eventually becomes a forest track (closed to private vehicles) which leads up to the Windknölle, the highest point of the Landgrafenberg. It was here that French Army HQ was established on the evening of 13 October. The sadly graffiti-disfigured Napoleonstein is alleged to be the site of Napoleon’s tent, but this seems unlikely – a better campsite would surely be in the hollow below the stone. Furthermore, the site does not offer a view of the Prussian front line, for which one needs to walk about 200m to the northern edge of the Windknölle.
In the village of Cospeda is the excellent small museum (Gedenkstätte 1806), with good models of phases of the battle. The whole of the Jena battlefield is marked with standing stones marking the positions of units at various times. A sketch map is displayed at numerous points to help visitors who wish to ‘walk the battlefield’.
For the Auerstädt battlefield (modern spelling Auerstedt), the visitor is recommended to follow Davout’s route from Naumburg, across the bridge at Kösen and up the steep hill to the plateau and the village of Hassenhausen. The site of Davout’s tactical headquarters is about 600m (650 yards) north of the village, and is marked with a stone similar to those at Jena. This spot offers a splendid viewpoint.
At Eckartsberga there is a fine model diorama at the Schloss, with a commentary in German. At the Schloss Auerstädt, which was the Prussian HQ at the start of the battle (and Davout’s after), there is another small museum with interesting exhibits.
The memorial to the Duke of Brunswick, on the spot where he was mortally wounded, can be found at grid reference 751656, midway between Hassenhausen and Taugwitz.
Memorial to the Duke of Brunswick. As a result of his death Brunswick units adopted black uniforms, which would prove to be doubly appropriate in 1815 when the then Duke of Brunswick fell mortally wounded at the battle of Quatre Bras, two days before Waterloo.
In this engraving by J. T. Willmore, Allied cavalry attack the squares of French infantry, which break before them. The dramatic charge of Le Marchant’s heavy brigade enabled Wellington to defeat Marmont.
SALAMANCA 1812
By Christopher L Scott
With the key border fortresses of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz secure by 1812, General Lord Arthur Wellesley, Viscount Wellington, planned a series of strategic moves enabling him to invade Spain and pit his Anglo-Portuguese army against Marshal Auguste Marmont’s Army of Portugal. Marmont arrived in the Peninsula with the reputation of being a first-class field general, adept in aggressive movement and decisive in battle, and by midsummer there had been a campaign of manoeuvre as each commander sought to gain an advantage to attack the other, until finally, on 22 July, Wellington saw his chance near the city of Salamanca.
MARMONT DEPLOYS FOY AND FEREY TO FACE ALLIES ACROSS THE VALLEY
The Allied army had deployed on the western ridge of the Pelagarcia Valley which ran south from the River Tormes. Wellington kept a large part of his army unseen, but had three of his seven divisions on this high ground with an outpost across the valley at the chapel of Nuestra Señora de la Peña. Marmont ordered General Maximillian Sebastien Foy’s division on his extreme right to go north and attack this outpost, and General Jean Guillaume Thomières’ division on his extreme left to march westwards and turn Wellington’s flank. Instead of concentrating his army he began overextending it.
BOTH SIDES TRY TO SEIZE THE TWO ARAPILES HILLS
Both commanders had seen the importance of two prominent, steep and rugged hills further south. Marmont dispatched General Bonnet’s division to seize the Arapil Grande, while Wellington had Major General Lowry Cole’s division take the Arapil Chico. The Allies tried to secure the Grande, but the French won the race, tumbled the attackers back, and hauled guns onto its commanding position.
WELLINGTON REALIGNS HIS ARMY FACING SOUTH BEHIND THE RIDGE
Using the Grande as a pivot, the French prepared to advance along a low, east–west ridge south of the village of Los Arapiles to turn the Allied right flank and threaten their supply lines. However, Wellington, not having a significant advantage to offer battle, started to retire, marching his baggage for Ciudad Rodrigo. He shifted his hidden divisions westwards to stop his right being turned and faced them southward. He also moved Major General Sir Edward Pakenham’s division and Brigadier General Benjamin d’Urban’s cavalry, further west to Aldeatejada, to a defensive line on the Zurguen Rivers, behind which the whole army could retire if pressed. The day seemed just another phase in the campaign of manoeuvre, and Wellington ordered his traditional rearguard, Major General Sir Charles von Alten’s light division and Brigadier General Eberhardt Bock’s brigade of heavy cavalry, to take over on the ridge. However, behind it, he not only changed his line of battle to face south but redeployed his army for attack.
From the Arapil Grande, Marmont could see a lot, but not everything, and he had learnt that if he could not see most of Wellington’s army, it was usually stealing a march. He saw the Allies’ westward shift and dust on the Ciudad Rodrigo road, so, believing Wellington was withdrawing, he thought that he could pin the rearguard and turn their southern flank, enveloping and destroying them before reinforcements could return to their aid. He saw his chance and ordered his army to march.
MARMONT ORDERS A LEFT HOOK AND THOMIÈRES TO THREATEN THE CIUDAD RODRIGO ROAD
Generals Sarrut’s and Ferey’s divisions were sent north to help Foy’s pin the Allied rearguard on their ridge. Bonnet’s division was the anchor on the Grande and General Maucune’s pushed westward along the southern ridge to turn the Allies’ flank. It then faced north opposite Los Arapiles only to discover they were opposite Lieutenant General James Leith’s division, while those of Generals Thomières, Antoine François (Count) Brennier and Bertrand (Count) Clausel moved westward, south of the Arapil Grande to extend the left hook and threaten the Ciudad Rodrigo road.
THOMIÈRES OUTSTRIPS BRENNIER
Thomières’ division marched past Maucune’s and was soon hurrying along the southern ridge, going further west. Brennier was to support them but had not yet moved. Wellington was having a late lunch when told the French were extending their left even more. After studying the movement he snapped his telescope shut with the words, ‘This will do, at last!’ and galloped the 5km (3 miles) to Aldeatejada and Pakenham and d’Urban.
The rapid French advance westward strung the French Army out over 6km (4 miles) and had opened a kilometre-wide gap between Thomières and Maucune, with Brennier too far back to cover it. This was the advantage Wellington had been seeking. He would attack across the valley, split the French, and launch a flank attack from Aldeatejada. It was time for battle. Having launched his right hook, Wellington ordered Cole’s and Leith’s divisions to attack in the centre covered by Portuguese brigades on their flanks, with Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton’s and Major General Sir John Hope’s divisions as a second line. Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton’s cavalry