of itself and directly conduces to this; further perfection, moreover, is to be expected from that which of itself has the least connexion with the appetite. But these things belong to a deeper inquiry, and of them we shall speak more properly in another place. Here is
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pertinent the example of the Chinese of which we have already spoken. The correction of the will depends of course upon the perfection of the intellect; nevertheless there is need of much caution, lest we may pervert the will by perfecting the intellect. This is a point to be considered among those things which we have suggested belong to a deeper inquiry.
§ 56. What purpose nations ought to set before themselves in perfecting the intellect
§ 54.
§ 53.
§ 29.
Likewise because nations ought to be civilized, consequently ought to perfect the intellect, moreover since the perfection of a nation consists in its fitness for attaining the purpose of the state, and since the condition of a nation is perfect, if nothing is lacking in it, which it needs for attaining that purpose; nations in perfecting the intellect ought always to consider the purpose of the state and those things which they need for attaining this purpose, consequently they ought to direct all their efforts to this end.
§ 2.
Note, § 28.
§ 30.
Inasmuch as the state is considered as a single person, to it belongs also an intellect peculiar to the nation, or the human intellect is to be looked at in its relation to the nation itself. Since, therefore, we are here speaking of the perfecting of the intellect, what things are said concerning it are not to be considered without regard to the nation, which as a nation we argue ought to perfect the same. Those things which we have said concerning the preservation of the nation, are with proper variation to be understood also here and in regard to other things which are said of the duties of nations. But just as it is plain from those things which have been proved concerning the establishment of the state, what things are required both for the perfecting of a nation, and for the perfecting of its condition, so likewise it is understood from this, what sort of an intellect ought to be attributed to a nation as such and consequently how it ought to be perfected, in order that a nation be in itself reputed cultured, and in what sense intellectual virtues must be applied to nations, that they may suit it as a nation and that that, which belongs to a nation as such, may be distinguished from that which comes from the individuals to it.
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§ 57. How we must look to a nation in the improving of the will
§ 54.
§ 57, part 2, Phil. Pract. Univ.
§ 53.
§ 56.
§ 321, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ., and § 547, part 1, Jus Nat.
Likewise since nations ought to be civilized, and therefore ought to have manners adapted to the rule of reason, and consequently to the law of nature, it is evident, as it was before, that in perfecting the will we ought to look to the purpose of the state and to those things which we need for attaining it, and therefore to direct all moral virtues to that end.
Note, § 30.
Just as in any nation we conceive an intellect peculiar to the nation as such, so also in it a will is thought of peculiar to the nation as such. Therefore just as by force of intellect it knows those things which are necessary to the perfection of itself and its form of government, so there ought to be produced a fixed and continual desire to strive after those things which produce this perfection and to avoid the things opposed to it. And hence we must decide what virtues are especially appropriate to a nation and what sort they ought to be, and in what way all other virtues may aid them. For a certain connexion exists between moral virtues, by which one is made dependent upon the other, so that therefore Christ will pronounce him a transgressor of the whole law who transgresses one precept. Just as the intellect of a nation, so also its will is in the ruler of a state, but it passes over into the intellect and will of the individuals in their various kinds of life as if to the organs of his body. And although these things may seem lofty, and those who decide hastily concerning things viewed as through a lattice may perchance include them among the Platonic ideas; nevertheless they follow, as it were spontaneously, when those things are given which we have proved concerning the establishment of the state in the eighth part of “The Law of Nature,” so that there is need of nothing further, unless to urge that here the precepts are general. But since in this way the motives for virtues are redoubled, their cultivation likewise is facilitated, so that such arguments must not be considered to be rashly urged.
§ 58. Of the right of a nation to purchase things for itself from another nation and to sell its own goods to the other
§ 35.
§ 29.
§ 13, part 5, Jus Nat.
§ 10, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 126, part 3, and § 322, part 4, Jus Nat.
§ 128, part 1, Jus Nat.
§ 142, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ., and § 23, part 1, Jus Nat.
To every nation belongs the right to purchase for itself at a fair price the things which it needs, from other nations, which themselves have no
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need of the same, but it has not the right to sell its products to another nation without its consent. For since a nation ought to perfect itself and its condition and therefore ought to be fitted to attain the purpose of the state, and since its condition is not perfect unless it has those things which make for the accomplishment of that end, and since a sufficient livelihood is part of the purpose of the state, that is, an abundance of those things which are required for the necessity, convenience, and pleasure of life; whatever it does not itself have, it is necessary for it to procure from others. Therefore, though every man has the right to procure for himself at a fair price from others the things that he needs, nevertheless no one has the right to procure from you the things which you yourself need, and since these natural rights on account of their immutability are not, as such, taken away because nations have arisen by bringing together civil societies, the right belongs to every nation to purchase at a fair price for itself the things which it needs, from those nations who themselves have no need of the same. Which was the first point.
§ 318, part 4, Jus Nat.
But since no man can be compelled to purchase things for himself from others, or from one rather than from another, no nation has the right to sell its goods to another without its consent. Which was the second point.
§ 32.
§ 28.
§ 23, part 8, Jus Nat.
§ 322, part 4, Jus Nat.
The right indeed of purchasing goods for one’s self from other nations at a fair price, it seems, can be inferred from the right to those things without which a nation cannot preserve itself because the union cannot endure unless the individuals are preserved; nevertheless since that right has reference to the property which belongs to other nations, there should also fall upon the other nations the obligation from which this right arises, such as is the obligation to share things one with the other at a fair price.
§ 59. Of forbidding the importation of foreign goods into a territory
§ 58.
§ 850, part 1, Jus Nat.
Since no nation has the right to sell its goods to another nation without its consent, if any nation is not willing that certain foreign goods be brought into its territory, it does no wrong to the nation from which they come, consequently if the bringing in of foreign goods and their
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sale is prohibited, there are no just complaints by foreigners concerning this prohibition.
§ 440, part