129–131, and Chapter 14 in this volume.
34 34 Some light infantry units are not clearly differentiated.
35 35 These Ptolemaic peltasts are not to be confused with peltasts of the Classical Age who were light-armed troops, most often armed with javelins. In the Antigonid army, the peltasts were the elite of the phalanx (Walbank 1957–1979, 1.274, 390).
36 36 The difficulty is that if the 25,000 figure represents an additional force of sarissai bearers, they are not specifically noted in Polybius’ delineation of the Ptolemaic forces at the actual battle. If the 25,000 phalangites include the 20,000 Egyptians and represent a total of these and the Libyans and perhaps another 2,000 others, the math works, but does not coincide with Polybius’ overall total of 70,000 infantry. The 70,000 figure is likely accurate. In the actual battle it is the charge of the phalanx troops under the command Andromachus and Sosibius that carries the day. The unspecified 25,000 are earlier listed under the command of Andromachus (Polyb. 5.65.3) and the 20,000 Egyptians under that of Sosibius (Polyb. 5.65.10).
37 37 Polybius also states that the Indian elephants were intimidating because of their greater size and strength. It is now generally conceded that this was a myth and that the African elephants likely used by Ptolemy were from Eritrea. These are large “savanna” elephants and consequently larger than their Indian counterparts (Brandt 2014, 82–90).
38 38 For a modern detailed account of this battle, see Bar-Kochva 1976, 132–137.
39 39 Appian (Syr. 6.32) relates that there were 22 elephants on the flanks of each section.
40 40 Livy states that Antiochus had 54 elephants (Liv. 39.37.13), with both wings having 16 and 18 interspersed in the phalanx, there are two missing. These may be on either end of the phalanx.
41 41 Appian (Syr. 6.32) calls these troops cavalry. While their positioning far on the right wing might appear peculiar, Livy (37.40.7) is clear that these are infantry (Briscoe 1981, 349).
42 42 Hippotoxotai. Appian (Syr. 6.32) records 200 Dahae.
43 43 Cytaea was a town on the Caspian Sea.
44 44 Elymais was a region located near the Persian Gulf.
45 45 Appian records 30,000, Livy gives no total, the units identified in Livy add up to 29,000.
46 46 Appian (Syr. 6.31) says that the Romans occupied the right with the Latins on their left, but Livy’s account of the battle makes this impossible.
47 47 These were apparently peltasts in the traditional sense. The unit included the Achaean Caetrati who were armed with “slings, javelins, and other light ordinance” (Liv. 31.36.1, 35.27.5).
48 48 See Briscoe 1981, 347–348.
49 49 Liv. 39.37; App. Syr. 6.31.
50 50 These were apparently the much-maligned African elephants (Liv. 39.37.13).
51 51 Harl (2008, 260) states that Antiochus’ charge came after the extensive Roman attack on the phalanx, but Livy’s account divides the action into three theaters: front, left, and right. Therefore, even though Antiochus’ charge on the right wing is placed after the Roman infantry attack, it likely occurred at the same time as that of the chariots and light cavalry on the left. Justin (31.8.6) has the Antiochean force routing the Roman legion on the right wing. This is accepted by Bar-Kochva (1976, 170), but rejected by Harl.
52 52 App. Syr. 6.33; Liv. 37.41.10–11.
53 53 In 149 a pretender to the Macedonian throne, claiming to be the son of the last king, raised a brief revolt against Roman authority. He was defeated in 148 in a second Battle of Pydna.
54 54 Liv. 42.51.3; cf. Plut. Aem. 13.3.
55 55 According to Frontinus this was the result of the deliberate strategy of the Roman commander to lure the Macedonians onto broken ground.
CHAPTER 5 Greek Warfare in Sicily
Melanie Jonasch
The historiography of Sicily between the eighth and third centuries recounts numerous violent conflicts over territorial control, political power, and social hierarchy. The expansion of Greek settlements on an inhabited island naturally led to war, just as city-state formation and consolidation led to competitive struggles and civil unrest. Because of the favorable position of Sicily and its natural resources, Sicilian Greeks confronted Mediterranean rivals, including Carthage and Athens, and later Rome.
During the initial stages of colonization, the struggle for land and resources took the form of widespread raids. Women and other non-combatants were affected only when seized as booty by the winners. At the end of the sixth century, when rival ambitions for political domination arose, battles came to involve larger numbers, specialized forces, elaborate equipment, and greater devastation and casualties. Such conflicts could be calamitous for the populace, who might be killed or sold into slavery after their cities were besieged and devastated. Often, however, conquered cities were disenfranchised and made tributary, and the civilian population did not materially suffer under the change of authority. By the fifth century, warfare in Sicily depended mainly on mercenaries and allies from non-Greek Sicilian settlements, mainland Greece, and Italy. Although mercenaries featured in Classical and Hellenistic warfare throughout the Mediterranean, Sicilian cities in particular relied on them. This policy guaranteed troop allegiance and prevented military coups by citizen armies. Yet reliance on mercenaries had far-reaching consequences when they attempted to integrate themselves locally after their military service.
Indeed, the average Greek Sicilian was likely affected less by combat than by preventive and preparatory military measures and by the social unrest caused by foreign troops. Warfare was costly, especially when mercenaries were involved. Even in times of peace, leaders resettled entire city populations to meet land or manpower requirements, and new settlers were imported to reinforce populations. Numerous domestic conflicts over political hegemony, property, and constitutional forms resulted from this social instability. While town defenses displayed the strength of the polis to outsiders and protected the citizenry, they also reflected social organization and stratification. Out of town, strategic requirements shaped the landscape through the construction of new towns, military outposts, and border sanctuaries in key positions.
Warfare changed significantly between the eighth and third centuries. From at least the fifth century, cavalry, archers, and slingers commonly fought alongside hoplites. Because Sicily is an island with many harbors, naval warfare played as important a role as ground combat. Siege equipment such as ramps, towers, and artillery were used by the Carthaginians and Greeks by the late fifth century, and complex siege walls were built, as at Syracuse during the Athenian Expedition in 413. Dionysius the Elder later initiated a series of improvements such as increasing the size and power of warships. The late fifth and fourth centuries also witnessed a major evolution in fortification, of which Hermocrates’ fortress at Selinus and the Euryalus fortress of Syracuse are prime examples. When the Romans besieged Syracuse in 214, they faced not only formidable fortifications but also the military inventions of the Syracusan engineer Archimedes.
The following account of violent conflicts in Sicily focuses on various Greek parties and their inter- and intracultural conflicts on the island, but includes the previously mentioned regional powers (Carthage, Athens, and Rome). The concluding section deals with social unrest and domestic conflicts. This artificial arrangement should not obscure the fact that several kinds of parties might participate in a given struggle. For example, Selinus and Carthage allied with one another against Syracuse and Acragas in 480 (Diod. Sic. 13.55.1), and in the mid-fifth century Hybla considered and then rejected an alliance with Sicels led by Ducetius (Diod. Sic. 11.88.6). Appeals to origin and ethnicity could justify military action or the creation of alliances and military support.
The main sources for this reconstruction are Thucydides, Herodotus, Diodorus, Polyaenus, Polybius, Plutarch’s Lives, and various fragments of the Greek historians. Archaeological evidence is considered whenever possible.1