of Christians were conscientiously opposed to the right of imposing any tax for the support of religion. The right therefore of taxing would operate unequally. The Episcopalians, the Baptists, the Friends, had never exercised the right. None he believed but the Congregational denomination had exercised the right. It was therefore granting to them an exclusive right. It had been contended that it was necessary for the support of religion. He did not agree that it was necessary. He contended that it was not. He found that all religious communities, besides supporting their own religious teachers, contributed large sums to the extension of the knowledge of Christianity to other countries. It was not necessary for securing the maintenance of the ministry, and it had a tendency to produce strife and contention. Persons were taxed in societies, who were accustomed to attend religious worship in other societies, and this produced jealousy, strife, ill feelings towards each other. The ministers in many instances do not wish it. They had rather labor with their own hands for their support, than that the stock and property of their flock should be taken and sold for their maintenance. He wished to strike from the constitution a provision that was not necessary for the support of religion, and which tended to produce strife and jealousy. It would reduce all the religious communities to a level, and would introduce a spirit of harmony and emulation for the support of religion, and he believed in a short time the amount of voluntary contribution for religious purposes, would be greater than can now be raised by the hand of power. If we would attend to the subject in its operation on religion, we should find it would have a good effect, to remove all restrictions, which operate to give exclusive privileges to a particular denomination. He wished to have the constitution so amended that there should be no inconsistency in it, and that each religious community should be entitled to equal privileges… .
… MR. CHILDS stated as a general principle, that the right of every individual to worship God in a manner agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience, was one which no government could interfere with. Whenever government had undertaken to exercise an authority in this respect, it was an usurpation, and when this usurpation had been submitted to, the worship rendered was not sincere. In our own government, unless it could be demonstrated that it was necessary to the support of government, and clearly for the interest of the community, it could not be fairly exercised. He would call the attention of the committee to the argument of the gentleman from Boston. He would not admit that he or any other gentleman who would support the report of the select committee felt a greater interest in the support of religious institutions than gentlemen who would advocate the resolution which he had proposed. The gentleman had said that the committee were unanimously of opinion that the support of institutions for religious instruction and worship were essential to the happiness of the people and the good order of society, and therefore ought to be supported by legislative provision. He, Mr. C., would draw a different conclusion from the same premises. He argued that because religious instruction and worship were essential to the happiness of the people and good order and preservation of government, they ought to be left to the free support of every individual, according to the dictates of conscience. He contended that this was the only mode in which religious worship could be properly supported, and the mode in which in practice under the constitution it had been actually supported. The principles of the third article in the declaration of rights had been abandoned in practice, and the resolution before the committee did not deviate from what had been the practice for many years in the Commonwealth—what had been recognized by the Legislature—and from the general sentiment of the people. He believed there was no state where there was so much refinement—so much instruction, and so great a regard for religion as were to be found in this Commonwealth. He was willing to go as far as any gentleman in this eulogy of the character of the people in all parts of the State. But he would not admit that this character was to be attributed to the inefficient and inoperative recognition of a principle in the constitution. It was to be attributed to the general support of common schools—they were the primum mobile of improvement in the Commonwealth. He appealed to the example of the town of Boston where this principle of the constitution had no effect, and yet there was nowhere to be found a higher degree of improvement. The example of Rhode Island had been appealed to as a case to show the necessity of some constitutional provision for the support of religion. But Mr. C. said that the low state of morals and improvement in that state could not be attributed to the want of a compulsatory provision for the support of religion, but to their want of common schools. In Providence, where schools were encouraged, as much attention was paid to the support of religion as in Boston. This amounted to a demonstration that the effect was to be attributed to the general diffusion of education by common schools, and not to any provision for the support of religion. The example of New York, he said, had been appealed to, but there was there the same want of schools as in Rhode Island. It was proposed to substitute the word Christian for Protestant. He called on gentlemen to define Christian. Clergymen differed on the subject. What would be called Christianity by one, would be called infidelity by another. Who knows what will be the state of things some years hence. The time was rapidly approaching when men professing to be Christians will be so opposed that if this part of the constitution is retained, the Commonwealth will be in a state of greater dissension from theological differences than they have ever been from political controversies. The resolution proposed by the select committee, declares the principle thus—the Legislature shall have power to compel the people to support religious teachers; but if gentlemen would examine it in its details, they would find that it would accord in practice with the principle in the resolution proposed by him as a substitute. In this construction his opinion was supported by the argument of the gentleman from Concord yesterday. That gentleman was consistent in his views, and for adopting a consistent course. Mr. C. said he would rather adopt the consistent principle of that gentleman, than the contradictory one of the committee. The proposition supported by him was explicit, and it would be known what was to be depended on. The principle maintained by the committee with the qualifications with which we had accompanied it, would keep the State in constant quarrels and collisions. He repeated that rather than take the report of the committee, he would take the proposition advocated by the gentleman from Concord. Our forefathers had been repeatedly brought forward as affording an illustrious example. He presumed, however, that their example was not to be adopted in everything, and contended that this was a domination of the same kind, and only differing in degree from that which every body at the present day disapproved. He would state how far, in his opinion, government has a right to interfere in matters of religion. So far as the laws can take cognizance of offences committed against good morals, government has a right to interfere; but the principle which leads us to worship God, is beyond the control of government. The gentleman from Concord had said, that if we abandon the means of supporting religious instruction, we should be obliged to resort to a standing army to enforce obedience to the laws. He, Mr. C., would reverse the proposition. Establish the principle that government has a right to compel the support of public worship, and a standing army will be necessary to carry it into effect… .
… MR. WILLIAMS of Beverly said, that some gentlemen seemed to suppose, that all who were in favor of the present proposition, were in favor of removing all religion from the State. He wished to remove this impression. He considered that religion was of great consequence to the Commonwealth, and that the government should protect all persons in the enjoyment of their religious rights and privileges. He was opposed to the present provision in the constitution. He understood that the third article allows a tax which favored one religious denomination, and he understood that the report of the select committee had the same object. He thought the terms of the constitution were not so explicit and intelligible as some gentlemen had asserted. He admitted the premises in the third article, but not the conclusion. He considered that liberty of action and of opinion was given by the constitution to only one religious denomination, that of Congregationalists. He denied that the operation of the constitution had been equal, as the gentleman from Concord had asserted; but he said some persons had been obliged to pay, where they had received no benefit. Sometimes the taxes of minor children were paid to the support of public worship where the father attended, and where they did not. He understood it had been said that persons might go from one society to another at their pleasure. He denied the fact. He mentioned that in one town there was a society, comprising almost all the inhabitants, and that afterwards a society of Congregationalists grew up there, and taxes paid to the treasurer were applied to the support of this worship in consequence of the provisions of the constitution. He thought this was unequal.