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to itself for that purpose, so that now the ruler of the state becomes a subject different from the nation, that moral person, which before existed in the nation as a whole, exists now in another physical individual. And so the ruler of a state represents the entire nation, so far as he is considered ruler of the state. But do not persuade yourself that the character as representative of the nation derogates in any respect from the dignity of the ruler of a state like the majesty of a monarch in a monarchical state. For this rather makes it the more conspicuous, because now one has that dignity which a large group of people has only when considered as a whole; from this, too, it follows, that this dignity is greater in a kingdom, in which one man has it, than in an aristocracy, in which it belongs to several together. And since none of this dignity will remain in the people, and none of it can belong to the individuals, since what belongs to the whole cannot be common to individuals, therefore the ruler of a state towers above the nation, nor can the dignity of any one of the nation be compared with his dignity. See what we have already proved and noted elsewhere.
§ 40. Of the knowledge of itself
§ 35.
§ 36.
Every nation ought to know itself and its condition. For it ought to perfect itself and its condition, and it ought to guard against and avoid those things which can hinder its perfection and that of its condition, or render itself or its condition less perfect. It is therefore necessary that it should know what sort of capabilities of mind and powers of body, and what things are needed for perfecting itself and its condition, what perfection it has already attained and with what imperfection it still suffers, both as regards itself and as regards its form of government. Therefore every nation ought to know itself and its condition.
This knowledge is especially necessary to a nation, unless it should wish to commit all to fortune and not to have knowledge except by its own hurt, or to trust simply to a blind imitation of other nations. Knowledge of its own self is enjoined for no other purpose than that a nation should, as far as is in its power, perform its duties to itself and strive to perform them fully. But if the care of perfecting itself and its condition is subjected simply to the power of fortune, a nation by no
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means perfects itself and its condition as far as it can. Hence we see that very many nations, which could have ascended to a high degree of perfection, have always remained in a low degree.
§ 41. The knowledge of a nation required of a ruler of a state
§ 40.
§ 38.
The ruler of a state ought to know his nation and its condition. It is plain from the proof of the preceding proposition that the care of perfecting itself and its condition demands a knowledge of itself and its condition in a nation. Therefore, since the care of perfecting a nation and its condition belongs to the ruler of a state, the ruler of a state ought to know his nation and its condition.
Note, § 39.
When sovereignty is transferred to another, the ruler of a state assumes the personality of the nation as a whole, and so all obligation passes to him of perfecting the nation and its form of government, consequently also the obligation of understanding perfectly the nation which he represents and whose personality he bears, and its condition. The care to be expended upon acquiring this knowledge is perpetual, although generally among many nations this is neglected. For without this knowledge it is impossible to administer the state properly.
§ 42. Of the necessity of knowledge concerning the condition of the territory and of all places in it
§ 41.
Since the ruler of a state ought to know the condition of his nation, since, moreover, this depends in great part on the condition of the territory, as is plainly evident, the ruler of a state therefore ought to know the condition of the territory which his nation inhabits, and when this is not the same everywhere, he ought to know the condition of all places in it.
It is impossible that the form of government of any nation should be brought to that degree of perfection of which it is capable, unless the condition of all the territory which it inhabits is accurately known and understood; as this cannot be done, so that the nation itself may be perfected, as far as possible, unless you examine carefully the natural gifts, the customs and the manner of life of all the inhabitants of all places. Moreover, each form of knowledge is so closely connected
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with the other that one cannot be separated from the other, whether you wish to perfect the condition of a nation, or the nation itself, or guard against imperfection, or remove blemishes from it. Whence it is plainly evident that for this knowledge is required an accurate geographical map of the whole territory and of the several parts, under whatsoever name they may finally come, an entire natural history of the whole territory, perfectly accurate measurement of all the fields, meadows, woods, cities, towns, villages, and so on, finally a trustworthy description of the inhabitants of all places and of those things which concern them in any manner. When this knowledge of the territory and inhabitants is prepared for the use of the ruler of the state and consequently of those whose advice and service he uses in administering the state, statecraft will readily tell what can be communicated safely to the public, and what ought to be concealed, lest it betray the country to others.
§ 43. Of those characteristics which are to be predicated of the nation by transfer from individuals
§ 5, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 2.
§§ 28, 30, Ontol.
Those characteristics which are to be predicated of the greater part of a nation or the majority in some particular walk of life, pass from the individuals to the nation as a whole and consequently are to be predicated of it. For since every nation is a multitude of people, since moreover neither nature and fortune nor education, training and intercourse, even if they be very much the same, make individuals the same; it is altogether impossible for the things, which, as it were, are peculiar to individuals, to be predicated of them as a whole. Nevertheless, since every nation is to be considered as a single personality, the characteristics of individuals pass from them to the nation. But since contradictions cannot exist in one entity and it would in truth be absurd for the name to be taken from the smaller rather than the larger part, those things which are to be predicated of the greater part of the nation pass from the individuals to the nation as a whole and consequently are predicated of it. Which was the first point.
Now further, it is quite plain a posteriori that, if men are to pass their lives advantageously and pleasantly and live happily, all cannot follow the same kind of life, but, in order that all things may be done which ought
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to be done in a well-established commonwealth, as we have fully shown in the entire third chapter of the eighth part of “The Law of Nature,”1 some ought to do one thing, others another, just as in the human body there are different functions for different organs, fitted to accomplish one definite general purpose; the characteristics of the several groups of men living the same kind of life pass into the nation as a whole. But since, as before shown, it cannot happen that individuals who live the same kind of life should be the same, as likewise was before made plain, the characteristics which are to be predicated of the majority in some definite kind of life pass from them to the nation, and consequently are to be predicated of it. Which was the second point.
That the force and influence of the present proposition may be grasped, it must of course be illustrated by examples. We say, for example, that a nation is vigorous and industrious, if the majority found in it are vigorous men and the men generally are industrious. A nation is said to be vicious, if a very great number pollute themselves by every kind of vice; it is said to be intemperate, if it is a common custom to delight in excessive drinking; it is said to be licentious, if its common vice has been lust. Those who write of the customs of nations can use no other principle of distinction than that those characteristics pass from the individuals to the nation, which belong to the great majority. Likewise a nation is called rich, in which many