International Responses to Mass Atrocities in Africa. Kurt Mills

A Human Rights Watch report¹¹² in May 1995 stated that arms were reaching the militants, and Zaire felt implicated. Further, Security Council Resolution 1011 of August 16, lifting the arms embargo against Rwanda, directly contravened Zaire’s position in favor of continuing the arms embargo. Consequently, approximately 12,000–15,000 refugees were expelled from the Kivu region to Cyangugu and Gisenyi in Rwanda over several days, beginning 19 August.¹¹³ It is unclear why the repatriations stopped. One senior UNHCR official claims it was the result of international pressure.¹¹⁴ The head of the UNHCR office in Goma at the time maintains that the repatriation was not seriously supported by the central government and that while it might have instigated the repatriation, the local officials were on their own. Under these conditions, there was no way that the repatriation could be sustained, and on 20 August the forcible returns ended.¹¹⁵

      Although the forced repatriation was condemned as a violation of human rights, and UNHCR could not support it because it contravened its mandate and other international law, some palliators saw it as a possibly positive development.¹¹⁶ There was relatively little violence, and the refugees, for the most part, seemed to move of their own free will. Yet, the hoped for momentum for further voluntary returns did not materialize, and some officials, particularly in Kigali, were coming to the conclusion that forced repatriation was the only way to get the refugees back. In other words, UNHCR should just allow this to happen, and then help the refugees when they were back in Rwanda. Some coercion, probably by Zairian forces, was necessary to break the stranglehold of the extremists to allow the refugees to make their own decision (although it was assumed most of them would decide to return).¹¹⁷

      Soon thereafter, Zaire announced a deadline of 31 December 1995 for all the refugees to leave Zaire. UNHCR did not oppose the deadline, and was roundly criticized.¹¹⁸ Yet some felt that the only way to deal with the situation and allow the refugees to exercise what was assumed to be their preferred option to return to Rwanda was to, in fact, force them to exercise that option.¹¹⁹ This was, at least on the surface, a significant breach of international norms, and it was shocking that UNHCR would not vigorously oppose such an eventuality. Yet it also highlighted the difficulties and conundrums faced by humanitarian actors in a situation where the international community is not willing to act. The deadline came and went without the hoped for returns. On 26 November, after a meeting with former President Carter, President Mobutu Sese Seko announced the deadline was being suspended. The voluntary return of refugees, which had increased significantly during the previous month, declined precipitously.¹²⁰

      The Return of the Refugees

      Throughout the first part of 1996, other strategies were pursued. The Zairian government restricted travel on the part of refugees. Further, much economic activity was quashed by Zairian troops, including the closing of shops. This was very short-lived, however.¹²¹ The problem of repatriation appeared intractable. While attempting to implement voluntary repatriation, UNHCR Goma also followed another tactic. Recognizing that there was no prospect of the refugees returning to Rwanda soon, it decided to investigate another durable solution—moving those refugees who did not wish to go back to settlements farther from the border. UNHCR recognized that this would not be looked on favorably by Zaire. Further, it would undermine efforts to encourage voluntary repatriation. It would help the leaders gain greater control over the refugees and a firmer position within Zaire from which to mount their hoped for return to power in Rwanda. Yet UNHCR hoped that it might put more pressure on Zaire to arrest the leaders as it had promised. However, it was difficult to envisage the entire refugee population moving to new locations, and just moving the camps without addressing the issue of the militants would not help the situation. UNHCR considered moving some of the camps closest to the border away from the border to deprive the militants of easy access for their raids into Rwanda. One camp considered was Kibumba, which had a relatively weak internal structure. Many in Kibumba wanted to stay there because they had easy access to their interests, such as property, in Rwanda. UNHCR hoped that moving the camp would undermine the camp structure and induce many of the refugees to repatriate. In turn, it was hoped, this would build momentum for repatriation from other camps. Yet relocation could also have the effect of making staying in Zaire appear like a realistic possibility for the refugees, undermining UNHCR’s position that stability in the region could only be attained by the return of the refugees. Such a strategy would allow the international community to continue to abdicate its responsibility. In the end, none of these options were implemented.¹²²

      At the same time, the security situation in eastern Zaire was getting worse. By October a widespread civil war had emerged in eastern Zaire as a result of an attempt by the government to expel approximately 400,000 local Tutsi—the Banyamulenge. The Banyamulenge, and other forces hostile to the Mobutu regime, constituted themselves as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) and counterattacked. The ADFL, which will figure prominently in the next chapter, was also supported by Rwanda and Uganda, who were concerned with ending the infiltrations from Zaire. As the ADFL swept through eastern Zaire, they attacked refugee camps, since they saw ex-FAR and militia as enemies and the camps as enemy bases. Thousands of refugees died, probably at the hands of all parties involved in the conflict—ADFL, ex-FAR and militia, and Zairian troops. And, from late 1996 onwards, all the major camps were emptied.¹²³

      As the conflict spread, and the pressures on the refugees from many different quarters increased, it was clear that UNHCR was involved in a situation far beyond its normal operating parameters and that it could not hope to adequately deal with the situation. It was marginalized as events overtook its capabilities. The High Commissioner told UNHCR’s Executive Committee on October 7 that “probably never before has my office found its humanitarian concerns in the midst of such a lethal quagmire of political and security interests.”¹²⁴ Refugees fled before their camps were destroyed, and eventually all international aid workers were evacuated from Bukavu and then Goma by 2 November, thus losing access to information and the refugees themselves. On 7 November UNHCR called on the international community to raise a force to ensure humanitarian access. UNHCR supported the proposed, but ultimately doomed, multinational force.¹²⁵ The High Commissioner also encouraged the refugees to return in a radio address in October.¹²⁶