this form of warfare was inexpensive. As noted, Macedon had no tradition of heavy infantry and the state, especially at the time of Philip’s accession, was not in a position to afford the equipment or pay for the training of a large force. Moreover, their training would have required more time than was typically available to the non-professional soldier. The use of hoplites was a different proposition entirely.
This use of combined forces is clearly seen in the Battle of Issus in 333 between Alexander the Great’s forces and those of Darius III (Arr. Anab. 2.8.5–11.7; Diod. Sic. 17.33–34). This clash took place in what is today southeastern Turkey very near the Gulf of Iskederun. Here the Macedonian king faced an army of far greater numbers; even though a total of 500,000–600,000 is mentioned in our sources for the total size of the Persian force (Diod. Sic. 17.33.4; Arr. Anab. 2.8.8), 100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry is a commonly suggested estimate.18 The Macedonian infantry was anchored on the right by the Hypaspists; the center was composed of the sarissa bearers, and the left wing covered by Greek allied hoplites. Alexander ordered his left wing to remain in contact with the sea in order to protect that flank from being turned by the larger Persian army. Alexander’s Companion Cavalry held the right, with the Thessalian cavalry and other Greek cavalry on the left. Those troops along the sea were to prevent the larger enemy forces from endangering his phalanx (Arr. Anab. 2.9.1).
In front of the cavalry on the right, Alexander posted the prodromoi (these were cavalry who carried longer pikes than the xysta used by the Companions), the Paeonian light cavalry armed with javelins and swords, archers, and the Agrianians. Other cavalry and archers screened the center. On Alexander’s left the light infantry comprised the Cretan archers and the light-armed Thracians. Other light-armed troops occupied the center in front of the phalanx. Numbers of Greek hoplites were kept in reserve. As the battle progressed, Alexander’s left was almost overwhelmed by the superior numbers of the Persians, but the Persian line became over-extended and a thinning occurred near its right flank. Into this weakness in the line charged the Companion Cavalry, in a wedge formation, followed by the Hypaspists. This charge, similar to the one at Chaeronea also led by Alexander, brought victory.19 The Greek mercenaries in Persian employ had held their own against the Macedonian phalanx and Alexander’s left was almost overwhelmed (Arr. Anab. 2.10.4, 11.2).
After Alexander’s death, in the great contest between Eumenes of Cardia and Antigonus Monophthalmus, the best generals among Alexander’s Successors, cavalry was again the decisive force in all three of their battles. In 319, Eumenes lost the engagement at Orcynia through the treachery of the Cardian’s cavalry commander who deserted in the the course of the battle (Diod. Sic. 18.40.5–8; Plut. Eum. 9.3). At Paraetacene three years later, it was Antigonus’ cavalry that salvaged a draw from what could have been an overwhelming defeat by exploiting a gap in Eumenes’ infantry line (Diod. Sic. 19.30.9–10) and roughly two months later won a victory by capturing Eumenes’ camp, which led to the latter’s surrender by his own forces.20
Hellenistic Innovations
While Philip’s and Alexander’s innovations changed the nature of warfare by introducing new weapons, new formations, and a greater use of combined arms, these were all, as one might say, variations on established themes. What was truly new to Hellenic warfare was the introduction of the elephant.21 Sometimes mistakenly compared to the tanks of modern warfare these impressively sized animals, however, seldom seriously affected the outcome of battle, and in some of those cases where they did, it was often to the detriment of their own army. Slingers, archers, javelin men, and caltrops were all effective against these animals, the last used effectively by Ptolemy in the Battle of Gaza in 312 (Diod. Sic. 19.84.4). Alexander the Great in his Battle on the Hydaspes River used his light infantry to kill the animals’ drivers and to surround the elephants, which were now injured by the javelins (Arr. Anab. 5.17.3). In 316, Antigonus Monophthalmus’ cavalry archers in the Battle of Paraetacene rode out of range and inflicted severe injuries on Eumenes of Cardia’s elephants (Diod. Sic. 19.30.2). Also, by maneuvering formations to let them pass harmlessly between the ranks and then attacking their legs and sides with javelins and swords experienced infantry would effectively negate them. Wounded or frightened elephants, unlike mechanized vehicles, had minds of their own and would often turn and injure their own forces. This was especially the case if their driver or the lead elephant was killed. Alexander faced elephants at least twice, at Gaugamela and on the Hydaspes. At Gaugamela, 15 were stationed in front of the Persian infantry (Arr. Anab. 3.11.6), but it has been argued that this is in error since they are only mentioned by Arrian and are never listed as engaging in the battle.22 They were, however, fully engaged on the Hydaspes. In 190, in the Battle of Magnesia, the Seleucid King Antiochus’ phalanx under attack on its flanks and rear formed a square with elephants in its center. The Roman ally, the Pergamene King Eumenes had his archers and slingers concentrated their fire on the elephants, causing them to panic and run through the Seleucid infantry destroying the cohesion of the square (App. Syr. 6.35).
Those actions where elephants proved effective were most often against forces unfamiliar with them. This was especially the case with horses who were commonly terrified of these animals unless they had previously been acclimated to them.23 In 275, in a battle between an invading force of Gauls and an army hastily assembled by Antiochus I, the Seleucid king, the elephants proved to be the source of the Seleucid victory. Antiochus was caught by surprise by the Gallic invasion. The Gauls had a sizable force of heavy infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and 240 war chariots. Against this formidable force the Seleucid king could muster only a small force mostly of skirmishers and light-armed troops, but also 16 elephants. The latter were arranged on the flanks and in the center to meet the chariots. Apparently the Gauls had never before encountered elephants. Even before they were within arrow range, they turned and fled the field (Lucian, Zeuxis 8–11). These battles where elephants proved effective would also include Pyrrhus’ first victory over the Romans at the Battle of Heraclea in 280. Here, as the battle reached a stalemate, Pyrrhus brought forth his elephants, which to this point had been held in reserve. The Roman cavalry had no experience with these creatures and fled before them, resulting in the rout of the Roman forces (Plut. Pyrrh. 17.3). Subsequently, the Romans in their contests against Pyrrhus negated their effectiveness through the methods already described.
There are few cases where elephants were used effectively against forces familiar with their presence. The most notable of these is the Battle at Ipsos in 301 where they were partially responsible for the victory of Lysimachus and Seleucus over their rival Antigonus Monophthalmus. The elephants blocked the return of Antigonus’ cavalry, which, while victorious over that of the opposition, had over-pursued the fleeing enemy, leaving one flank of the phalanx unprotected. The result was the defeat and death of Antigonus (Plut. Demetr. 28–30). Elephants were also one key in the Roman victory over the Macedonians at the Battle of Pydna, where they faced forces familiar with them, but despite the usual counter measures, nonetheless proved effective (see the section on Later Battles: Raphia, Magnesia, and Pydna).
In the years that followed the great conqueror’s death, cavalry continued to retain their importance, but seldom again became the “Hammer” envisioned by Philip and executed by Alexander. The numbers of heavy cavalry steadily decreased over time. This was not the case, however, during what is called the Second War of the Successors, fought from 320 to late 316.24 In what was probably the best documented battle of the entire Hellenistic era, heavy cavalry proved the salvation of what might have been a devastating loss for one of the parties. In late October or early November of 316, the armies of Eumenes and Antigonus drew up for battle in the Median district of Paraetacene, located somewhere on the fringes of the Dasht-i Kavir, likely southwest of the modern city of Isfahan. Antigonus’ army contained 28,000 heavy infantry, 15,000 light infantry,25 10,600 cavalry of whom approximately 6,900 were light cavalry, and 65 elephants; while Eumenes’ forces numbered 35,000 infantry,26 of whom 17,000 were heavily armed, approximately 2,000 heavy cavalry, 4,300 light, and 125 elephants. Both armies were of Asian majority. While Antigonus’ phalanx was likely mostly Macedonian, much of the rest of his forces, especially the light-armed infantry and cavalry, were recruited in Asia, and Eumenes’ heavy infantry was largely