wealth is more appropriate for aristocracy.
In our present case, the citizen-bodies of all Greek communities of the archaic period can logically be subsumed under the category of nobility. What remains is the question of tools or definitions one should employ in our quest for an archaic Greek aristocracy. In that, whatever path of enquiry we adopt, the necessary starting point must be the axiom that in archaic Greece, to quote van Wees and Fisher once more, “the political and economic preconditions for the creation of hereditary aristocracies […] (strong royal authority, stable transmission of wealth) did not exist.” In fact, if we look for archaic Greek aristocracies, hereditary titles and offices, or large property, bestowed upon individuals or families or larger social groups by a superior political or religious authority will not be there. Rather, we should focus on the relationship and on conceivable differences and interplay between the “nobles” and the “aristocrats,” i.e., between the citizens at large and their elites.
Following the pioneering study by Benedetto Bravo, I would suggest a working hypothesis based on a historical analogy that I consider particularly appropriate in this context (esp. Węcowski 2014: 21–26).4 In several European countries of the late mediaeval and early modern periods, aristocracies were less dependent on the good graces of the monarch than in others. But a truly exceptional case is that of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth between the late 15th and late 18th centuries ad, where royal privileges were conspicuously limited by the political rights of the so-called “noble nation” consisting of all nobles of the land and amounting to 10 up to 15 percent of the population (cf. Frost 2007). Importantly, hereditary aristocratic titles were banned because of the dominating ideology of the basic equality of the entire body of “noble brethren,” as they called themselves. Their elite, who called themselves “magnates,” was never legally defined. The estates of many of such aristocrats exceeded by far those of the wealthiest aristocrats in Western Europe (in particular in what is now Ukraine, where they were duly called “petty kings” and mercilessly exploited the local population of this fabulously fertile land), whereas many nobles in central Poland were often poorer than their non-noble neighbors. Despite that, the ideology of the equality of nobles as a group was much more than a fiction, since the political rights were limited to this group, featuring the most spectacular right to elect the king. On such occasions, every member of this group, i.e., every member of the citizen-body of the “noble nation,” had the same say, with one vote for each of the nobles notwithstanding their economic or political status.
Despite the inherent risk of anachronism in such historical analogies, this is a very close approximation to what we encounter in the archaic Greek city, where the basic political right to participate in the Popular Assembly and to vote on the most vital communal issues did not depend on the economic status of a citizen, provided one was regarded as such. In both historical cases it was clear to all who did and who did not belong to those powerful few who were “more equal” than the others and who, based primarily on their elevated economic status, dominated the political life of their community.
But the most important lesson to be drawn from this historical analogy is that for a member of a well-defined and legally delimitated “nobility” of a given community, in our case, for a Polish or Lithuanian noble proud of his elite status and of his ideological equality with all other members of the group including the most powerful and the wealthiest, it was possible to advance into the ranks of the “aristocracy,” or the “magnates,” when one was propelled by spectacular individual success (political, but especially military) backed by a steady economic advance. If able to pursue the lavishly “aristocratic” lifestyle, one becomes universally perceived as an aristocrat. Naturally, the nouveau-riche aura may accompany a family for a time, but this is another phenomenon that we also find in archaic Greece.
Aristocracy as a Social Group
Bearing this in mind, let us take a brief look at the data at our disposal for the archaic Greek world.
Insiders always know who is and who is not one of them, based on various and often very vague criteria, often without recourse to definite standards. Ideally, as in Homer, members of elite circles would interact with one another on an equal footing long before they are formally introduced, on the basis of their good looks. In archaic Greek sympotic poetry, the elite insiders would characterize themselves as elite-members and deplore the infringements on their status by the arrivistes. However, it is not entirely clear for an outside observer what might be the criteria of legitimate membership in such inner circles beside being well born, a criterion which in the elegiac poet Theognis may itself be ambivalent (cf. Węcowski 2014: 56–65).5 Even more so would be the criterion of wealth, often lamented in the Theognidea (e.g., 149–150; 155–158; 165–166; 173–180) as not duly accompanying the aristoi (“the best ones”) but bestowed by the gods on commoners (kakoi, “the vile ones”). The only absolute standard, then, may be the ambition to fulfill a set of social ideals sometimes subsumed under the notion of aretē (“excellence” or “virtue”). But even aretē, as often emphasized by the moralizing Theognis, can only be earned or proven in the eyes of their peers (cf. 147–148; 150; 335–336; 465–466). Moreover, in the eyes of a Persian outsider in Herodotus (8.26.3), it is all Greeks that compete, or witness others competing, for aretē (instead of material gain) in the athletic contests at Olympia. Logically, then, all the citizens of the Greek cities could naturally aspire to the aristocratic ideal. When they prove themselves victorious, the divine grace itself may seal their advent to the ranks of aristocracy.
From the perspective of Herodotus’ Histories, our main narrative source for the historical period under scrutiny, things look even more confusing. Herodotus never explicitly touches upon the status of “aristocrats,” or Greek elites. He usually takes their being aristocrats for granted and only deals with this issue when confronted with abnormal circumstances. Thus, when a former collaborator of the tyrant Polycrates (3.142.5), Maiandrios, magnanimously decides to restore political freedom to his fellow citizens on Samos, he must face accusations of being unworthy of leadership as being born “lowly” (kakōs). In Athens, Miltiades the Elder is described in some detail as “belonging to a four-horse family,” i.e., to a horse-breeding family who was successful in racing competitions, as well as ultimately stemming from an important hero Aiakos. But this is only mentioned because it helps Herodotus explain that Miltiades was powerful (ἐδυνάστευε) in Athens despite the fact that the city was ruled by the tyrant Pisistratus at the time (6.35.1–2). In other words, occasional glimpses do not allow us to decide with any precision who was and who was not an aristocrat in the eyes of Herodotus and more importantly of his public.
The closest we come to this is the episode of the wedding of Agariste, daughter of Cleisthenes the tyrant of Sicyon (6.126–130). Here, the mixed bunch of her suitors is supposed to compete in andragathiē, the “manly virtue,” which may be understood here as particular competences testifying to their aretē. While the tyrant will test them all year long in athletics and in table manners at their nocturnal symposia (see below), they arrive already equipped with some renown. Perhaps too young to have already earned their own celebrity, they can still boast about their fathers’ or their elder brothers’ lavish lifestyle, family riches, good looks, wisdom, athletic victories, exceptional physical strength, family connections to powerful tyrants, and even personal familiarity with gods (6.127).
To sum up, Herodotus’ audience must have instinctively been able to recognize the outstanding aristocrats as such, and the only criterion seems to have been some sort of celebrity, with good birth as an ideological sine qua non. Most often, however, we will only learn of an individual that he was notable (δόκιμος, δοκιμώτατος, or λόγιμος), powerful (e.g., he ἐδυνάστευε in his city), or had a great power (κράτος) in his local community.6
When it comes to describing social groups in Herodotus, we are on much safer ground. True, he does deal with a few exceptional cases of seemingly closed oligarchic groups, such as the Corinthian Bacchiadai, the Eretrian Hippobotai (lit. “feeders of horses,” as in 5.77.2–3; 6.100.1), or the γαμόροι (lit. “the landowners,”