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THE BATTLE OF JENA
During 13 October, Marshal Lannes’ V Corps entered the town of Jena, and his advance guard clambered up the steep slope of the Landgrafenberg. The countryside north of Jena forms a large rolling plateau of farms and villages, with very steep wooded slopes on the south (the valley of the Muhlbach) and east (the valley of the River Saale). Roads, or rather tracks, to the high ground were few and tortuous; the only one immediately accessible is nowadays called ‘Am Steiger’. French engineers set to work to improve it. Late in the afternoon, Napoleon himself, together with the 4000 infantry of the Guard, arrived on the Landgrafenberg and, as night fell, he could see the campfires of Hohenlohe’s force, and somehow convinced himself that the whole Prussian army of over 100,000 men lay before him.
Although arguably the greatest commander in modern history, Napoleon shared with others, both before and since, a serious shortcoming, namely the temptation to believe that intelligence reports endorsed his own suppositions. As night fell, observation of the relatively few campfires of Hohenlohe’s force firmly convinced him that he now faced the main body of the Prussians. Orders were given for the corps of Augereau, Ney and Soult to close up without delay. Davout, with III Corps, now at Naumburg, was ordered to advance on Apolda to threaten what Napoleon fondly believed would be the Prussian left rear. Berthier’s postscript to Davout’s orders suggested that I Corps should act in support of III Corps, and Davout immediately sent a written copy to Bernadotte.
During the night of 13 October, Napoleon, noting an apparent delay in the arrival of V Corps artillery, went personally to find out where it was. The column had mistaken the route up the hill and the leading gun had somehow become hopelessly stuck in a ravine. The Emperor immediately took charge, as if he were once again the battery commander, and the column soon moved on again.
Concentration of the Bataillon Carré now proceeded apace. Augereau’s VII Corps was ordered to secure the road from Jena to Weimar, along the Muhltal, with one division, while the remainder were to form on the left of V Corps. In view of the steep wooded slope it is not too surprising that the junction was not established until about 09:30. VI Corps (Marshal Ney) was ordered to form on the right of V Corps and Soult’s IV Corps was to form on the extreme right flank. At dawn on the 14th, despite the best efforts of all concerned, the French position was relatively weak, with only V Corps and the Guard properly deployed, perhaps 25,000 men in all. The Prussians thus had a golden opportunity to sweep them off the plateau and into the Saale, but it seems that Hohenlohe had received an order from the King that no serious engagement was to be undertaken. In any case, Napoleon intended to be the first to strike. At 06:30, in a thick fog, Lannes launched two divisions in an attack on the village of Closewitz.
The main body of Hohenlohe’s army, now only about 40,000 strong altogether, had camped for the night along the general line Isserstadt, Lützeroda, Closewitz, with outposts in Cospeda. Commanding this main force was General von Tauentzien. The left flank was guarded by a detachment of about 5000 men under General von Holtzendorf. The reserves, including General Grawert’s division, were posted on the Dornberg, overlooking the villages of Vierzehnheiligen and Krippendorf, where the windmill provided a useful reference point for both sides.
In the fog, Lannes’ leading troops somewhat lost their way, but broke the Prussian line between Closewitz and Lützeroda. However, St Hilaire’s division, part of Soult’s IV Corps, and with the Marshal himself at its head, cleared the enemy from Closewitz, and then advanced to Rodigen. Thus, when Ney arrived with his small advance guard, he found Lannes’ right in touch with St Hilaire’s division, but his left apparently open to counterattack. Meanwhile, Lannes himself had at first taken the village of Vierzehnheiligen, but then been forced to withdraw to the lower slopes of the Dornberg. The fiery Ney, despite having only his small advance guard to hand, immediately attacked to retake the village, but, carried away with his own excitement, quite overlooked the need for support and was soon isolated. Fortunately for him, the Emperor, from his vantage point on the hill overlooking the village, noticed what had happened. Furious with Ney, who received a severe reprimand later in the day, he despatched some cavalry to rescue his impetuous Marshal.
Hohenlohe (who appears to have thought the French operations were merely those of the advance guard) at last realized he needed to make a serious counterattack on Vierzehnheiligen. What followed was one of the most pitiful and extraordinary events in all military history. The Prussian infantry of General Grawert’s division, magnificently drilled as they were, advanced as if on a parade ground, halting to fire volleys from time to time. The French infantry, on the other hand, supported by artillery, were firing as individuals from the cover provided by the shattered village. For the French it was like target practice; for the brave Prussians it was a terrible disaster. For two hours or so, they were shot down, standing in the ranks, exposed to the merciless fire of grapeshot and musketry. Meanwhile, as the remainder of IV, VI and VII Corps arrived, together with most of Murat’s cavalry reserve, Napoleon’s strength had risen to nearly 140,000 men.
Hohenlohe decided to wait for reinforcements, either from Rüchel’s army, on the way from Weimar, or from Holtzendorf’s division, which was now running away towards Apolda, with Soult in hot pursuit. The gallant Prussian infantry, inspired by the bravery of their officers, managed to keep a front line together until about 14:30, but repeated cavalry attacks, led personally by Marshal Murat with a whip in his hand rather than a sabre, eventually reduced them to a rabble. Rüchel had at last arrived, (having taken four hours to march six miles!), and gallantly attempted a stand between Kapellendorf and Gross Romstadt. But again, Prussian parade ground tactics succumbed to the French cavalry and horse artillery, and Rüchel’s men joined the others in a desperate rout, pursued by Murat.
JENA TIMELINE
| 10 August | Prussia begins mobilization. |
| 13 September | The Prussians occupy Dresden, thus confirming their alliance with Saxony. |
| 15 September | The Imperial Guard leaves Paris to rejoin the army in Germany. |
| 8 October | The first engagement at Schleiz. |
| 10 October | Battle of Saalfeld; death of Prince Louis Ferdinand. |
| 13 October | French V Corps takes Jena; deploys on the Landgrafenberg. Napoleon issues orders for the remainder of the army to close up. |
| 14 October | Thick fog at dawn. |
| 06:30 | Initial attack by V Corps between Closewitz and Lützeroda. |
| 07:30 | Imperial Guard artillery deploys 25 guns in support of V Corps. |
| 08:00 | Closewitz is taken by St Hilaire’s division (IV Corps). V Corps advances to Vierzehnheiligen and the Dornberg. |
| 09:30 | VII Corps at last reaches the battlefield near Lützeroda Ney’s advance guard retakes Vierzehnheiligen but then has to be rescued. |
| 10:00 | The Prussians mount a major counterattack on Vierzehnheiligen but fail to carry it through, deciding to await reinforcement (which never comes). |
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