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The vote of New England was a unit, 39 for the Federalists. The vote of the South was nearly a unit, 48 for the Republicans and 4 for the Federalists. The vote of the Middle States was nearly equally divided, 25 for the Republicans, 22 for the Federalists. Of the Republican majority of 8 votes, the West furnished 7. What was known in that day as ‘the West,’ embraced the ceded country between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi river. In this country were two States. Kentucky had been made a State by consent of Virginia in 1792, and Tennessee, ceded by North Carolina in 1790, had been admitted by Congress in 1796, being the first State erected out of Federal territory. The rest of this country was still in territorial apprenticeship, but Ohio was approaching statehood and other territories were growing rapidly. A strong bond of sympathy, social and political, bound the Western people to their parent States, while Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia felt motherly pride in their Western daughters.
The question of absorbing interest with the Western people was the navigation of the Mississippi river. They resented the indifference which the United States had shown to their interests, under the control of the Federal party. They were indignant against the people of the Northeast for the jealousy so plainly manifested toward the navigation of the Mississippi. General Wilkinson and others had endeavored to turn this feeling of indignation to the interest of Spain. A party of Separatists was formed, one faction of which desired to establish a government under the protection of Spain and the other to form an independent Western republic. The mass of the people, however, were attached to the Union, but dissatisfied with the government. They could with difficulty be restrained from seizing New Orleans and forcing the United States into war with Spain.
They now looked to the Republican party for relief. Unless Jefferson could find a peaceable solution, he must choose between a Spanish war or the disintegration of his party. In addition to this, another question was growing in importance and would demand attention in the near future. The territory included in the Georgia cession, soon to become the States of Alabama and Mississippi, was attracting population. The rivers of this section ran through Florida directly into the Gulf of Mexico. Outlets would .soon be needed to the Gulf. While the present pressure was directed to secure the great outlet of the Mississippi river, yet the other demands were sure to follow.
The one solution of all these troublesome questions could be found in the possession of the Floridas and the Island of Orleans. No way seemed open to secure this much desired end except a war of conquest. The free navigation of the Mississippi had been provided in the treaty of 1795 with Spain, but was subject to frequent infractions on the part of the Spanish authorities. The West was quiet for the present, relying upon the friendly purposes of the new administration. That Jefferson was worthy of this confidence had been demonstrated by his previous sympathy with Western interests, manifested for many years. （Jefferson's Complete Works, H. A. Washington, vol. 2, p. 107.)
As early as January 30, 1787, he wrote to Madison from Paris: ‘I will venture to say that the act which abandons the navigation of the Mississippi is an act of separation between the Eastern and Western country.’ His matured purpose to use peaceful means, and his reasons for avoiding war, if possible, are shown in the following letter to Dr. Hugh Williamson, written as late as April 30, 1803:
(Jefferson's Complete Works—H. A. Washington, vol. 4, P. 483.)
‘Although I do not count with confidence on obtaining New Orleans from France for money, yet I am confident in the policy of putting off the day of contention for it till we have lessened the embarrassment of debt accumulated instead of being discharged by our predecessors, till we obtain more of that strength which is growing on us so rapidly, and especially till we have planted a population on the Mississippi itself sufficient to do its own work without marching men fifteen hundred miles from the Atlantic shores to perish by fatigue and unfriendly climates.’ * * *
These two letters, written so far apart, clearly reveal his sentiments and the fixed purpose which he steadfastly maintained and finally carried to complete success: 1. The navigation of the Mississippi river should never be abandoned. 2. It was to be protected as long as possible by negotiation and appeals to justice. 3. War was to be used as the last resort, and to be avoided, if possible, while the country grew in strength.
This patient policy would have secured its object, the navigation of the Mississippi, but the door to far greater success was unexpectedly opened. Before the end of the first month of his administration as President, whispers of the sale of Louisiana to France began to circulate in court circles and were communicated to the American government by their foreign ministers. The first intimation came from Mr. King, in a letter, March 29, 1801. The French minister, Talleyrand, refused to throw any light upon these rumors. They gained credence, however. (Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, p. 1017.)
Mr. Rufus King, the minister at London, in a subsequent letter, dated November 20, 1801, put all doubts at rest by forwarding to the secretary of state, James Madison, a copy of the treaty for establishing the prince of Parma in Tuscany, which made allusion to the secret treaty ceding Louisiana to France.
Previous to this letter, Mr. Madison, under date of July 29, 1801, wrote to Mr. Pinckney, minister at Madrid, instructing him to obtain information and to use what influence he could to dissuade Spain from the cession, if not already completed. September 28th, Mr. Madison wrote to Mr. Livingston, minister at Paris, instructing him, if the cession had ‘irrevocably taken place,’ to make overtures for the cession of the Floridas, especially of West Florida, to the United States, but to be very careful to avoid irritating France in the methods of negotiation. Mr. Livingston, in obedience to these instructions, began the negotiations, which lingered more than a year, receiving no encouragement from France. (Ibid, 1013, 1014.)5
As these tidings began to spread, the Western country was thrown into a state of feverish excitement and anxiety. Grave fears were entertained of the purposes of Napoleon, and a sentiment of hostility to France began to develop. Alexander Hamilton, in a series of newspaper articles, advocated the policy of taking immediate possession of New Orleans and the Floridas. Such a course would lead inevitably to a war with France and Spain, and to alliance with Great Britain, an event congenial to Federalist policy. The Western excitement was intensified by the action of the Spanish intendant, Don Juan Morales, closing the port of New Orleans.
Congress convened December 10, 1802, and the administration was subjected to fierce attacks from the Federalist minority. The leaders of this party joined the Western war cry, aiming to force on Jefferson a choice between adopting the Federalist policy of hostility with France and Spain or a breach with his Western allies. Jefferson, however, was not to be coerced nor deceived. He was firm in his own course, and it was well for the country that he was firm. His policy was not only right, it was successful. The dilemma on which the Federalists sought to impale him was skillfully avoided. This political Scylla and Charybdis had left a middle space wide enough to admit of safe passage, and Jefferson had learned from Ovid, in medio tutissimus ibis.
War could be delayed for some hostile act of France, while the attachment of the Western people to the Republican party and their confidence in Jefferson were too firm to be easily shaken. The temper of the West was plainly shown in the debates upon the resolutions introduced into the Senate by Mr. Robert Ross, of Pennsylvania, February 16, 1803. These resolutions authorized the President ‘to take immediate possession’ of New Orleans; to call into service the militia of South Carolina, Georgia, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi Territory; to employ the military and naval forces of the United States; and use for these purposes the sum of $5,000,000, appropriated from the treasury. The administration opposed these resolutions, on the ground that there was no cause as yet to justify an act of war, and that favorable results were in prospect from negotiation. The Western senators sustained this policy. (Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, pp. 95, 119.)
Mr. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, offered a substitute placing the entire control of the matter in the hands of the President, and empowering him, if necessary, to call out the militia, not only of the vicinity but of all the States. (Ibid, p. 255.)
This substitute was finally adopted by a vote of 15 to 11, all the Western senators present voting in its favor. The resolutions as amended