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Talmud


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enclosures." Now, if the length of the corner-boards should be increased, then R. Jehudah would say that the boards around a well also constitute a partition. Rejoined Abayi: Around a cattle-pen or a fold, a bleaching-ground or a courtyard, according to R. Jehudah, the law of a partition is applied and that must not contain a space larger than ten ells, and it matters not whether that space have a capacity large enough to permit of planting one or five kur of grain; but the space between the corner-boards was fixed at thirteen and one-third ells because the law of enclosures is applied, hence it should not have a capacity larger than would permit of the planting of two saahs of grain, even if the length of the boards be increased.

      Abayi asked Rabba again: "Can a sandheap four ells wide and sloping up to a height of ten spans take the place of the corner-boards at a well?" Answered Rabba: "This is taught in a Tosephta: 'R. Simeon ben Elazar said: If there was a square rock standing at the corner of a well, which if divided would form an angle, each side of which would be one ell, it may take the place of corner-boards, otherwise it cannot.'" R. Ishmael the son of R. Johanan ben Berokah said: "Even if the rock was round and when made square and divided would form an angle each side of which would be one ell, it may also take the place of the corner-boards." On what point do they differ? According to the former Tana there is only one supposition allowed regarding the rock, whereas according to the latter, even two suppositions concerning the rock are permitted.

      He asked him again: "May a bush take the place of corner-boards?" and Rabba answered: "We have learned this in a Boraitha: If there was a fence, a tree, or a number of cane-laths on the spot, they may serve as corner-boards." What is meant by cane-laths? In all probability a bush. Nay; we might assume, that they were really cane-laths and less than three spans apart? Then, by application of the law of "lavud" it would be a fence, and the Boraitha mentions a fence in the first place; why should the repetition be made? If it is a bush, it is the same as a tree; why the repetition in this instance? It might be said, then, that two kinds of a tree are mentioned; why should not two kinds of fences be mentioned?

      Abayi asked him again: May things be carried from a courtyard opening into the enclosure around a well and vice versa? Rabba answered: "They may." "How is it if there were two adjoining courtyards opening into the enclosure?" "Then one must not carry from the courtyards into the enclosure." Said R. Huna: "If there were two courtyards, even an Erub will not make it lawful to carry things from the courtyards into the enclosure as a precaution, lest it be said, that the law of Erub applies also to enclosures." Rabha, however, said: "If an Erub was made, it is lawful." Said Abayi: "I know of a Boraitha, which supporteth thy opinion, viz.: If a courtyard opened into an enclosure around a well, things may be carried to and from the courtyard and the enclosure, but if two courtyards opened into the enclosure, this is not allowed, provided an Erub was not made. If an Erub was made, it is lawful."

      Abayi asked Rabba again: "What is the law concerning the enclosures of a well which had gone dry on Sabbath?" and he answered: "Were not the enclosures made merely for the sake of the water? If the water gave out, the enclosures are void." Now asked Rabin of Abayi: "What is the law if the well went dry on the Sabbath and was filled again on the same day?" Answered Abayi: Concerning the law of a well that had gone dry I asked Master and he told me that the enclosures were void; hence if the well filled up again on the same day the enclosure must be regarded as one constructed on the Sabbath and it was decided that [in Tract Sabbath, page 200] a partition constructed on the Sabbath is valid.

      R. Elazar said: "If one throw something (from public ground) within the enclosures around a well, he is culpable." Is this not self-evident? If the enclosures were not regarded as a partition, how would it be allowed to draw water from the well on Sabbath? R. Elazar means to tell us, that if such enclosures were erected in public ground without having a well, it also makes one culpable to throw a thing within the enclosures. Is this not self-evident? If such enclosures were not regarded as a partition elsewhere, how could they be thus considered when erected around a well? He lets us know, that even if the space surrounded by the enclosures is used as a public thoroughfare, it is nevertheless regarded as private ground. Then he means to tell us, that the public who pass through the enclosures do not nullify the validity of the enclosures? This we have also been taught [in Tract Sabbath, page 10]. The ordinance there is derived from his dictum above.

      "It is permitted to place the enclosures quite close to the well." We have learned in a Mishna [Sabbath, xi.]: A man must not, standing in private ground, drink in public ground, nor, standing in public ground, drink in private ground, unless he place his head and the greater part of his body within the place in which he drinks. Such is likewise the law regarding a vine-press. Shall we assume, that it is sufficient for a man to have his head and the greater part of his body in the place in which he drinks, but does this also apply to cattle or not? If the man hold the vessel from which the cattle drink and holds also the cattle (so that they cannot turn around), there is no question but that it is sufficient if they have their heads and the larger part of their bodies within the enclosures; but if the man hold the vessel only, and not the cattle, what is the law? Replied one of the schoolmen to the questioner: We have learned this in our Mishna, viz. "Providing the head and the greater part of the body of the animal be within the enclosure while it drinks." Must we not assume, that in this case the man holds only the vessel and not the animal? Nay; he holds both the vessel and the animal and the law seems to apply to the latter instances; for had he not held the animal also, how could this be allowed? Did we not learn in a Boraitha: A man must not fill a vessel with water to give to his cattle, but he may fill up the vessel and let his cattle drink of their own accord. (This was taught concerning the enclosures around the well.) Now, then, if we should say, that this Boraitha applies to a man who holds both the vessel and the cattle, why should he not water the cattle out of the vessel? We must therefore assume, that he did not hold the cattle, and consequently it is obvious that one must hold both the vessel and the cattle.

      Have we not learned, that Abayi explains the mentioned Boraitha as follows: The case was, where a crib, ten spans high and four spans wide (forming in itself a private ground), and opening into the enclosures surrounding the well, stood in public ground and the animal stood in private ground? The Boraitha ordains, that the man should not fill a vessel with water and carry it to the animal, but pour it into the crib, i.e., he should not lift the vessel with water over the crib and carry it through public ground to the animal, lest he notice that the crib is broken and he will carry the crib into the place where the animal stands to mend it, thus carrying a thing from public into private ground?

      Even if he did so, can the man be held culpable? Did not R. Saphra say, in the name of R. Ami, quoting R. Johanan: "If one moved a certain thing from one corner into another in private ground and then carried it into public ground, he is not culpable, because his original intention was not to carry it into public ground?" Abayi means to state, that the man might mend the crib where it was standing and then carry it into private ground. Come and hear (another objection): "A camel, whose head and greater part of the body was within the enclosures around a well, may be crammed." Now, in such a case, the man certainly holds the animal and the vessel, and still it is necessary that the head and larger part of the body of the animal be within the enclosures? Said R. A'ha bar R. Huna in the name of R. Shesheth: "With a camel it is different; the neck of a camel being very long, if the camel turned its head around it would be in public ground."

      We have learned also in a Boraitha, that R. Eliezer also prohibits this to be done with a camel, because its neck is very long.

      R. Itz'hak bar Ada said: "The enclosures around wells are not permitted to be used by any but the pilgrims while going to Jerusalem for the festivals." Did we not learn in a Boraitha that the enclosures are allowed only for cattle? By cattle is meant the cattle of the pilgrims, but what should a man who wishes to drink do? He should hold on to the walls of the well and drink there. [This is not so! Did not R. Itz'hak in the name of R. Jehudah quoting Samuel say, that the enclosures are permitted to be made only around wells containing spring-water but not rain-water? If the wells were only allowed for cattle, why should this distinction be made? The water must be fit for human use also (because the enclosures are erected for the sake of the water, the latter should be good water).] If the walls of the well were very wide and a man could not climb over them, he may draw water from the well and drink it.

      R. Jeremiah bar Abba said