I have scarcely recovered it when I must expect to lose it. But if it escapes from me, it shall one day cost dearer to those who oblige me to strip myself of it than to those to whom I wish to deliver it. The English have successively taken from France, Canada, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, New Foundland, and the richest portions of Asia. They are engaged in exciting trouble in St. Domingo. They shall not have the Mississippi, which they court. Louisiana is nothing in comparison with their conquests in all parts of the globe, and yet the jealousy they feel at the restoration of this colony to the sovereignty of France acquaints me with their wish to take possession of it, and it is thus they begin the war. They have twenty ships of war in the Gulf of Mexico; they sail over those seas as sovereigns, whilst our affairs in St. Domingo have been growing worse every day since the death of Leclerc. The conquest of Louisiana would be easy, if they only took the trouble to make a descent there. I have not a moment to lose in putting it out of their reach. I know not whether they are not already there. It is their usual course, and if I had been in their place I would not have waited. I wish, if there is still time, to take away from them any idea that they may have of ever possessing that colony. I think of ceding it to the United States. I can scarcely say that I cede it to them, for it is not yet in our possession. If, however, I leave the least time to our enemies, I shall only transmit an empty title to those republicans whose friendship I seek. They only ask me for one town in Louisiana; but I already consider the colony as entirely lost, and it appears to me that in the hands of this growing power it will be more useful to the policy, and even to the commerce, of France than if I should attempt to keep it.’
The two ministers were requested to express their opinions freely. Marbois strongly urged the cession, and gave his reasons at length. Decres opposed it, and favored the colonial policy of Talleyrand. The conference lasted till midnight, when the ministers were dismissed. It will be remembered that Marbois had taken an active part, in 1783, in favor of limiting the boundaries of the United States to the Alleghany mountains. He was now to be the instrument for extending them beyond the Mississippi. He was summoned at daybreak on the following morning (April 11th), when Napoleon, after alluding to what had appeared in the London papers in reference to the measures proposed in the United States for seizing New Orleans, thus addressed him:
‘Irresolution and deliberation are no longer in season. I renounce Louisiana. It is not only New Orleans that I will cede, it is the whole colony without any reservation. I know the price of what I abandon, and have sufficiently proved the importance that I attach to this province, since my first diplomatic act with Spain had for its object its recovery. I renounce it with the greatest regret. To attempt obstinately to retain it would be folly. I direct you to negotiate this affair with the envoys of the United States. Do not even await the arrival of Mr. Monroe; have an interview this very day with Mr. Livingston. But I require a great deal of money for this war, and I would not like to commence it with new contributions. For a hundred years France and Spain have been incurring expense for improvements in Louisiana, for which its trade has never indemnified them. Large sums, which will never be returned to the treasury, have been lent to companies and to agriculturalists. The price of all these things is justly due to us. If I should regulate my terms according to the value of these vast regions to the United States, the indemnity would have no limits. I will be moderate, in consideration of the necessity in which I am of making a sale. But keep this to yourself. I want fifty millions, and for less than that sum I will not treat. I would rather make a desperate attempt to keep these fine countries. Tomorrow you shall have full power.’ * * * ‘Perhaps it will also be objected to me that the Americans may be found too powerful for Europe in two or three centuries; but my foresight does not embrace such remote fears. Besides, we may hereafter expect rivalries among the members of the Union. The confederations that are called perpetual only last till one of the contracting parties finds it to his interest to break them, and it is to prevent the danger to which the colonial power of England exposes us that I would provide a remedy.’ * * * ‘Mr. Monroe is on the point of arriving. * * * Neither this minister nor his colleague is prepared for a decision which goes infinitely beyond anything they are about to ask of us. Begin by making the overture without any subterfuge. You will acquaint me day by day and hour by hour of your progress. * * * Observe the greatest secrecy, and recommend it to the American ministers.’
April 11th, the day of the conversation between Napoleon and Marbois, Talleyrand dropped a hint to Mr. Livingston by inquiring whether the United States desired the whole of Louisiana, and what price they were willing to pay for it. Mr. Livingston says (Letter of Livingston to Madison, Annals of Congress, 1802-3, p. 1126): ‘I told him no; that our wishes extended only to New Orleans and the Floridas; that the policy of France should dictate to give us the country above the river Arkansas, in order to place a barrier between them and Canada.’ Mr. Monroe, who had sailed March 8th, reached Paris April 12th, the day after Napoleon's conference with Marbois, and at once entered into conference with Mr. Livingston. On the night of the 12th, Marbois made to Livingston the informal overtures, as directed by Napoleon. (Annals of Congress, 1802-3, pp. 1128-9, 30, 31, 32.)
Mr. Livingston details the interview in a letter to Mr. Madison. He received the overtures with caution and took occasion to repeat the assurance which he had frequently given: ‘I told him the United States were anxious to preserve peace with France; that, for that reason, they wished to remove them to the west side of the Mississippi; that we should be perfectly satisfied with New Orleans and the Floridas, and had no disposition to extend across the river.’
The negotiation now passed into the regular channels, and was conducted by James Monroe, as ‘minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary,’ and Robert R. Livingston, ‘minister plenipotentiary,’ on the part of the United States; and ‘the French citizen., Barbe Marbois, minister of the public treasury,’ on the part of France. After a few skirmishes in settling the price and minor stipulations, the treaty was signed May 2nd, but dated April 30, 1803. The treaty consisted of three separate conventions. The first ceded Louisiana to the United States. The second provided for the payment of 60,000,000 francs to France. The third provided for the assumption by the United States of claims due from France to American citizens. The whole sum was equivalent to $18,738,268.98, exclusive of interest. The area of the whole province was 1,182,752 square miles. (Pub. Domain, p. 12.)
When the treaty was signed the ministers shook hands and pronounced this the noblest act of their lives. Yet they were not without apprehensions. They had, indeed, done a work which deserved the gratitude and applause of their countrymen, but they had exceeded their authority. How would their action be received at home? The joint letter of Monroe and Livingston, announcing the treaty, reads more like a letter of apology and explanation than a letter of triumph.
Let us see how it was received at home. At this day we can hardly believe that this acquisition met with active and violent opposition; yet such was the case. Jefferson and the Republican leaders received the news with delight. The policy of negotiation had triumphed beyond their most sanguine expectations. War was averted and the West was bound to them by new ties of gratitude. Their party had laid the foundations of future greatness for the United States and of political power for themselves. Yet there was one source of disquietude. In the contests in Washington's cabinet, between Jefferson and Hamilton, both of these great men had gone to extremes which both were afterward compelled to abandon. Jefferson had maintained that the general government had no powers beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. The power to acquire foreign territory was not so enumerated. He foresaw the opposition of the Federalists. He felt secure of the ratification of the treaty, but he was sensitive to the charge of inconsistency in reference to the construction of the Constitution, which he knew would be brought against him. He wished to preserve the strict construction, which he believed to be the safeguard of the rights of the States. Yet Louisiana was ‘an opportunity snatched from fate.’ It secured the expansion of the United States and the triumph of the Republican party. The opportunity must not be lost. The treaty must be ratified. Cobwebs must be brushed away.
He wrote to the members of his cabinet and to the Republican leaders, suggesting arguments and proposing a constitutional amendment to the effect: ‘Louisiana, as ceded by France, is made a part of the United States.’ His letter to Senator John Breckinridge, of Kentucky, explains his views (Jefferson's Complete Works, H. A. Washington, vol. 4, pp. 499, 500):
‘Objections are