally.
Furthermore, the question of how best to protect those affected by mass atrocity situations and associated humanitarian crises is difficult to answer. Palliation saves lives; yet, in the most extreme circumstances, it cannot protect individuals from government troops, warlords, paramilitaries, or rebel forces. Prosecution punishes criminals; yet it might also make peace negotiations more difficult. And, in the absence of evidence of a significant deterrent effect, it cannot be claimed to protect people in harm’s way. Robust R2P activities can physically protect people, but it can also endanger them. There is also little appetite on the part of those who could protect to actually do so in most situations. It is thus a very unsure route to protection. All three of these responsibilities have a role to play in assistance and protecting those affected by widespread violent conflict and human rights abuses. The issue, as always, comes down to political will to choose and implement the most appropriate response(s), although this will is in little evidence in too many situations.
Table 1.1. Responsibility Conundrums
CHAPTER 2
Rwanda: The Failure of “Never Again”
We in the United States and the world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred in Rwanda in 1994…. We must have global vigilance. And never again must we be shy in the face of evidence.
We will not deny that, in their greatest hour of need, the world failed the people of Rwanda.
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994, which claimed around 800,000 lives, illustrated the failures of the international community in the post-Cold War world. Yet, as much as anything, it was the response that did occur—and in particular the role of humanitarian action—combined with this failure and the resulting conflict in neighboring Zaire, which was an even more significant legacy. As will be clear, it is difficult to address the first two conflicts that are the subject of the present and following chapters—Rwanda and DRC/Zaire—separately. To a significant extent, one begat the other. Rwanda, which was ignored by the international community, became the watchword for “never again!” while DRC/Zaire exists below the global radar, even though the death and devastation eclipses the Rwandan genocide.
This chapter will briefly discuss the origins of the genocide in Rwanda and the global context in which the genocide occurred. It will examine how the failure of the international community to respond to the genocide and adequately deal with the humanitarian and security aftermath led directly to the conflict in the DRC/Zaire. It will look at how the emerging responsibilities played out. It was failure in Rwanda that helped set the scene for the development of R2P. Yet before R2P there was the “never again” norm, which structured how the international community talked about the genocide, even if it had little effect on the response. The creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda helped set the scene for the eventual establishment of the ICC, but in Rwanda demonstrated the problematic nature of international justice mechanisms. But it was the humanitarian response that led to much soul-searching on the part of humanitarians and raised significant questions about the role of humanitarianism in the midst of conflict.
Heading Toward Genocide
The early 1990s were a period of hope internationally. The Cold War had ended, the UN was no longer deadlocked, conflicts such as those in Namibia and Mozambique were being settled, and the UN began to flex its muscles a bit more as it expanded peacekeeping operations around the world. Yet this optimism was soon dashed as the UN failed for three years to adequately address the spreading conflict in the former Yugoslavia and also failed to bring to an end the fighting in Somalia, which began in 1991 and continues to this day. The Rwandan genocide has been covered in exhaustive detail elsewhere.1 Rather than going over old ground, the discussion below will highlight details that are salient for the ensuing analysis of competing responsibilities and pinpoint how the international community’s failure to deal with the genocide and its aftermath led directly to a much bigger crisis.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Rwanda was controlled by Germany. After World War II, control of Rwanda was transferred to Belgium. As part of their strategy to control the population, the Belgians manipulated and reified previously fluid identities, resulting in two major groups—the minority Tutsi who ruled over the majority Hutu (as well as a much smaller group of Twa). Rwanda has experienced multiple instances of genocide and other conflict since it became independent of Belgium in 1962. Many Tutsi fled the country, in fear of the Hutu majority regime that took power at independence. Genocide occurred in 1963, and more Tutsi fled to neighboring countries—in particular Uganda—with more fleeing in 1972. In 1973, Juvénal Habyarimana, a Hutu, took power in a coup.2
In 1990, Tutsi militants in the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)—many of whom had been trained and incorporated into the Ugandan military—invaded Rwanda. This failed, at least partly because France and Zaire sent forces to protect the government. Killing of Tutsi followed, as did further incursions from Uganda.3 An RPF attack in February 1993 led to renewed negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania, eventually resulting in a peace agreement (the Arusha Accords) and the creation, later in 1993, of a UN peacekeeping mission—the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), led by Canadian general Roméo Dallaire.4 General Dallaire had originally planned for 8,000 troops, although the eventual number agreed on was 2,548. This was due to reluctance on the part of the United States and UK to fund yet another mission, with 80,000 troops in 17 UN peacekeeping missions already deployed, and with the U.S. responsible for one-third of the peacekeeping bill. Furthermore, the failure of the U.S. in Somalia made the U.S.—and the UN—more skittish about robust peace operations. They were worried about crossing the “Mogadishu Line” from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. Both UN and U.S. reviews of peacekeeping led to criteria that would constrain the use of force in UN operations, and thus delimited the possible boundaries of UN peacekeeping operations, including Rwanda.5 The U.S. initially wanted a token force of 500 troops, but eventually relented to a certain extent, allowing a large, but still inadequate, force to be created.6 The mandate of the mission was to support the transition to democratic governance. However, UNAMIR was severely underequipped and undersupported from the start, lacking a full complement of troops, key equipment such as helicopters and armored personnel carriers, desks,