6), which, for example, can serve to restrict flows of badly needed funds into Southern nations unless, for example, those nations engage in restructuring and austerity programs that are designed to slow down their economies (at least in the short run). Such austerity and restructuring programs often involve insistence that welfare programs be cut back or eliminated and the result is that the most disadvantaged members of Southern countries – racial and ethnic minorities, women, those in the lower classes – are hurt the most by these programs.
Those in superordinate positions also encourage certain kinds of flows that work to their advantage (and to the disadvantage of dominated groups). For example, the so-called “brain drain” (Dube and Rukema 2013; Fink and Miguelez 2017) (see Chapter 10) is a global phenomenon and it most often takes the form of highly trained people leaving the South and moving to the North. Those in the North actively seek out skilled people in the South and expedite their movement to the North. At the other end of the spectrum, flows of unskilled labor are highly restricted (often limited to poorly paid menial positions sufficient to fill openings in farm or household work).
It is also the case that the prototypical Northern male upper-class white Anglo-Saxon Protestant has, in the contemporary world, acquired a great deal of fluidity and “lightness” in the form of mobility, and thus is able to move about the globe quite readily and easily. In contrast, the Southern female, lower-class, black, Ibo is far less fluid, much “heavier,” and therefore has far less capacity to move about the globe.
While the advantages of those in the North over those in the South remain, elites in the South have been increasingly successful, at least in some instances, at gaining advantages by better controlling flows into and out of that part of the world. For example, Middle Eastern oil used to be largely controlled by Northern corporations (e.g. Shell) which kept the price low and made sure that the more developed North was adequately supplied with comparatively inexpensive oil. This adversely affected oil-producing countries which did not get the price they deserved and furthermore a large proportion of the profits went to the Northern corporations and not the Middle Eastern countries from which the oil came. Now, of course, the wealthy in those countries (through OPEC, see Chapter 6) control the flow of oil and are profiting enormously from it. So while they occupy positions of disadvantage (i.e. in the global South), their class positions enable them power and various advantages over others.
In the end, then, globalization involves flows – of liquids, gases, and so on – and a wide range of structures that not only expedite, but also impede, and even halt, those flows in unequal ways.
ON THE INCREASING UBIQUITY OF GLOBAL FLOWS AND STRUCTURES
Globalization (especially global flows and structures) is increasingly ubiquitous (Boli and Petrova 2007). Indeed, our everyday lives have been profoundly affected by this process.
Global flows and structures have become an inescapable part of our everyday experience. They are not just flows and structures that are “out there” affecting the world as a whole. It is not just the largest social structures and processes that are affected, but also the most personal and intimate parts of our everyday lives, even our consciousness (Robertson 1992). Furthermore, these flows and structures are not seen by most as being imposed on them against their wills, but rather they are seen as legitimate by most and are even sought out by them. As a result, they are more welcomed than they are seen and treated as unwelcome impositions. Of course, the disadvantaged in the world are the ones who are not likely to welcome global flows and structures. It is the case that one hears increasingly loud voices raised in the North, and especially in the South, against global flows and structures and the problems caused by them. This is true of the poor in the North (and their representatives) and especially of those who live in the global South. Nevertheless, even the protests and opposition in the North and South add to the sense of the ubiquity of global flows and structures and their impact on daily life.
Global flows and structures are increasingly taken-for-granted aspects of the social world. That is, they no longer seem to most to be exotic phenomena or even open to question, doubt, or debate. This is quite remarkable since the ideas of global flows and structures, as well as globalization in general, have only been in general usage since about 1990. Global flows and structures no longer affect mainly societal elites; they have descended to the lowest reaches of society. That is not to say that the latter have benefited equally, or even at all, from the global flows and structures; they may even have been adversely affected by them, but they have been affected by them.
The above is, in effect, a more micro-perspective on global flows and structures. However, we must not forget the more macro-level aspects of the ubiquity of globalization. There is, for example, the globalization of social entities, or social structures, especially cultural and organizational forms including the state and the multinational corporation. Then there is the globalization of civil society (see Chapter 5), and of those social institutions (e.g. Intergovernmental Organizations [IGOs] and International Non-Governmental Organizations [INGOs]) that occupy a position between the state and the market and people in society.
THINKING ABOUT GLOBAL FLOWS AND STRUCTURES
Several concepts are useful for thinking about globalization in general, especially the global flows of focal concern here (Held et al. 1999).
1 How extensive are the global flows, relations, networks, interconnections? Obviously, such phenomena have existed for centuries, if not millennia, but what is unique today is how much more extensive they have become. They now cover a much greater portion of the globe, involve many more global flows, and will likely grow even more extensive in the future.
2 How intensive are the global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? While these phenomena may, in the past, have lacked much intensity and, as a result, been more epiphenomenal, they are now much more central and important. This is due, at least in part, to the increasingly frenzied activity associated with these flows, as well as to the similarly intense attention to, and concern about, them. For example, many people today are virtually addicted to such things as e-mail to friends throughout the world and to social networking websites that include participants from around the globe.
3 What is the velocity of global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? It is not just their extensity and the intensity that matters, but also the speed at which they move. It is clear that globalization brings with it, and is characterized by, increasingly rapid movement of virtually everything. Velocity is closely related to many of the concepts discussed above (and thereby closely related to globalization) including liquidity, gaseousness, lightness, and weightlessness. Increases in any and all of these characteristics tend to lead to movement around the globe at greater and greater speed.
4 What is the impact propensity of global flows, relations, networks, interconnections, and so on? Again, while these flows may have had little likelihood of having a deep and widespread impact in the past, the increasing propensity to have such effects is characteristic of globalization. Think, for example, of the huge global impact of September 11 because of the fact that it was known about, and even viewed, simultaneously throughout much of the world.
This same set of ideas can – and should – also be used to think about the various structures that have emerged to both expedite and impede globalization:
1 How extensive are the structures that expedite and impede globalization? It is clear that the structures designed to expedite globalization (for example, export-processing zones, see Chapter 4) are far more extensive than they once were and it is likely that they will grow even more extensive in the future. Structures designed to impede globalization (e.g. tariffs, customs restrictions, border controls, etc.) are undergoing something of a renaissance today, especially in light of the Great Recession.
2 How