from Asia Minor, where they were trying to liberate the Greek cities),35 that the outbreak of the Corinthian War occurred.
The war began in 395 with a dispute engineered by the Thebans between Phocis and Locris, both of whom appealed to their allies. Lysander advanced to Haliartus in Boeotia, hoping that victory there would bring a speedy end to the conflict, but was defeated and killed before Pausanias could arrive with reinforcements.36 The following year saw two large-scale hoplite battles at the Nemea River near Corinth (before the return of Agesilaus from Asia Minor) and Coronea in Boeotia (after his return).37 Sparta’s failure to gain a decisive victory resulted in a stalemate marked by ongoing conflict around Corinth for control of the isthmus. The Spartans were frustrated also in their attempts to end the war through diplomacy,38 and it was only when the Persians became alarmed by Athens’ growing naval resurgence and renewed control of the Aegean that peace was signed in 387/386.
Spartan Imperialism (387/386–371)
The King’s Peace was negotiated with the Persians by the Spartan nauarch Antalcidas. In exchange for signing over the Greeks of Asia Minor to Persia, the Spartans were given a free hand within Greece (Isoc. 4.127), and the autonomy clause at one stroke dashed the hegemonial aspirations of Thebes over Boeotia, Athens’ hopes to establish a new maritime empire, and the political union of Corinth and Argos, forcing Corinth to return to the fold of the Peloponnesian League.39 The Spartans used the authority conferred upon them to enforce the terms of the treaty to punish the Arcadian city of Mantinea for evincing insufficient loyalty during the Corinthian War (Xen. Hell. 5.2.1–7), and then to suppress the increasingly powerful Chalcidian League, led by the city of Olynthus (Xen. Hell. 5.2.11–24, 37–43, 3.1–9, 18–20, 26). Even more egregiously, in 382 the Spartans occupied the Theban acropolis, garrisoned the city, and imposed a pro-Spartan government (Xen. Hell. 5.2.25–36), a blatant violation of the autonomy clause.
This act of hybris (cf. Xen. Hell. 5.4.1) marked the climax of Spartan power and matters rapidly went downhill for them afterward. The first nail in their coffin was the recapture of the Theban acropolis by a group of exiles who had taken refuge in Athens; they assassinated the pro-Spartan rulers and forced the Spartan garrison to withdraw.40 Successive Spartan military incursions into Boeotia were limited and unsuccessful, and the attempted raid on Attica by the Spartan harmost Sphodrias succeeded only in exacerbating tensions with Athens.41 The Thebans re-established the Boeotian League and the Athenians founded a second Athenian naval confederacy, of which the Thebans were founding members. Mutual antipathy for Sparta did not make easy bedfellows, however, and the Athenians became increasingly nervous of the rapid growth of Theban power, particularly after Pelopidas’ reorganization of the Theban army around a core unit of elite warriors, the Sacred Band, led to the unexpected defeat of a larger force of Spartans at the Battle of Tegyra in 375 (Diod. Sic. 15.37; cf. 15.81.2; Plut. Pel. 16). Tensions culminated in renewed peace negotiations in 375, but the peace was short-lived thanks to continuing conflict between Sparta and Athens, as well as aggressive Theban expansion, including the destruction of Athens’ loyal ally Plataea (Isoc. 13; Paus. 9.1.8; cf. Xen. Hell. 6.3.1). In 371, both Sparta and Athens agreed to put aside their differences, and hammered out a peace agreement, which the Thebans refused to sign when the Spartans would not recognize their hegemony over Boeotia (Xen. Hell. 6.3.18–20; Diod. Sic. 15.50.4). Resolving to force the Thebans to comply with the terms of the peace, the Spartans sent an army into Boeotia, which engaged with the deepened Theban phalanx at Leuctra. Unable to cope with novel military strategy, the Spartans were severely defeated and the battle ended Sparta’s traditional hegemony of Greece.42
The Theban Hegemony (371–362)
After their decisive victory at Leuctra, the Thebans immediately struck at Spartan control of the Peloponnese with a series of successful invasions, in the course of which the Spartans witnessed their own territory devastated for the first time (Xen. Hell. 6.5.24–32; Diod. Sic.15.64–65). Worse yet, the Thebans permanently liberated Messenia (Diod. Sic. 15. 66.1; Paus. 4.27), not only putting an end to centuries of Spartan domination but also crippling Spartan infrastructure. Although the Thebans also intervened in both central and northern Greece, they did not impose direct control on their allies outside of Boeotia,43 which led to constant shifting of alliances and jockeying for position among previously subordinate states, particularly in the Peloponnese. This Peloponnesian infighting culminated at the Battle of Mantinea in 362, when despite the expectation that the battle would determine the leadership of Greece, the death of the Theban leader Epameinondas led to a stalemate, and “there was even more confusion and disorder in Greece than there had been before,” as Xenophon states in the pessimistic conclusion to his Hellenica (7.5.27).
The Road to Chaeronea (362–338)
The indecisive result of the Battle of Mantinea left a power vacuum in Greece, exploited by a new player on the scene, Philip II of Macedon, hailing from a region that was traditionally considered a backwater on the periphery of the Greek world. Upon his sudden accession to the throne in 360/359, Philip energetically began to transform Macedonia into a major power. After centralizing his kingdom and reorganizing the Macedonian army, Philip began to expand, both in the northern Aegean, where the Athenians soon became concerned about maintaining control of their grain supply, and in Thessaly, where he was invited to settle the perennial rivalry between powerful elite families. This Thessalian connection offered Philip an opportunity to intervene in central Greece, in the so-called Third Sacred War (356–346), instigated by the Thebans and the Amphictyonic League that controlled Delphi against the Phocians, who seized the sanctuary and used its resources to hire a mercenary army. A string of victories by the Phocians and their mercenaries resulted in the Thessalian summoning of Philip, who experienced a rare defeat in a first engagement in 353. The following year, however, Philip returned to Thessaly with a larger army and was victorious against the Phocian army in the Battle of the Crocus Field, which established both his control of Thessaly and his reputation as a pious defender of Apollo.44 Nevertheless, the war dragged on for another six years while Philip consolidated his gains in the north, leaving the Athenians little choice but to reluctantly sign a peace with him in 346. The same year, Philip was invited by the Thebans to march south and settle the Sacred War; the Phocians abruptly surrendered (Buckler 2003, 443–452).
The uneasy peace between Philip and Athens did not last long. The orator Demosthenes inflamed emotions in Athens against Philip,45 who responded by laying siege to two of Athens’ allies in the Chersonese and seizing an Athenian grain fleet; the Athenians thereupon renounced the peace.46 When Philip used the outbreak of the Fourth Sacred War to advance to central Greece,47 Demosthenes persuaded the panicked Athenians to forge an alliance with the Thebans.48 The combined armies of the Athenians and the Thebans attempted to bar Philip’s passage south in 338 at Chaeronea in Boeotia. The result was a resounding victory for Philip, whose 18-year-old son Alexander annihilated the Theban Sacred Band (Diod. Sic. 16.85.5–86; Justin 9.3.9–11; Polyaen. 4.2.7). The Battle of Chaeronea left Philip in control of the Greek city-states, ending their long-cherished autonomy.
Conclusion
Their victory in the Persian Wars ushered in a series of internal wars that plagued the Greek city-states for the next century and a half, rendering them unstable and ultimately unable to mount an effective defense against a new external invader. For much of the fifth century, the division of the Greek world into two power blocs, with Sparta the acknowledged military leader by land and Athens by sea, provided a modus vivendi. Eventually, however, Athens’ openly imperialistic behavior and territorial aspirations began to cause alarm among Sparta’s allies, leading inexorably to the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. The 27-year length of the war not only left both Athens and Sparta in considerably weaker positions but permanently altered the balance of power in the Greek world. In the fourth century, no individual state had the resources to achieve long-lasting hegemony, and Greece became increasingly fragmented and subject to short-lived alliances of convenience. An ongoing