Subsequent career of De Grasse
Court-martial ordered upon the officers of the French fleet
Findings of the court
De Grasse appeals against the finding
He is severely rebuked by the king
Deaths of De Grasse, Rodney, and Hood
Chapter XIV: Critical Discussion of the Maritime War of 1778.
The war of 1778 purely maritime
Peculiar interest therefore attaching to it
Successive steps in the critical study of a war
Distinction between "object" and "objective"
Parties to the war of 1778
Objects of the different belligerents
Foundations of the British Empire of the seas
Threatened by the revolt of the colonies
The British fleet inferior in numbers to the allies
Choice of objectives
The fleets indicated as the keys of the situation everywhere
Elements essential to an active naval war
The bases of operations in the war of 1778 In Europe On the American continent In the West Indies In the East Indies
Strategic bearing of the trade-winds and monsoons
The bases abroad generally deficient in resources
Consequent increased importance of the communications
The navies the guardians of the communications
Need of intermediate ports between Europe and India
Inquiry into the disposition of the naval forces
Difficulty of obtaining information at sea
Perplexity as to the destination of a naval expedition
Disadvantages of the defensive
England upon the defensive in 1778
Consequent necessity for wise and vigorous action
The key of the situation
British naval policy in the Napoleonic wars
British naval policy in the Seven Years' War
Difficulties attending this policy
Disposition of the British navy in the war of 1778
Resulting inferiority on many critical occasions
Effect oil the navy of the failure to fortify naval bases
The distribution of the British navy exposes it to being out-numbered at many points
The British naval policy in 1778 and in other wars compared
Naval policy of the allies
Dives-gent counsels of the coalition
"Ulterior objects"
The allied navies systematically assume a defensive attitude
Dangers of this line of action
Glamour of commerce-destroying
The conditions of peace, 1783
Preface
The definite object proposed in this work is an examination of the general history of Europe and America with particular reference to the effect of sea power upon the course of that history. Historians generally have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues has consequently been overlooked. This is even more true of particular occasions than of the general tendency of sea power. It is easy to say in a general way, that the use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world; it is more troublesome to seek out and show its exact bearing at a particular juncture. Yet, unless this be done, the acknowledgment of general importance remains vague and unsubstantial; not resting, as it should, upon a collection of special instances in which the precise effect has been made clear, by an analysis of the conditions at the given moments.
A curious exemplification of this tendency to slight the bearing of maritime power upon events may be drawn from two writers of that English nation which more than any other has owed its greatness to the sea. "Twice," says Arnold in his History of Rome, "has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation, and in both cases the nation was victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome, for sixteen years Napoleon strove against England; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo." Sir Edward Creasy, quoting this, adds: "One point, however, of the similitude between the two wars has scarcely been adequately dwelt on; that is, the remarkable parallel between the Roman general who finally defeated the great Carthaginian, and the English general who gave the last deadly overthrow to the French emperor. Scipio and Wellington both held for many years commands of high importance, but distant from the main theatres of warfare. The same country was the scene of the principal military career of each. It was in Spain that Scipio, like Wellington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly all the subordinate generals of the enemy before being opposed to the chief champion and conqueror himself. Both Scipio and Wellington restored their countrymen's confidence in arms when shaken by a series of reverses, and each of them closed a long and perilous war by a complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen veterans of the foe."
Neither of these Englishmen mentions the yet more striking coincidence, that in both cases the mastery of the sea rested with the victor. The Roman control of the water forced Hannibal to that long, perilous march through Gaul in which more than half his veteran troops wasted away; it enabled the elder Scipio, while sending his army from the Rhone on to Spain, to intercept Hannibal's communications, to return in person and face the invader at the Trebia. Throughout the war the legions passed by water, unmolested and un-wearied, between Spain, which was Hannibal's base, and Italy, while the issue of the decisive battle of the Metaurus, hinging as it did upon the interior position of the Roman armies with reference to the forces of Hasdrubal and Hannibal, was ultimately due to the fact that the younger brother could not bring his succoring reinforcements by sea, but only by the land route through Gaul. Hence at the critical moment the two Carthaginian armies were separated by the length of Italy, and one was destroyed by the combined action of the Roman generals.
On the other hand, naval historians have troubled themselves little about the connection between general history and their own particular topic, limiting themselves generally to the duty of simple chroniclers of naval occurrences. This is less true of the French than of the English; the genius and training of the former people leading them to more careful inquiry into the causes of particular results and the mutual relation of events.
There is not, however, within the knowledge of the author any work that professes the particular object here sought; namely, an estimate of the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations. As other histories deal with the wars, politics, social and economical conditions of countries, touching upon maritime matters only incidentally and generally unsympathetically, so the present work aims at putting maritime interests in the foreground, without