Aviezer Tucker

Democracy Against Liberalism


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The difference is that the Nazis did not have a parliamentary majority and so they had to arrest their opponents in order to have a majority, whereas Orbán the illiberal democrat already had a parliamentary majority that was ready to make itself politically powerless. Orbán’s use of an apparent emergency as a pretext is as obvious as it had been during the refugee crisis. As much as Hungary had one of the lowest rates in the EU of refugees trying to settle there, it also had one of the lowest mortality rates from the coronavirus in Europe, less than a percentage of that of Italy when the law passed. Obviously, suspension of civil rights and the powers of the parliament will not save a single soul. The worst-hit European countries at that stage, Italy and Spain, did not take any steps away from liberal democracy in response to the crisis, let alone suspend parliament.

      Meanwhile, in Israel Netanyahu used the crisis and the health restrictions on public gathering in Israel to suspend the courts that should have tried him for corruption and to suspend the activity of the parliament where, following the elections, his coalition parties had a narrow minority. Israel’s Supreme Court ruled against the government and in favor of the parliament. But then Netanyahu was successful in following the neo-illiberal tried-and-tested book of tricks, where it is not necessary to have a majority, as long as the majority is sufficiently divided against itself. As I write in April, he may well neutralize the courts by controlling the appointments of new judges and have a new “emergency” government that would not undo the damage his government has already inflicted on Israel’s liberal institutions, if not expand it.

      Yet, though the current crisis has been fueled by populism, and the dramatic noises of populism drown the steady droning of neo-illiberalism, its substance is neo-illiberal democracy, the unprecedented systematic attempt to deconstruct the independent branches and institutions of the liberal state. Populist president Jackson was a lawyer and he knew better than to challenge the constitution, such as it was, allowing slavery. The most extreme challenge president Jackson posed to liberal institutions was in his struggle with the Bank of the United States (Signer 2009). A comparable contemporary liberal populist to Jackson is Trump’s first Attorney General, former Alabama senator Jeff Sessions, a populist xenophobe and likely racist, but also a liberal in respecting the constitution and the separation of powers. Trump, Orbán, Kaczyński, and so on, by contrast, are strictly illiberal. They have no respect for the rule of law and the institutions in charge of enforcing it.

      The strategic plan of the book is to move from a general historically based comparative study of illiberal democracy to the current crisis of populist neo-illiberal democracy, its causes and scenarios for its future. The current predicament raises general questions about its historical evitability. Finally, on the basis of the previous chapters, I propose policy reforms that may preempt similar recurrences in the future, laying the foundations for new liberalism without nostalgia.

      The next chapter, “Old Hemlock in Plastic Cups,” examines what neo-illiberal democracy is by comparing ancient and modern forms of absolutist democracy.

      The third chapter, “All the Roads Lead to Caesarea,” examines the two types of path dependencies that have led to neo-illiberal democracy recently: Post-totalitarian technocratic to populist illiberalism, as it developed in Hungary and Poland; and the post-liberal populist illiberalism of established liberal democracies like the United States and Israel. I argue that neo-illiberal democracies are inherently unstable. They may result in a Caesarian transition to stable authoritarianism, or in a stable liberal restoration. Other scenarios are less probable.