shows, that the principle is not just. Society may make a part of its members obnoxious to laws, and yet deny them the right of suffrage, without any injustice.
Again—it has been said that pecuniary qualification was contrary to the spirit of our constitution. Those who took this ground had not favored the Convention with their definition of the spirit of our constitution, though it was very plain from the course of their arguments that what they understood by it, was a spirit of universal or unlimited liberty. Now, this is not the spirit of our constitution; which is a spirit of limited liberty; of reciprocal control. Reduced to the form of a definition, this is the meaning of the term, spirit of our constitution—The will of the people, expressed through an organization by balanced power. Every man, therefore, who would compare any given provision, with the spirit of our constitution, ought not to recur to principles of abstract liberty, but to principles of balanced liberty. With respect to those checks and balances, which according to the form of our constitution, constitute the character of Massachusetts liberty, those gentlemen take a very narrow view of the subject who deem that they exist only in the separation of the powers of government into the legislative, judicial and executive; or in the division of the legislative power among three branches. Every limitation of the exercise of any right or power, under the constitution, makes a part of that balance, which will be disturbed by its removal. The provision of a pecuniary qualification is of this nature. It is one of the checks in our constitution. How it operates, whom it affects, whom it benefits, are worthy of consideration. In the course of the argument in the Convention, it has been considered as a check, in favor of the rich, and against the poor. Now the fact is, that it is directly the reverse. If we should suppose the rich, acting as a class, this is the first provision, which they ought to expunge. And on the other hand, it is the last, with which the poor ought to consent to part. In its true character, this provision is in favor of the poor, and against the pauper;—that is to say, in favor of those who have something, but very little; against those who have nothing at all. Suppose all qualifications of property taken away, who gains by it? The poor man, who has just property enough to be qualified to vote? Or the rich, whose property is a great surplus? The rich man’s individual vote is, indeed, countervailed by it, as well as the poor man’s. But the great difference is this, that the poor man has thus lost his political all; he has no power of indemnifying himself. Whereas the rich, by the influence resulting from his property over the class of paupers, has a power of indemnifying himself a hundred fold. The theory of our constitution is, that extreme poverty—that is, pauperism—is inconsistent with independence. It therefore assumes a qualification of a very low amount, which, according to its theory, is the lowest consistent with independence. Undoubtedly it excludes some, of a different character of mind. But this number is very few; and from the small amount of property required, is, in individual cases, soon compensated.
At the present day, the provision was probably worth very little. In the present results of our elections, it would not make one hair white or black. But prospectively, it was of great consequence. In this point of view he put it to the consideration of the landholders, and yeomanry of the country. The principle was peculiarly important to them. Everything indicates that the destinies of the country will eventuate in the establishment of a great manufacturing interest in the Commonwealth. There is nothing in the condition of our country, to prevent manufacturers from being absolutely dependent upon their employers, here as they are everywhere else. The whole body of every manufacturing establishment, therefore, are dead votes, counted by the head, by their employer. Let the gentlemen from the country consider, how it may affect their rights, liberties and properties, if in every county of the Commonwealth there should arise, as in time there probably will, one, two, or three manufacturing establishments, each sending, as the case may be, from one to eight hundred votes to the polls depending on the will of one employer, one great capitalist. In such a case would they deem such a provision as this of no consequence? At present it is of little importance. Prospectively of very great. As to the inconvenience resulting from the present provision, this was amply balanced by its effect as a moral means, and as an incentive to industry… .
… MR. AUSTIN of Boston said that gentlemen, who were unwilling to change the principles of the constitution, instead of striking out this qualification ought to increase the sum, on account of the change in the value of money; he thought, however, that it would be impossible for them to effect this, and experience had shown the impolicy of requiring the present qualification. He would not contend against the right of requiring it, though there were strong arguments on that side, but he considered it inexpedient. The provision could not be carried into effect; it was the cause of perjury and immorality—it did not prevent a fraudulent man from voting, who owed more than he was worth, but debarred an honest poor man who paid his debts—and it tended to throw suspicion of unfairness on the municipal authority. He asked, what will you do with your laboring men? They have no freehold—no property to the amount of two hundred dollars, but they support their families reputably with their daily earnings. What will you do with your sailors? Men who labor hard, and scatter with inconsiderateness the product of their toil, and who depend on the earnings of the next voyage. What will you do with your young men, who have spent all their money in acquiring an education? Must they buy their right to vote? Must they depend on their friends or parents to purchase it for them? Must they wait till they have turned their intelligence into stock? Shall all these classes of citizens be deprived of the rights of freemen for want of property? Regard for country, he said, did not depend upon property, but upon institutions, laws, habits and associations. This qualification was said to encourage industry;—it was better to depend on the principle of character and independence which a man feels in exercising the privilege of a freeman. If taking away this qualification would weaken the moral force in the community, as had been urged, he should be for retaining it; but that force depends on education, and the diffusion of intelligence. One gentleman (Mr. Quincy) had looked forward to our becoming a great manufacturing people. God forbid. If it should happen, however, it was not to be expected, that this modicum of property required would exclude the laborers in manufactories from voting. It was better to let them vote—they would otherwise become the Lazaroni of the country. By refusing this right to them, you array them against the laws; but give them the rights of citizens—mix them with the good part of society, and you disarm them… .
6. The Basis of Representation *
After disposing of the suffrage question, the committee of the whole proceeded to take up Henry Dearborn’s resolution to change the basis of representation in the senate from property to persons. Dearborn spoke at length, but the Journal preserves only a brief abstract of his speech. The resolution passed. The convention voted to reconsider, and Dearborn explained his plan for a democratically based representation encompassing both chambers of the legislature. Levi Lincoln then introduced his plan, which he expounded on the floor the next day, December 13. Dearborn and Lincoln, the foremost democratic leaders in the convention, were both sons of Massachusetts Jeffersonians who had served in Jefferson’s cabinet. Dearborn, who represented Roxbury in Norfolk County, succeeded his father as Collector of the Port of Boston in 1812 and remained in that post until 1829. Lincoln, from Worcester, was a lawyer and, at intervals, an influential member of the legislature. He was later governor of the state for a solid decade, from 1825 to 1834. The speeches of Saltonstall and John Adams—his longest in the convention—briefly state the views of the two conservatives.
MR. DEARBORN… . He did not know whence the principle, by which the senate is apportioned by the present constitution, was derived. It was not to be found in the organization of any of the republics, ancient or modern. It did not exist in Greece, Rome, Venice or Genoa. It was found in the British House of Lords. The members of that house support the rights of the aristocracy, and are their own representatives. In the United States there is but one class of people. They are all freemen and have equal rights. The principle of a representation of property in our constitution was not derived from the neighboring states. New Hampshire was the only state whose constitution contained a similar provision. If the principle was a good one, it was remarkable that it had not been adopted in any other state. The only reason he had ever heard of to justify the principle was, that the taxes are paid in proportion to property, and that the principle of apportionment was designed for the protection of property.