could not endure. As democratic leadership matured and acquired effective political organization, the electorate gradually reformed the historic constitution that was so little disturbed by the convention of 1820–1821.
| 1820 | |
| June 16 | A statute provides for a referendum on the question of a convention to revise the constitution and for the election of delegates if a majority of the voters approve. |
| August 21 | In town meetings the people endorse a convention; the vote is 11,756 to 6,593. |
| October 16 | The convention delegates are elected in town meetings. |
| November 15 | The convention opens in Boston. |
| November 24 | The delegates commence debate in committee of the whole on the reports submitted by the select committees. |
| 1821 | |
| January 1 | The convention begins consideration of amendments reported by the committee of the whole. |
| January 2 | The convention approves, 245 to 147, the revised plan—the eighth resolution of the legislative committee—for the apportionment of representatives. |
| January 6 | The convention rejects, 136 to 246, Childs’s substitute amendment for the third and fourth articles of the bill of rights. |
| January 8 | The convention takes up the report of the committee appointed to reduce the approved amendments to form. |
| January 9 | The convention gives final approval to fourteen amendments and to an “Address to the People” and adjourns sine die. |
| April 9 | Nine of the fourteen amendments are ratified by the people in town meetings. |
The question of religion in its connections with civil government was first discussed in the convention on December 4. At issue was the test oath—a declaration of belief in the Christian religion—required of all elective officials. The select committee on this chapter of the constitution called for abolition of the oath. Daniel Webster, the chairman, opened the debate with a justification of the change on grounds of expediency rather than of right. The thirty-eight-year-old Webster, though a native of Massachusetts, had not yet embarked on his distinguished political career in that state. He had moved to Boston to practice law in 1816, having served for several years in Washington as a New Hampshire Congressman. He apparently held no firm convictions on the question before the convention.
The speakers who followed him did, however, James Prince, of Boston, condemned the test oath on the principles of religious liberty. Joseph Tuckerman, a Unitarian minister who later became famous for his ministry to the poor of Boston, held that a Christian people had a right to demand Christian rulers. James T. Austin, a prominent Boston attorney, Republican, and legislator, concisely and cogently defended the resolution.
MR. WEBSTER. It is obvious that the principal alteration, proposed by the first resolution, is the omission of the declaration of belief in the Christian religion, as a qualification for office, in the cases of the governor, lieutenant governor, counsellors and members of the Legislature. I shall content myself on this occasion with stating, shortly and generally, the sentiments of the select committee as I understand them on the subject of this resolution. Two questions naturally present themselves. In the first place; have the people a right, if in their judgment the security of their government and its due administration demand it, to require a declaration of belief in the Christian religion as a qualification or condition of office? On this question, a majority of the committee held a decided opinion. They thought the people had such a right. By the fundamental principle of popular and elective governments, all office is in the free gift of the people. They may grant, or they may withhold it at pleasure; and if it be for them, and them only, to decide whether they will grant office, it is for them to decide, also, on what terms, and with what conditions, they will grant it. Nothing is more unfounded than the notion that any man has a right to an office. This must depend on the choice of others, and consequently upon the opinions of others, in relation to his fitness and qualification for office. No man can be said to have a right to that, which others may withhold from him, at pleasure. There are certain rights, no doubt, which the whole people—or the government as representing the whole people—owe to each individual, in return for that obedience, and personal service, and proportionate contributions to the public burdens which each individual owes to the government. These rights are stated with sufficient accuracy in the tenth article of the bill of rights in this constitution: “Each individual in society has a right to be protected by it, in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to the standing laws.” Here is no right of office enumerated; no right of governing others, or of bearing rule in the State. All bestowment of office remaining in the discretion of the people, they have, of course, a right to regulate it, by any rules which they may deem expedient. Hence the people, by their constitution, prescribe certain qualifications for office, respecting age, property, residence, &c. But if office, merely as such, were a right, which each individual under the social compact was entitled to claim, all these qualifications would be indefensible. The acknowledged rights are not subject, and ought not to be subject to any such limitation. The right of being protected in life, liberty, and estate, is due to all, and cannot be justly denied to any, whatever be their age, property, or residence in the State. These qualifications, then, can only be made requisite as qualifications for office, on the ground that office is not what any man can demand as matter of right, but rests in the confidence and good will of those who are to bestow it. In short, it seems to me too plain to be questioned, that the right of office is a matter of discretion, and option, and can never be claimed by any man, on the ground of obligation… . However clear the right be, (and I can hardly suppose any gentleman will dispute it) the expediency of retaining the declaration is a more difficult question. It is said not to be necessary, because in this Commonwealth, ninety-nine out of every hundred of the inhabitants profess to believe in the Christian religion. It is sufficiently certain, therefore, that persons of this description, and none others, will ordinarily be chosen to places of public trust. There is as much security, it is said, on this subject, as the necessity of the case requires. And as there is a sort of opprobrium—a marking out for observation and censorious remark, a single individual, or a very few individuals, who may not be able to make the declaration, it is an act, if not of injustice, yet of unkindness, and of unnecessary rigor to call on such individuals to make the declaration. There is, also, another class of objections which has been stated. It has been said that there are many very devout and serious persons—persons who esteem the Christian religion to be above all price—to whom, nevertheless, the terms of this declaration seem somewhat too strong and intense. They seem, to these persons, to require the declaration of that faith which is deemed essential to personal salvation; and therefore not at all fit to be adopted by those who profess a belief in Christianity, merely in a more popular and general sense. It certainly appears to me that this is a mistaken interpretation of the terms; that they imply only a general assent to the truth of the Christian revelation, and, at most, to the supernatural occurrences which establish its authenticity. There may, however, and there appears to be, conscience in this objection; and all conscience ought to be respected. I was not aware, before I attended the discussions in the committee, of the extent to which this objection prevailed… . For my own part, finding this declaration in the constitution, and hearing of no practical evil resulting from it, I should have been willing to retain it; unless considerable objection had been expressed to it. If others were satisfied with it, I should be. I do not consider it, however, essential to retain it, as there is another part of the constitution which recognizes in the fullest manner the benefits which civil society derives from those Christian institutions which cherish piety, morality and religion. I am conscious, that we should not strike out of the constitution all recognition of the Christian religion. I am desirous, in so solemn a transaction as the establishment of a constitution, that we should keep in it an expression of our respect and attachment to Christianity;—not, indeed, to any of its peculiar forms, but to its general principles.
MR. PRINCE… . There are, said Mr. P., two distinct rights belonging to man—UNALIENABLE and NATURAL—among