Property secures respect whenever it is not abused, and the influence of those who possess it is sufficient for its protection. He apprehended nothing at present from the representation of wealth. But the time might come when the accumulation of property within twenty miles of the capital would be sufficient to control the senate. At present the county of Berkshire, of about equal population with Suffolk, would have but a third part of the representation, and the man of large property in the former county would have but a third part of the influence through the senate which was enjoyed by a man of the same property in the latter county. This was not just, equitable nor proper. He appealed to the magnanimity of the rich to yield to the poor their equal proportion of rights. The principle might be adopted now, but the people would be dissatisfied with it, they would constantly protest against it, and it would be at some time or other necessarily yielded to their importunity… .
… MR. LINCOLN… . The question now under consideration was on what principle should the representation in the senate be founded? He agreed in the sentiment that a free government must be founded on a system of checks and balances—and it was on this principle that he supported the resolution offered by the gentleman from Roxbury. But he did not admit that to obtain this check it was necessary to assume the principle of a representation of property in either branch. It was attained by adopting a different mode of representation for the two branches as well as a different principle. The object of a check was equally attained by adopting different qualifications for electors, or different periods of election. If it was shown by argument, by experience, or by arithmetical calculation that any principle was unequal, that ought to be abandoned, and another adopted not susceptible of the objection. He should proceed to show the inequality and unjust operation of the old principle, and then endeavor to show that the effect contemplated from checks may be secured by another principle not liable to these objections. If it should be shown that representation according to valuation was not just, and that the object could be attained by letting the whole people vote for one branch, and freeholders only for the other—by choosing one for two years and the other for one, or in any other mode which is not unequal—this principle should be abandoned. He admitted that if senators were to be chosen from certain districts, and representatives from the same, and for the same period, according to the plan of the gentleman from Roxbury, there would be no check. But it was not so with the plan which he had proposed. He had proposed that the representatives in the other branch should be chosen by towns—and the system would then be analogous to that of the Congress of the United States, reversing the terms only, one representing the corporations of towns and the other the population. Was the principle of representation in the senate equal and just? Our government is one of the people, not a government of property. Representation is founded on the interests of the people. It is because they have rights that they have assumed the power of self government. Property is incompetent to sustain a free government. Intelligence alone can uphold any free government. In a government of free-men property is valuable only as the people are intelligent. Were it not for a government of the people, the people would be without property. But it is contended that this system is justified by another principle. Representation and taxation have been described as twin brothers. But this principle has not been fully understood. It does not follow that there shall be an unequal representation, that taxation may be represented. It is only necessary that all who are taxed should be represented, and not that they should be represented in proportion to their tax. Boston would be represented if it had but a single member. This was the principle which was contended for in the revolution, and that revolution would never have been effected if we had had a single representative in the British parliament. Secure the right of representation; but in the regulation of that right, you may restrict it to any proportion whatever. Whether you are represented by one or forty-five, it is utterly in vain to complain that you have no representation. But any other distribution of representation than according to population, is unequal and unjust. He alluded to the case mentioned yesterday by the gentleman from Roxbury of one senator for the county of Suffolk for every 7,500 inhabitants, while there was in the county of Berkshire but one for every 20,000, which he pronounced to be an instance of most gross and cruel inequality. He stated the case of an individual lately deceased whose property of 1,300,000 dollars alone, would have as much influence in the senate as 1300 independent farmers with a property of 1000 dollars each. This principle conferred upon a dangerous part of the community an undue and unwarrantable share in the representation. A man of 1,300,000 dollars property surrounded by 1299 others of no property, confers on them an influence equal to the same number of independent men worth 1000 each. He contended that if it was a sound principle that property should confer the right of representation, it ought not to be restricted, and Suffolk should have eight senators. Imposing the restriction was admitting that the principle was false and unjust. Taking population as the basis, no inequality would result. He protested against any misapprehension of his feelings and motives—he had no disposition to excite jealousies, nor to prevent the exercise of rights—if they were founded upon principle. He professed a great respect for the people of the metropolis—but he protested against their borrowing, through the respect entertained for the town, any influence that was not secured to every other part of the people… .
… MR. SALTONSTALL of Salem observed that this Convention exhibited a singular and most interesting scene. A free people by their delegates assembled to deliberate upon the constitution under which they have so long lived, inquiring into its operations, and whether there is any evil that requires amendment. It is a subject of gratitude that while the nations of the old world are obliged to submit to reforms, dictated by standing armies, we are witnessing this quiet scene. But there is also much cause of anxiety. A short time since we were all happy under the present constitution. There was no symptom of uneasiness, no project for a convention. Our government secured to us all the objects for which civil society was instituted. The separation of a part of the Commonwealth, rendered it expedient to propose to the people the question of a convention, and it was adopted by a very small vote,—a fact which shows conclusively that no evil was pressing on the people; that no grievance loudly demanded a remedy. But now, amidst constant professions of veneration for the instrument, every part of it is attacked, and we are called on to defend the elementary principles of government. First, we abolish one session of the Legislature, which has existed for two centuries; we then dispense with the necessity of a declaration which has existed from the beginning; we disown that the people ever enjoyed their rights in the election of counsellors. And now the foundation of a great branch of the government is attacked, as unjust and aristocratic. Is the constitution to be thrown by as an old-fashioned piece of furniture, that answered well enough in its day, but is now fit only to be stowed away in the lumber room with the portraits of our ancestors? Let us rather meet the objections, listen to the arguments, correct the evil, if one is shown to exist, and the constitution will come out of the fiery furnace unhurt, still more precious for the trial it has endured. Mr. S. then observed that he had not expected a serious attempt would be made to change the basis of the senate; that it had not been a cause of dissatisfaction; that nothing had been written or said against it until the separation of Maine; that there was occasionally some difficulty as to the fractions, and some irritation in the formation of districts, but no serious disaffection; and he believed no objection was ever made to it in the Legislature, as unjust or unequal. He had thought also that the constitution was endeared to the people from the circumstances under which it was made,—in the midst of war; our independence not yet secure; while our armies were yet in the field. At such a time the convention met, and deliberately discussed the great principles of government, and framed the present system of government. There were circumstances also calculated especially to endear this part of the constitution to us. When the convention assembled, a majority were opposed to two branches; they thought the people needed no check: like the gentleman from Worcester [Mr. Lincoln], they thought the people were capable of self-government. Its analogy to the old council had also a tendency to render it odious; it also savored a little of aristocracy, and the leaders of that day had been irritated under the influence of the old government; yet they listened to the sages who were with them, and adopted the principle. The present basis of the senate is perfectly defensible in theory. Some check on the popular branch is necessary; this is admitted by all. Mr. S. then referred to history,—the English parliament,—to the national assembly, &c., to show its necessity. There are times when popular ferments are excited, that would destroy everything fair and valuable in society, if unchecked. Mr. S. then remarked