1803. (Annals of Congress, 1802– 1803, p. 107.)
It may be interesting to note the sentiment of the Western people, as expressed by their senators. Said Mr. Anderson, of Tennessee: ‘Gentlemen wished to treat the people like little children. * * * He care from a part of the country which was greatly interested in the subject, and he knew the people were not such fools as the gentlemen would make them. They will not believe that those who know them, and have taken the most effectual measures to procure safety and security for them, are plotting evil for them.’ (Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, p. 214.)
‘He knew this people and that they wished for peace, though, if justice required it, they would be in the ranks of battle while those who asperse them would perhaps be at their toilettes. The resolutions substituted would according with the wishes of his constituents. He, would therefore support them.’ ( Ibid. pp. 140, 142.)
Mr. Cocke, of Tennessee, expressed his ‘confidence in the administration’ ‘from real respect and knowledge of the Executive for thirty years past.’ He spoke tauntingly of the newly awakened interest of the leaders of the Federal party in behalf of the West, as follows:
‘Why, this is very generous of them, and is more remarkable because it is an uncommon thing with them. But it is very certain we do not stand in need of their pledges nor of their assistance. On former occasions they did not display any of this liberality, and he could not help suspecting their sincerity now.’
Mr. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, said: ‘The time was, indeed, when great dissatisfaction prevailed in that country as to the measures of the general government.’ * * * ‘Distrust and dissatisfaction have given place to confidence in and attachment to those in whom the concerns of the nation are confided.’
Previous to these proceedings in the Senate, a resolution in the House providing for the appointment of a committee to inquire what legislation is necessary with reference to the navigation of the Mississippi river, had been voted down. January 7th, by a vote of 50 to 25, a resolution was adopted that, ‘relying with perfect confidence on the vigilance and wisdom of the Executive, they will wait the issue of such measures as that department of the government shall have pursued.’ (Ibid, pp. 117, 342, 368.)
A resolution offered by Mr. Griswold, of Connecticut, January 4th, calling on the Executive for information with reference to the negotiations concerning Louisiana, was defeated January 11th by a vote of 51 to 35. An act was passed by both houses and approved February 26th, appropriating $2,000,000 to provide for foreign negotiations.
Meanwhile Jefferson had been in negotiation with Spain and France. These negotiations were actively pressed. Spain, France and Great Britain were approached through the American ministers resident at the respective courts, through the foreign ministers at Washington, and through unofficial channels. Mr. Monroe, in whom the President reposed implicit confidence, was sent as minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary to Paris to act in conjunction with Mr. Livingston. (Annals of Congress, 1802-1803, pp. 1095-1108.)
The instructions to Monroe and Livingston were full and were intended to cover every contingency that might arise. The ministers were to urge a cession of the Island of Orleans and of the Floridas. In case that France should refuse a cession, they were to gain all that was possible to secure the navigation of the Mississippi river. The free navigation of this river was the ultimatum. The desideratum was, to make the Mississippi the national boundary. Considerations were suggested which might influence the French government. If they should have formed any plan of seducing the Western people to separate from the Union, the fallacy should be pointed out. The commercial advantages of a cession should be shown, etc. It was indicated that ‘to incorporate the inhabitants of the hereby ceded territory with the citizens of the United States on an equal footing, being a provision which cannot now be made,’ must be left for future action. ‘The instability of the peace of Europe, the attitude taken by Great Britain, and the languishing state of the French finances,’ were mentioned, as rendering the present time favorable for negotiation.
These instructions show that Jefferson and Madison, while prudently refraining from any public expression of sanguine expectation, foresaw the coming struggle in Europe, and were founding hopes upon it. Yet there is no evidence that either of them dreamed that the full fruition of their hopes was so near at hand.
Meanwhile, the negotiations with Spain were speedily successful. In April the Spanish minister, Yrugo, announced the disavowal by Spain of the orders of her intendente in closing the port of New Orleans against American commerce. Thus one cause of irritation was removed, and interest centered in the negotiations with France. Very little confidence was felt in their success, but the West was willing to wait, and Jefferson maintained his policy. Only one of his acts indicates any intention of departing from it. Some restlessness is shown in the instructions to Livingston and Monroe, written April 18, but which did not reach Paris till after the treaty had been signed. These instructions indicate an apprehension of hostility on the part of Napoleon, and direct the two ministers, in the event that such purpose should be shown by France, immediately to open secret negotiations with Great Britain with a view to alliance. They are cautioned to take no such step unless a hostile purpose of France is evident. This step plainly shows that Jefferson intended to resort to war, if it became necessary as a last resort. He would, if necessary, become the ally of Great Britain, though preferring peace and the friendship of France.
Viewed in every aspect, whether as a patriot seeking the good of his country or as a political leader conducting his party in the paths of patriotism and victory, Jefferson undoubtedly pursued a wise and skillful course. The Federalist leaders had not only been thwarted but had been handicapped. If negotiation should succeed, their party was ruined. If war became necessary, they were committed to its support. Their course in Congress had stirred up the whole country, and the war would have the sanction of all sections. But the Federalist leaders had aided Jefferson by their agitation in a way which they had not contemplated.
Napoleon was watching American politics. The imperious will of the ‘proudest warrior of Europe’ would have brooked no threat of war from the ruling powers of the United States. Jefferson could not approach him with any intimation of hostile purpose. But Napoleon was not only an imperious warrior. When not blinded by passion or drunk with ambition, he was also the profoundest statesman of Europe. He was, at the time, in the calmest period of his political life. He had decided to be Emperor of France and to dictate to Europe. He was then revolving in his mind the steps to be taken. He was preparing for war with England. Should he yield this purpose to plans which could be successful only by peace with England? Just at this time threats reached his ear of the prospect of war from America, if he attempted to occupy New Orleans. Fortunately these threats came in a form not to arouse his pride but to warn his judgment.
The party which had, when in power, shown hostility to France and friendship for .England were now, as a minority party, urging the United States to steps which must involve war with France. This party had been, for the time, restrained by the party in power, who were recognized as friendly to France. The government of the United States had made no arrogant demands. The resident minister, Mr. Livingston, under instructions from a friendly President, had assiduously urged that the Mississippi river should be made the boundary line between Louisiana and the United States, but had shown cogent and friendly reasons for the request, and had manifested no desire to acquire the entire province. The whole matter had come before Napoleon in the best possible form, and at the best possible time. He needed money for the approaching war with England, and he needed, if not the alliance, at least the neutrality of the United States. His decision was made. With characteristic impetuosity he proceeded to put his plans into execution.6
The world is indebted to M. Barbe Marbois, the agent employed by Napoleon in the subsequent negotiations, for recording the private interviews in which Napoleon revealed his thoughts. Ignoring Talleyrand, who had heretofore been in charge of the negotiations, he summoned two of his ministers and opened his mind. With the exception of a previous conversation which he had with Talleyrand, but of which no record exists, the first expression of his purpose was made to Marbois and Decres April 10, 1803. He thus abruptly addressed them: ‘I know the full value of Louisiana, and I have been desirous of repairing the fault of the French negotiator who abandoned it in 1763. A few