vulnerable to conquest in 338 by the capable and ambitious Philip of Macedon. Ironically, it was Philip who united the fractious Greek city-states under his leadership, forcing them to come full circle in his planned campaign against Persia (eventually carried out by his son Alexander the Great), where they would be revenged for their suffering during the Persian wars.
Notes
1 1 This “traditional” view of early intra-Greek conflicts (see e.g. Ober 1996; Hanson 2000 and 2009, 27–39; Schwartz 2009, 102–146 and 226–230; cf. Thuc. 1.15) has been challenged, on the grounds that the hoplite phalanx did not develop fully until the Classical period (van Wees 2000), its origins possibly retrojected into the Archaic Period as a nostalgic response to the destructive nature of contemporary warfare (Krentz 2002, 25). For a succinct overview of the controversy, see Lee 2006, 484–486; cf. Chapter 6 in this volume.
2 2 As Hornblower (2011, 12) observes, Thucydides (1.95.1) offers both a negative and a positive motive for the Ionian approach to the Athenians: resentment of the oppressive behavior of the Spartan regent Pausanias and recognition of the Athenians’ traditional status as mother city of the Ionians.
3 3 As Thucydides implies (1.75.2, 1.95.7; see also Xen. Hell. 6.5.34), but cf. 1.92.1 and evidence from other authors suggests otherwise: Hdt. 8.3.2 (on this passage, see Munson 2001, 214–217); [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 23.2; Plut. Arist. 23.2. Diodorus (11.50) may be correct that the Spartans themselves were divided on this point; see Hornblower 2011, 8–10.
4 4 Thuc. 1.96.1, who states that the League was founded in order to get revenge on the Persians by ravaging their land; it is generally assumed that the League had a defensive purpose as well as an offensive one (Rhodes 2010, 19), and that it offered the Athenians a pretext (proschema) for leadership over the Greeks (Hornblower 2011, 12–13).
5 5 Herodotos’ reference (9.35.2) to Spartan battles in the 470s and 460s at Tegea and Dipaea suggests the presence of anti-Spartan movements in the Peloponnese (cf. Thuc. 1.118.2); see Lewis 1992a, 104–108.
6 6 On the tension created by the rebuilding of the walls, see Thuc. 1.89.3–93. The tradition that the Spartans were prevented from coming to the Thasians’ aid by a devastating earthquake and ensuing helot revolt is probably a later invention designed to explain why they did not seize the opportunity to nip nascent Athenian imperialism in the bud; Rhodes 2018, 47; cf. Rhodes 2010, 31.
7 7 Lewis 1997; Hornblower 2011, 25–26.
8 8 Harrison 2006: 518. Hornblower (2011, 26–29) observes that the Spartans were also jostling for position with the Athenians for influence at Delphi.
9 9 So Lewis 1997, 75–76.
10 10 An Athenian casualty list (IG I3 1147) records the campaigns of Halieis, Aegina, and Megara as occurring in a single year, either 460 or 459 (on the date, see ML no. 33 and Rhodes 2010, 50).
11 11 The original impetus for the outbreak of hostilities was rivalry between Athens and Corinth, rather than Spartan hostility toward Athens; so Holladay 1977 and Lewis 1997 contra De Ste. Croix 1972, esp. 187–190.
12 12 Hornblower (2011, 28–29, 32) is almost certainly correct that the object of the Spartan intervention was to restore their influence at Delphi.
13 13 So Diodorus 11.81.2–3, supported by Justin 3.6.10; see Badian 1993, 213 and Hornblower 2011, 32–33.
14 14 Probably in 457; on the date, see Rhodes 2010, 50.
15 15 On the problems associated with the dating of this truce, see Green 2006, 165 n. 351.
16 16 The so-called Second Sacred War; cf. Pownall 1998, 36–38 and Hornblower 2011, 28–29, 35.
17 17 The date can be calculated from Thucydides 2.2.1, 2.21.1; cf. Rhodes 2010, 57.
18 18 Thuc. 1.35.2, 1.40.2, 1.44.2; cf. Hornblower 2011, 36.
19 19 On the Samian Revolt, see Thuc. 1.115.2–117; Diod. Sic. 12.27–29; Plut. Per. 24.1–2, 25–28; cf. Shipley 1987, 113–122 and Hornblower 2011, 36–37. For the war atrocities that the Athenians were alleged to have committed on their prisoners, see Duris of Samos, FGrH 76 FF 66 and 67. As Hornblower (2011, 37) observes, Thucydides ends his Pentekontaetia here, because “Samos was the last big violation of autonomy which Athens was to get away with”.
20 20 Thuc. 1.44.2; cf. the careful financial preparations laid out in the Callias decrees, ML no. 58.
21 21 On Thucydides’ downplaying of the grievances of Aegina and Megara, see Hornblower 2011, 112–114.
22 22 On the war strategy on both sides, see Rhodes 2010, 101–106 and Hornblower 2011, 157–160.
23 23 For the reaction of the other Greeks to the surrender of the Spartan hoplites at Sphacteria, see Thuc. 4.40.
24 24 Thuc. 4.75–76; cf. Buck 1994, 16–18.
25 25 Thuc. 4.89–101.2 with Lendon 2005, 78–90.
26 26 So Lewis 1992b, 432 and Hornblower 2011, 164–165.
27 27 Thuc. 6.27–29; on the atmosphere in Athens, see Rubel 2000, 178–232 and Rhodes 2010, 166–168.
28 28 For a useful summary of the Athenian weaknesses that ultimately crippled the Sicilian expedition, see Hornblower 2011, 174–178.
29 29 On the oligarchic revolution of 411, see Rhodes 2010, 168–175 and Hornblower 2011, 178–187.
30 30 Xen. Hell. 2.2.19; Andoc. 1.80, 3.11–12; Diod. Sic. 13.107.4; Plut. Lys. 14.8.
31 31 On the effects of the Peloponnesian War, see Hornblower 2011, 190–216; cf. Welwei 2006, 535–537.
32 32 On the challenges facing Sparta in 404, see Buckler 2003, 1–3.
33 33 Xen. Hell. 2.4.1; Aeschin. 2.147–148; Diod. Sic. 14.6.2–3; cf. Buckler 2003, 5–8.
34 34 Corsi and Bernardini 2008, 33.
35 35 Xen. Hell. 3.5.2–12 (who patriotically denies that the Athenians accepted Persian gold); Hell. Oxy. 10.2; Paus. 3.9.8; Polyaenus Strat. 1.48.3.
36 36 Xen. Hell. 3.5.17–25; cf. Buckler 2003, 79–83.
37 37 Xen. Hell. 4.2.18–23 and 4.3.15–20; cf. Buckler 2003, 85–95.
38 38 On the failed peace agreements of the late 390s, see Buckler 2003, 139–152 and Rhodes 2010, 227–228.
39 39 On the King’s Peace, see Xen. Hell. 5.1.31 and 36; Diod. Sic. 14.110.2–4; cf. Badian 1991 and Buckler 2003, 166–180.
40 40 Xen. Hell. 5.4.1–12; Diod. Sic. 15.25; Buck 1994, 71–87.
41 41 On this puzzling episode, see Xen. Hell. 5.4.20–24, with Buckler 2003, 220–225 and Buckler and Beck 2008, 79–84.
42 42 Xen. Hell. 6.4.1–15; Diod. Sic. 15; cf. Buckler 2003, 289–293.
43 43 Buckler 2003, 298–299 and LaForse 2006, 544–546.
44 44 On Philip’s exploitation of his role in the Sacred War, see Buckler 1989 and Pownall 1998.
45 45 Buckler 2003, 467–477.
46 46 Dem. 18.87–94; Theopompus FGrH 115 F 292; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 162; Diod. Sic. 15.74.2–77.3; Plut. Phoc. 14.
47 47 On the so-called Fourth Sacred War, see Pownall 1998, 53–54.
48 48 Dem. 18.169–179; Aeschin. 3.14041; Philochorus FGrH 328 F 56a; Diod. Sic. 16.84; Plut. Dem. 18.
CHAPTER 4 Hellenistic Land Warfare
Edward M. Anson
Usually seen as beginning with the conquests of Alexander the Great, Hellenistic warfare in terms of armament and tactics actually began with the innovations of the conqueror’s father, Philip II. He brought changes to land warfare that were to dominate until supplanted by the Roman legions