once again proved to be useful in such a situation. In 2011 Pakistani prime minister Yousaf Raza Gilani accepted an invitation from his Indian counterpart Singh to watch cricket World Cup semifinal in Molahi between India and Pakistan together. The initiative was commented as an attempt to create a better political climate between both countries, which contributed to the initiation of talks between ministries of foreign affairs in 2011 and the gradual normalization of relations.46 Once again, cricket exchanges helped to ease tensions. Interestingly, it was the first time when the Indian side came forward with such a proposal. Another new thing is that sports diplomacy stemmed from international cricket competition rather than from arranged exhibition matches.
India and Pakistan keep employing cricket as a tool of diplomacy. In 2013 cricket exchanges were resumed, and a series of three matches was organized in India.47 In turn, the opening of the cricket World Cup in 2015 allowed political leaders from both countries to talk despite another diplomatic deadlock. India’s prime minister Narendra Modi called his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif to wish good luck to the Pakistani team. During the conversation, Modi offered to send a new foreign secretary to Islamabad.48 Modi called leaders of other states competing in the World Cup as well, so his gesture could be perceived as the behavior of a good host. The context of India-Pakistan relations made the conversation significant from the diplomatic perspective, though.
Cricket diplomacy between India and Pakistan had several forms. They included a series of exhibition matches and using the opportunity of cricket matches/exchanges to arrange contacts between political leaders. Some of the exchanges were part of the general détente tendencies, while others were established at the times of increased tensions to initiate relaxation of bilateral relations.
The eventual effectiveness of cricket diplomacy is strongly connected to cricket’s popularity in India and Pakistan. People from both countries love their players and perceive them as “good ambassadors of peace.”49 The use of cricket as a tool of political rapprochement between both states, therefore, appears as the right choice despite the risk of arising nationalist sentiments. Organizers of the exchanges were aware of this risk—one of them recalled that his job was to persuade local (Pakistani) fans to treat the matches as sports events and not as the struggle between hostile nations.50 This and similar attempts proved to be successful, and cricket diplomacy over the years was somewhat effective in supplementing traditional diplomacy. It did not bring a lasting rapprochement though but was capable of creating circumstances for this. This appears to be a common observation concerning the use of sport to shape positive relations with other states. Its effectiveness is strongly dependent on external factors.
It is important to underline the fact that sports events were used by political leaders to meet, even though cricket diplomacy as a process is much wider and also includes other ways of employing cricket in order to bring both states closer together. This type of diplomatic employment of sport, which Stuart Murray described as the informal sports diplomacy summit,51 most of all utilizes the fact that establishing contact through sport is easier, and often safer comparing to traditional diplomacy. In case of a failure of the initiative, an explicitly nonpolitical character of a sports event allows state leaders to save their faces. Apart from that, the atmosphere of a sports event may facilitate friendlier and more open contact.
We should also refer to the sports diplomacy against public diplomacy debate. Political leaders were using cricket exchanges for diplomatic reasons in a traditional way as opportunities to hold meetings. On the other hand, cricket diplomacy in principle was meant to build more positive emotions between the two estranged nations so its public diplomacy dimension is also evident.
Football Diplomacy between Turkey and Armenia
Football diplomacy (or soccer diplomacy) between Turkey and Armenia was another example of a situation when sport was employed to foster international rapprochement and to create an opportunity for political leaders to meet. Both states did not have diplomatic relations, so traditional diplomatic contacts were difficult to establish. Estranged relations between Turkey and Armenia have a historical background and connects to territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey backed Azerbaijan and closed its border with Armenia. Another contentious issue refers to Turkish denial to recognize the events in 1915 in the Ottoman Empire as genocide. According to some authors, another problem relates to Armenian territorial claims against Turkey concerning western provinces of “historical Armenia.” However, it is claimed that normalization would be beneficial for both sides.52
Certain attempts to bring both states closer were observed in 2002 when AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) party assumed power in Turkey, and Abdullah Gül became minister of foreign affairs. Gül met several times with his Armenian counterpart Vartan Oskanian during international conferences in 2003 and 2004. Later Turkish prime minister Recep Erdoğan exchanged letters with Armenian president Robert Kocharyan. More significant developments took place in 2008. In February Serzh Sargsyan was elected as new president of Armenia. Turkish president since August 2007 Gül decided to send him a congratulatory letter, expressing his hope that relations between both states would be normalized.53 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that the letter “broke the ice, extending a new hand to the Armenian side.”54 At the time, other goodwill gestures were made as well; for example, illegal immigrants from Armenia were allowed to work in Turkey.55 Apparently, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the attitudes concerning Turkish-Armenian relations have changed to some extent.
In response to the congratulatory letter, Sargsyan invited Gül in July 2008 to watch a football match between both national teams in FIFA World Cup 2010 qualifications together.56 The visit of Turkish president to Armenia was not confirmed for a long time due to numerous protests of Turkish opposition57 and because of security matters. Only a week before the match it was announced that the presidents would watch it together. After accepting the invitation, Gül said he hoped his visit would “be instrumental in removing the barriers blocking rapprochement between the two peoples with a common history.”58 Importantly, his decision was not fully supported by Turkish society, which was one of the reasons for the subsequent failure of the whole attempt to bring both states closer.
The match was held on September 6, 2008.59 The presidents’ meeting marked the first visit of Turkish president to Armenia ever.60 For obvious reasons, it was preceded by a series of secret diplomatic negotiations in Switzerland and Armenia.61 Secrecy of the negotiations confirms one of the assumptions that this form of sports diplomacy is useful when societies of the engaged countries have negative attitudes toward each other, and straightforward establishment of transparent diplomatic contacts is difficult or impossible. Sports contact is seemingly nonpolitical and may help the societies to accept diplomatic breakthrough.
Both presidents claimed the meeting was successful. Sargsyan expressed his hope that it would create the possibility to establish contacts and that he had already received an invitation to watch the rematch in Turkey. Gül said that according to him, the meeting would allow removing obstacles that block the rapprochement of both nations and that both presidents agreed that to make a step forward both sides need to step down from their positions.62
The meeting provoked Azerbaijan’s reaction. It even threatened to limit the supply of energy resources to Turkey. Shortly afterward Gül visited Baku to assure normalization with Armenia would only be possible after the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh is settled.63 Engagement of a third party, for which rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia was detrimental, could, therefore, be observed.
After the match in Armenia, Turkish minister of foreign affairs Ali Babacan who accompanied Gül stayed in Yerevan to hold a meeting with Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandian. It was the first of a whole series of bilateral talks until April 2009.64 On November 24, Nalbandian declared during the meeting of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in Istanbul that Armenia was ready to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey without preconditions.65 In the following months, numerous meetings between representatives of both countries were held, on different levels, for example, Turkish prime minister Erdoğan met with Sargsyan in Davos in January 2009 during the World Economic Forum.66