either intentionally or inadvertently, he prevents the others from doing so, so said R. Meir. R. Jehudah said "only if he did so intentionally." All agree, however, that such is only the case, if the other inmates of the court had not carried out things before he did, but if they had done so, he does not prevent them at all, whether he had carried out things intentionally or unintentionally.
The master said: "R. Jehudah, however, gave another version of the affair. Then R. Jehudah holds, that the Sadducee is considered as a Gentile, and in the Mishna we have learned, that R. Gamaliel said: "Lest the Sadducee bring out his vessels," etc. This presents no difficulty. There are two kinds of Sadducees. One who publicly violates the Sabbath is considered as a Gentile, and one who does so secretly, is not considered as a Gentile. According to whose opinion will the following Boraitha be: "One who publicly violates the Sabbath, cannot resign his place?" According to the opinion of R. Jehudah.
Once a man went out on the Sabbath with a bundle of spices in his hand, and seeing the approach of R. Jehudah the Third, he concealed it. Said R. Jehudah the Third: According to R. Jehudah a man of this kind may resign his place, as we have learned in another Boraitha: An apostate who does not violate the Sabbath in the markets may resign his place, but one who does violate the Sabbath in the markets cannot do so; for it was said, that only an Israelite may resign his place or accept ground resigned to him by another, but from a Gentile the place must be rented. How may a place be resigned by Israelites? One says to the other: My place is sold to thee or my place is resigned to thee, and no token of acceptance is necessary.
MISHNA: Should one of the householders of a court forget, and not join in the Erub, neither be nor the other inmates of the court are allowed to carry anything into or out of his house, but he and they may carry into or out of their houses. If the other inmates have resigned to him their common right to the court, he is permitted to carry therein, but they must not do so. Should there be two persons who have neglected to combine in an Erub, they mutually prevent each other; for one individual can resign his right to the court or can acquire that right; but two persons, though permitted to jointly resign their right, cannot jointly acquire the right to the exclusive use of the court.
From what time is the right to be conferred? Beth Shammai hold, "While it is yet daylight," but Beth Hillel maintains "even from dusk (on the eve of Sabbath)." Whoever resigns his right (to the court) and afterwards either intentionally or inadvertently carries within it, prevents (renders it unlawful for) the others from doing so. Such is the dictum of R. Meir. R. Jehudah, however, said: If he carries (within the court) intentionally, he prevents them, but if inadvertently, he does not.
GEMARA: Is it unlawful only to carry into and out of his house, but carrying into and out of the court it is lawful? How was the case? If he resigned his right to the house why should it be unlawful (to carry into) the house; if he did not resign his right to the house, why should they all have a right to the court? In this case, the man had resigned his right to the court alone but not to his house, and the sages maintain, that by resigning his right to the court he did not also resign his right to his house, and there are men who live in houses that have no court. Why then is it lawful for him to carry in and out of their houses? Because he is considered as a guest.
"If the other inmates have resigned to him," etc. Will they then be considered as his guests? One man can be the guest of five, but five men cannot be considered the guests of one. Can we adduce from this clause in the Mishna that this resigning of the right (to a place) can be repeated mutually several times? The Mishna may mean to state that the other inmates had already previously resigned their rights to the one man, in which case it becomes lawful for him, but not for them.
"Should there be two persons," etc. Is this not self-evident? The case is, if after having forgotten to join in the Erub, one of the two persons resigned his right to his house and also the right to the part of the court renounced to him by the others. We might assume that this could be lawfully done. We are therefore told that the other inmates having resigned their rights to the two persons jointly, one of them individually cannot resign his right, because he had not an individual right at that time.
"For one individual can resign his right," etc. This was just stated in the Mishna, what need is there of the repetition? We have learned both concerning resigning and acquiring a right? The latter part of the clause, which teaches that two persons may resign their right, but must not acquire it, is essential. This, however, is also self-evident? We might assume, that a precautionary measure is necessary prohibiting two to resign their right, lest one resign his to two; therefore we are told, that such a precaution is not necessary.
"Two persons cannot jointly acquire the right." Why this repetition again? Here we are told, that two persons must not acquire the right even when presented with the ground in question outright, so that they have the privilege of transferring it to others.
Abayi asked of Rabba: "If five men inhabited one court and one of them had forgotten to join in the Erub, must he resign his right to each of the others individually or can he do so collectively?" Rabba answered: "He must do so to each individually." Rejoined Abayi: "We have learned, that one who had not joined in an Erub, may resign his right to another that had, and two persons who had joined in an Erub may resign their right to one who had not; two who had not joined in an Erub may also resign their right to two others who had not, but one who had not joined in an Erub must not resign his right to another in the same condition nor may two who had not joined in an Erub resign their right to two others, who were similarly situated. It says, then, that one who had not joined in an Erub, may resign his right to one who had. The one who had, certainly must have had another person to combine an Erub with him, then it seems to be sufficient if he (who had not joined) resigned his right to the one man only and not to the other also?" Rabba replied: "Yea, he certainly had a companion in the Erub, but it may be the case, that the companion died and he was left alone."
Rabha asked R. Na'hman: "May an heir (whose father died on the Sabbath) resign his right or not? Shall I say, that because he could not prepare the Erub, on the preceding day, not having his own property, he cannot resign his right on the Sabbath; or that he, being a descendant of his father, has also inherited his father's right?" Answered R. Na'hman: "I hold, that he may, but the disciples of Samuel maintain, that he must not." Rabha objected: We have learned: This is the rule: A thing that had been permissible on part of the Sabbath is permissible for the entire Sabbath, and that which was prohibited for part of the Sabbath was also prohibited for the entire Sabbath. What is meant by "had been permissible on part of the Sabbath?" e.g., a door which was used for making the Erub and had become closed up during the Sabbath, and "by prohibited for part of the Sabbath" is meant, e.g., two houses, each one of which stood on the opposite sides of a wide street and a partition was made by Gentiles on the Sabbath. The exception is as regards one who resigned his right, i.e., although a man had forgotten to join in an Erub before the Sabbath, he was not permitted to carry on part of Sabbath, still he may on the Sabbath resign his right to the place and carry. It says, however, that only the man may carry but not his heir? Replied R. Na'hman: "Learn: instead of 'the exception is as regards one who resigns his right,' the exception is the law pertaining to the resigning of a right."
Rabha raised another objection: We have learned: "If one of the householders of a court died and left his right to the ground to one living in the market, if the death took place while it was yet day before the Sabbath, the man living in the market impedes the inmates of the court; but if the death took place after dusk, he does not. If a man, however, living in the market, was possessed of a house and having died left his right to his place to one of the inmates of the court, then the reverse is the case, i.e., if he died before Sabbath set in, the inmate of the court does not impede the others, (because he could have joined in an Erub); but if the man died on the Sabbath, he does impede the others." Now if thou sayest, that the heir may resign the right, let him do so, why should he impede the others? Answered R. Na'hman: "This means, that he impedes the others only until he resigns his right."
R. Johanan said: The above Boraitha is according to Beth Shammai, who hold, that it is not allowed to resign a right on Sabbath as we have learned in our Mishna: From what time may the right be resigned? Beth Shammai hold "while it is yet daylight," and Beth Hillel maintain: "From dusk."
Said