in wealth; that one is called educated and learned, which has many educated and learned men; the English are called excellent artisans, because manufactured articles are carefully fashioned in England; the Italians remarkable architects, because among them architecture has been cultivated and is to-day cultivated; the Dutch pre-eminent merchants, because merchandising flourishes among them in a singular manner. But it is to be observed that when a majority of those who are pre-eminent in any walk in life are to be considered, the number of those who are in one nation is customarily compared with the number of those who follow the same walk in life in other nations. But although that comparison may be especially attributed in general to
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prejudice, nevertheless this does not prevent these general principles from having a basis also in truth. For prejudices act in no other way than that principles true in themselves may be wrongly applied, just as also is often done by those, who from one or two instances, draw a conclusion as to more, because they assume wrongly that, if not all, at least very many, ought to be such as they recognize the one or two to be. But he who avoids prejudice knows that it is to be proved and not assumed that those are in the majority, from whom some characteristic is to be transferred to the nation, before it can be attributed to the nation; nor in proving that does he assume what formerly was, but what now is, when a decision as to the present is to be given, and concerning that characteristic which he assigns to the majority, or to the very great number, he decides after very careful investigation. For unless those things are observed, his decision concerning the nation will be just as false as if, those points being ignored, he should decide concerning other things.
§ 44. Of the duty of individuals arising therefrom
§ 43.
§ 152, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ., and §§ 522, 523, part 1, Jus Nat.
Since those characteristics which are to be predicated of the greater part of a nation, or the majority in some definite kind of life, pass from the individuals to the nation as a whole and consequently are to be predicated of it; whoever belongs to a nation owes this not only to himself, but also to his nation, that, to his utmost ability, he perfect himself and his condition and so perform his work, that he may through that endeavour perfectly attain his purpose, and consequently may excel, so far as it can be done, in that kind of life which he follows.
§ 887, Psych. Emp.
§ 118, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.
So we owe it not only to ourselves to acquire intellectual and moral virtues, but also to the nation to which we belong, lest we be to blame for its being styled less virtuous, or lest this or that intellectual or moral virtue come to be denied to it. Likewise the scholar is bound to his nation, that it may excel especially in learning, and that he may not detract from its reputation as a learned nation, and the artisan is bound to it, that it may be adorned by the art which he practices, and that he may not by his error diminish its reputation. It is in harmony with these general ideas that the characteristics of individuals pass from them to the nation, so that the individuals also who belong to
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the nation seem to share the reputation of the others who are of the same nation. Therefore contrary to common sense are the customs of that set of scholars in Germany who discredit the men especially deserving in the republic of letters and afterwards flatter and exalt to heaven with the highest praise those things in the works of foreigners which they have ridiculed in their own, as if by flattery they could share in the reputation of a foreign nation. But from this a new motive arises to perform with all our might all duties imposed by natural law, on which is based a new natural obligation, that we should not allow ourselves to be lacking in any effort or exertion to perfect ourselves.
§ 45. Of the necessity of not bringing disgrace on one’s nation
§ 44.
§ 722, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 395, part 8, Jus Nat.
Since each and every one owes it to his nation that, to his utmost ability, he should perfect himself and his condition and excel in the kind of life which he follows, as far as he can, and since he who is bound to do this, is bound at the same time not to do the opposite, each one ought to be on his guard, lest by doing those things which are wrong or less right, he may bring disgrace upon his nation; consequently since the ruler of a state ought to take care that citizens should not do the things which are opposed to the obligations prescribed by natural law, he therefore ought not to allow citizens to bring disgrace upon their nation.
§§ 653, 654, part 8, Jus Nat.
Many particular conclusions follow from this, since this obligation is as widely extended as are the duties of a man and citizen. And hence also follows the right to punish the acts of subjects by whom disgrace is brought upon the nation, of which we have spoken elsewhere.
§ 46. Of zeal for the reputation of one’s nation
§ 43.
§ 554, part 1, Jus Nat.
Because those characteristics pass from the individuals to the nation as a whole and are predicated of it, which come to be predicated of the greater part of a nation, or the majority in some definite kind of life, and consequently the good reputation also of the greater part, or of the majority in some definite kind of life passes over to the nation as a whole, those who are of the nation owe this not only to themselves, but also to their own nation, that its reputation should be good; consequently they
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ought to defend the reputation of their nation and country so far as in them lies.
The learned undoubtedly sin against their nation who revile with insult the men especially deserving in the republic of letters, preservers of the reputation of their nation, and who detract from their reputation or even strive with all their might to make public those things which ought rather to have been concealed, lest disgrace be imposed upon their nation. But those things which are said of the nation as a whole ought likewise to be understood of definite classes or groups of men. Now the duty of which we have already spoken, ought to be the more carefully observed when the welfare of the nation or of a definite class or group depends upon its reputation. Moreover, they err the more basely who do anything contrary to this duty, if it shall have been entrusted to their charge to protect the reputation of the class or group. I do not add examples lest they may be invidious.
§ 47. What fame is
§ 551, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 552, part 1, Jus Nat.
Fame is the unanimous praise of the good and wise, or of those who judge properly. We call it in our native vernacular ein grosser Nahme [a great name]. Therefore since deeds arising from intellectual and moral virtues produce praise, and show that a man is worthy of that praise; without intellectual and moral virtues no one can attain real fame, and he excels especially in fame who is the most pre-eminent in virtue.
§ 553, part 1, Jus Nat.
Fame does not differ from praise, except that praise is assigned by one, but many agree as to fame. Moreover the consensus of the many according to the laws of probability proves that praise is deserved. Still, it is needful that those who judge should judge well, consequently that they be wise, lest they fail in judgement, and that they be good, lest contrary to conscience they may honour some one with undeserved praise. For many, and often also the wise, praise in order that they may be praised, and are influenced either by the hope of some personal advantage or by the desire to promote the welfare of the one whom they praise. Hence, not rarely does it happen that some deserve fame, others have it. Now it is better to deserve than to have and not deserve. And since the reputation of a man is the common report of
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other men concerning his intellectual and moral habits, by force of the definition, fame without reputation is inconceivable. For those who are not able to judge for themselves follow the judgement of the wise, a course which at length becomes general. But because it happens that those are considered wise who are not, true and genuine fame differs from the false