Cf. Thuc. 1.73.4; 2.34.5; Aeschin. 3.181.
12 12 Wiesehöfer 2013, 281.
13 13 Heinrichs and Müller 2008, 288; Heinrichs 2017, 88–93.)
14 14 ML no. 27.
15 15 Hdt. 7.143.3, with Heinrichs 2017, 91–3; Hdt. 7.205.2–220.4.
16 16 Arr. Anab. 3.16.7–8; 7.19.1–2 with Müller 2016a, 173–187.
17 17 Cf. Aeschin. 2.172; 3.181; Lyc. Leocr. 70, 73.
18 18 Balcer 1984, 281.
19 19 Thus, Alexander I of Macedon seems to have had an arrangement with Cimon regarding his expansion into parts of Bisaltia in about 477/476 (Heinrichs 2017, 79 n.1). Later on, in the late 460s, when Cimon was tried in Athens, his opponents also relied on his activities in the past, accusing him of having been bribed by Alexander (Plut. Cim. 14.3). For Argead Macedon, obviously, the trouble did not start with the Persian presence in northern Greece but with the Athenians as the new dominating force posing a constant threat to Argead autonomy, policy, and freedom of action under Perdiccas II who found his realm surrounded by Athenian foundations, allies, and members of the Athenian Naval Confederacy (Müller 2017, 125–224).
20 20 Hdt. 7.107; Thuc. 1.98.1; Plut. Cim. 14.1.
21 21 Heinrichs 1989, 85.
22 22 Cf. Kurt Raaflaub, “with few exceptions, the entire range of the Athenian instruments of empire was derived from Persian models” 2009, 97.
23 23 Isoc. Pan. 117–118; Plut. Cim. 13.4–5.
24 24 Invented: Rhodes 2006, 185. Informal: Heinrichs, loc. cit.
25 25 Xen. Hell. 2.1.27–28; Diod. Sic. 13.105–106.
26 26 Welwei 2006, 535–536.
27 27 Xen. Ages. 1.6–7; Hell. 3.4.1, 5; Nep. Ages. 2.1–2.
28 28 Nep. Ages. 3.1–2; Hell. Oxy. 14.1–16.2; 24.1–25.4.
29 29 McKechnie and Kern 1988, 181.
30 30 Satrapal coins bearing the legend and showing his portrait on the obverse, support the view that the naval campaign was financed by Persia.
31 31 Xen. Hell. 5.1.35–36; Diod. Sic. 14.110.3; cf. Cawkwell 1981a. Koine Eirene: Jehne 1994.
32 32 Dem. 15.3; Diod. Sic. 16.21.1–4 with Cawkwell 1981b, 52–55; Rhodes and Osborne no. 22.
33 33 Anab. 2.14.1–2 with Olbrycht 2010c, 350. Arrian, however, problematically refers to a letter written by Darius III to Alexander. Its authenticity is uncertain. But the historical kernel, namely the alliance, might have been trustworthy.
34 34 Wirth 1985, 148–150; Worthington 2008, 170; Müller 2010, 179.
35 35 Plut. Alex. 10.1–3, Ruzicka 2010, 4–11.
36 36 Arr. Anab. 1.23.6–8; Strab. 14.2.17; cf. Ruzicka 1992, 136–139.
37 37 Heckel 2006, 162; Panovski and Sarakinski 2011, 8.
38 38 Revolts: Aesch. 3.239; Din. 1.10; Hyp. 5.17; Diod. Sic. 17.7.2. Demosthenes: Wirth 1999, 75.
39 39 Philip: Flower 2000; Squillace 2010. The generals: Heckel 2016a, 53–55.
40 40 Ashley 1998, 91. The fleet disbanded: Diod. Sic. 17.22.5; Arr. Anab. 2.20.1. Revived: Curt. 3.1.19; Arr. Anab. 3.2.6.
41 41 Heckel and McLeod 2015, 260.
42 42 Heckel 2006, 65; the citiation, Ruzicka 1988, 134.
43 43 The citation, Ruzicka 1988, 144. Levantine events: Ruzicka 2012, 206.
44 44 Scythians: Diod. Sic. 17.59.5, 8; Curt. 4.14.3, 15.14, 15.18; Arr. Anab. 3.8.3, 11.5–6, 13.2, 13.4. Indians: Diod. Sic. 17.59.4; Arr. Anab. 3.8.3, 8.6, 11.5–6, 15.1.
45 45 Heckel 2017a.
46 46 Bessus: Jacobs 1992. India: Bosworth 2003.
CHAPTER 3 Internal Wars from the “First Peloponnesian War” to Chaeronea
Frances Pownall
Introduction
Although the Persian invasions galvanized many of the Greek city-states in uniting, this new-found harmony was short-lived and shortly afterward the Greeks reverted to their traditional state of perennial internecine warfare, with one important difference—the stakes were now much higher. Instead of relatively small-scale campaigns where citizen armies challenged their neighbors for control of scarce agricultural land (particularly in border territories) in a single pitched infantry battle,1 the Greek world was now divided into two competing spheres of influence, ensuring that henceforth internal wars were to become lengthy large-scale campaigns.
In response to the Persian threat, the Athenians developed the largest navy in the Greek world. Even more importantly, the Persian Wars instilled into the Athenians the mindset that not only could they protect their fellow Greeks from any possible Persian repercussions, but that as the saviors of Greece they were entitled to exercise hegemony over them (Aesch. Pers. 233–234; Hdt. 7.139; Thuc. 1.73–75.1, 5.89, 6.83.2). The foundation of the Delian League (so named after the organization’s headquarters on the island of Delos, site of an important pan-Ionian sanctuary) in 478/477 afforded the Athenians leadership over willing allies.2 Athenian control over the allied naval forces as well as the annual tribute of those allies who did not contribute ships (Thuc. 1.96.2) soon gave them the ability to rival the Spartans’ military dominance in Greece through leadership of the Peloponnesian League. As Thucydides observes (1.18.2–3), not long after the Persian Wars the Greek world became divided between two great powers, Athens on the sea and Sparta on land, each heading a coalition of allies. The military polarization between the two soon shaded into the realm of ideology, as the Spartans tended to favor oligarchic governments and the Athenians democratic ones. When the uneasy alliance forged during the Persian Wars began to fray, the stage was set for a major confrontation between Athens and Sparta, each of which now possessed the manpower and the resources to wage extensive year-round campaigns far beyond their borders throughout the Greek world.
The “First Peloponnesian War” (460–446/445)
Although the Spartans at first acquiesced in the Athenian leadership of a maritime naval alliance,3 it soon became apparent that the Athenians had their own increasingly imperialistic interests in mind at least as much as action against the Persians, the ostensible purpose of the Delian League.4 According to Thucydides, our main source for the period between the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War (the so-called Pentekontaetia or “Fifty Years”), the early years of the Delian League were marked not only by naval campaigns against Persia, but also by the increasingly heavy-handed Athenian treatment of their allies, including the forcible subjugation of members of the League who attempted to secede (Thuc. 1.98–100). Thucydides’ terse narrative is tendentious, however, and deliberately shaped to support his contention that the “truest cause” (as he put it) of the Peloponnesian War was the growth of Athenian power and the fear it engendered in the Spartans (1.23.6). For what it is worth, the Spartans also experienced difficulty in maintaining control over their Peloponnesian allies in the decades following the Persian Wars.5 Nevertheless, despite the appearance of cracks in the truce between Sparta and Athens (most notably the Spartan opposition to the Athenian rebuilding of their city walls and the alleged secret promise of the Spartans to support the Thasians in their revolt by invading Attica),6 open hostility did not break out until the Spartans dismissed the Athenian commander Cimon and his troops who had come to assist them in suppressing the helot revolt at Mount Ithome (Thuc. 1.101–102).
This unceremonious dismissal had far-reaching consequences, for the Athenians renounced their existing alliance with the Spartans, and energetically proceeded to make alliances with Sparta’s traditional enemy of Argos as well as Thessaly (Thuc. 1.102.3). They also accepted an alliance