Not necessary to give a term the same sense every-where in the same deed,
282. We ought to reject every interpretation which leads to an absurdity,
283. or which renders the act null and void of effect,
284. Obscure expressions interpreted by others more clear in the same author,
285. Interpretation founded on the connection of the discourse,
286. Interpretation drawn from the connection and relation of the things themselves,
287. Interpretation founded on the reason of the deed,
288. Where many reasons have concurred to determine the will,
289. What constitutes a sufficient reason for an act of the will,
290. Extensive interpretation founded on the reason of the act,
291. Frauds tending to elude laws or promises,
292. Restrictive interpretation,
293. Its use, in order to avoid falling into absurdities, or into what is unlawful,
294. or what is too severe and burthensome,
295. How it ought to restrict the signification agreeably to the subject,
296. How a change happening in the state of things may form an exception,
297. Interpretation of a deed in unforeseen cases,
298. Reasons arising from the possibility and not the existence of a thing,
299. Expressions susceptible of an extensive and a limited sense,
300. Things favourable, and things odious,
301. What tends to the common advantage, and to equality, is favourable: the contrary is odious,
302. What is useful to human society, is favourable: the contrary is odious,
303. Whatever contains a penalty, is odious,
304. Whatever renders a deed void, is odious,
305. Whatever tends to change the present state of things, is odious: the contrary is favourable,
306. Things of a mixed nature,
307. Interpretation of favourable things,
308. Interpretation of odious things,
310. How we ought to interpret deeds of pure liberality,
311. Collision of laws or treaties,
312. First rule in cases of collision,
322. General remark on the manner of observing all the preceding rules,
CHAPTER XVIII Of the Mode of terminating Disputes between Nations.
323. General direction on this subject,
324. Every nation is bound to give satisfaction respecting the just complaints of another,
325. How nations may abandon their rights and just complaints,
326. Means suggested by the law of nature, for terminating their disputes:—amicable accommodation,
330. Conferences and congresses,
331. Distinction to be made between evident and doubtful cases,
332. Essential rights, and those of less importance,
333. How we acquire a right of recurring to force in a doubtful case,
334. and even without attempting other measures,
335. Voluntary law of nations on that subject,